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Introduction: International Humanitarian Law and 
Areas of Limited Statehood  
Heike Krieger, Björnstjern Baade and Linus Mührel 
IHL needs to cover increasingly diverse forms of armed conflict. While its 
main structural features were conceived in the 19th and 20th century against 
the background of a predominant narrative of war conducted on a battlefield 
between armies and navies of sovereign States, the effectiveness of its legal 
rules has been constantly challenged by recurring changes in the conduct of 
warfare. During the last twenty-five years, the predominance of intra-State 
conflicts and the militarisation of terrorism has led to a focus on 
asymmetrical conflicts and NIACs. In recent years, challenges stem from 
the increasingly blurred lines between armed conflicts and more subversive 
forms of the use of force, as symbolised by the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’. 
For maintaining its effectiveness, IHL needs to respond to changing social 
realities and thus accommodate new phenomena. Accordingly, changing 
conflict paradigms as well as the development of new technologies and 
corresponding strategies have tested the adaptability of existing rules and 
pushed for new rules, mostly laid down in treaty obligations.  
However, since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
1977 Additional Protocols, new treaties on the conduct of warfare have not 
been concluded. Instead, the international community has accommodated 
new phenomena through customary international law, interpretation and a 
focus on compliance. In particular, international tribunals have developed 
the rules of IHL in their jurisprudence and both the ICRC and the UN SC 
have focused on the enforcement of and compliance with IHL. Despite 
these efforts, including the establishment of the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
ICC, there is a widespread perception of a crisis of IHL. Some observers 
hold that its rules cannot sufficiently direct the behaviour of relevant 
actors.1 In order to counter the perception of such a trend the ICRC has 
____________________ 
1  Cf ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict’ UN Doc S/2017/414 (10 May 2017) 3, 7 et seq; Ian Clark et al, ‘Crisis 
in the laws of war? Beyond compliance and effectiveness’ (2017) European 




changed its publicity strategy and aims to shed more light on successful 
cases of compliance.2 One may assume that this policy change reflects the 
understanding that the effectiveness and the legitimacy of norms are 
mutually reinforcing.3 While emphasising that the rules of IHL are still 
effective might contribute to an increase in compliance, challenges to their 
legitimacy also need to be addressed in order to further compliance.4  
The interplay between effectiveness and legitimacy as an important 
precondition for norm-compliance in IHL can be made explicit by focusing 
on the challenges which stem from areas of limited statehood. The present 
volume considers the impact such areas have on IHL and it inquires whether 
IHL can be adapted to meet challenges emerging from them in a way that 
is perceived as legitimate.  
While the term ‘areas of limited statehood’ (A.) as such is only seldom 
used in legal discourse, areas of limited statehood have had a discernable 
impact on various developments that affect international law.5 Regarding 
IHL, various challenges stem from the territorial State’s limited capabilities 
and the need to compensate for them through other actors, in particular other 
States, international organisations and NGOs. Armed non-State actors’ 
exercise of governance functions poses the most problems in this context 
(B.). How has IHL responded to these challenges so far? Or has a lack of 
responsiveness created legitimacy problems (C.)? These and other 
questions were probed by the contributions to this volume (D.). As a whole, 
the contributions reveal the dilemma that by trying to improve legitimacy 
and effectiveness for some actors, the same might be reduced for others. 
____________________ 
7/1354066117714528> accessed 13 December 2017 (hereafter Clark et al, 
‘Crisis in the laws of war?’).  
2  For further reading, see Juliane Garcia Ravel, ‘Changing the narrative on inter-
national humanitarian law’ (Humanitarian Law & Policy, 24 November 2017) 
<http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/11/24/changing-the-narrative-on-in-
ternational-humanitarian-law/> accessed 13 December 2017. 
3  Heike Krieger ‘Governance by armed groups: Caught in the legitimacy trap?’ in 
Cord Schmelzle and Eric Stollenwerk (eds), Virtuous or Vicious Circle? 
Governance Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood, 
Special Issue (under review).  
4  Heike Krieger (ed), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law 
(CUP 2015) (hereafter Krieger, Inducing Compliance). 
5  For further reading, see Heike Krieger, ‘International Legal Order’ in Tanja 
Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance and Limited Statehood (OUP 2018, forthcoming) (hereafter 
Krieger, ‘International Legal Order’). 
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A. Areas of Limited Statehood6 
Areas of limited statehood constitute those parts of a State in which the 
government lacks the capability to implement and enforce rules and 
decisions or in which they do not command a legitimate monopoly over the 
means of violence.7 The term does not imply the extinction of a State (as a 
whole or in a certain area). The area still de jure belongs to the State, but its 
internal sovereignty there is de facto tenuous. 
The term ‘areas of limited statehood’ describes an empirical phenomenon 
which has to be distinguished from normative concepts such as ‘unwilling 
and unable’ or ‘failed’ States.8 These concepts are closely related to the 
phenomenon of securitisation and may thus be understood as tools of States 
of the Global North to push their specific interests in law-making processes, 
for instance in relation to re-interpretations of the right to self-defence. In 
contrast, the term ‘areas of limited statehood’ neither implies a normative 
judgment that a State has failed nor suggests that State failure would be the 
definite result of a process.9 It is meant as a neutral analytical tool that 
avoids negative connotations and opens the door for an analysis from 
different perspectives. These can include the questions whether and to what 
extent the limitedness of statehood is compensated by other actors, what 
kind of governance they may perform, and how effective those governance 
functions are.10 The term is also broader in the sense that only certain policy 
____________________ 
6  This part draws from Krieger, ‘International Legal Order’ (n 5). 
7  Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude, ‘Governance in Areas of Limited 
Statehood: Conceptual Clarifications and Major Contributions of the Handbook’ 
in Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Governance and Limited Statehood (OUP 2018, forthcoming) (hereafter 
Börzel, Risse and Draude, ‘Governance in Areas of limited Statehood’). 
8  Ibid.  
9  Note that also e.g. Görlitzer Park in Berlin Kreuzberg can be qualified as an area 
of limited Statehood, see Börzel, Risse and Draude, ‘Governance in Areas of 
limited Statehood’. 
10  Cf Klaus Schlichte, ‘A Historical Sociological Perspective on Statehood’ in 
Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance and Limited Statehood (OUP 2018, forthcoming); Andrew Brandel 
and Shalini Randeria, ‘Anthropological Perspectives on the Limits of the State’ 
in Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (eds), The Oxford Handbook 




areas or parts of one or more States might be affected.11 Another advantage 
is that the limitedness of statehood is empirically measurable according to 
certain factors, including administrative capacity and monopoly of force.12 
While the term ‘areas of limited statehood’, which was conceived by 
political scientists in the Collaborative Research Centre 700 ‘Governance 
in areas of limited Statehood’, has so far only seldom been used in legal 
discourse, it is by now gradually adopted because of its more neutral 
connotations.13 
B. Legal Issues when other Actors Step in 
Areas of limited statehood generally are not simply ungoverned.14 Other 
actors regularly step in to perform government functions: other States, 
international organisations and non-State actors, including non-State armed 
groups and NGOs, have the potential to, and do, exercise effective and long-
term regulatory power in such areas.15 This has raised questions concerning 
the international legal obligations of non-State actors, international 
organisations and of States acting extraterritorially. The relevance of non-
State practice and the possibility of a change in the structure of the law-
making process that weakens or even undermines the primacy of State 
consent as the traditional foundation of positive international law-making, 
in order to improve the law’s legitimacy towards non-State actors, has also 
become a contentious issue.  
____________________ 
11  Thomas Risse and Ursula Lehmkuhl, ‘Governance in Areas of Limited 
Statehood – New Modes of Governance?’, Research Program of the 
Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 (Berlin 2006) 9. 
12  Eric Stollenwerk, ‘Measuring Governance and Limited Statehood’ in Tanja 
Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance and Limited Statehood (OUP 2018, forthcoming). 
13  See e.g. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies of KU Leuven, in 
particular the research projects on ‘human rights, democracy and rule of law’, 
‘peace and security’, and ‘non-state actors’ <https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs> 
accessed 13 December 2017. 
14  This part draws from Krieger, ‘International Legal Order’ (n 5). 
15  Cf various chapters in in Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood (OUP 2018, forth-
coming), e.g. Markus Lederer, ‘External State Actors’; Benedetta Berti, ‘Violent 
and Criminal Non-State Actors’; Marianne Beisheim, Annekathrin Ellersiek, 
and Jasmin Lorch, ‘INGOs and Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships’. 
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I. Other States and International Organisations   
With third States and international organisations, difficulties arise in the 
classification of armed conflicts and the determination of the applicable 
human rights standards. These uncertainties endanger these actors’ 
compliance and, more generally, the relevance of the law to the situation on 
the ground in areas of limited statehood, and thus its effectiveness 
1) Fluidity of armed conflicts 
The interventions of third States in internal armed conflicts in areas of 
limited statehood triggered a debate concerning the classification of those 
armed conflicts, which directly relates to IHL’s effectiveness in these 
conflicts. Since the law of IAC provides a framework of detailed treaty rules 
as well as widely accepted customary law rules, it is prima facie better 
suited to effectively govern the conduct of States. In contrast, the law of 
NIAC only consists of a few treaty rules and the customary law status of 
several rules is contested. Intervening States will have fewer legal standards 
to guide their conduct if the conflict is classified as non-international. Thus, 
IHL becomes potentially less effective due to a lack of legal certainty which 
regime applies. 
The debate around these so-called ‘internationalised’ NIACs focuses on 
two issues. On the one hand, it concerns the relation between the intervening 
State and the territorial State. On the other hand, it deals with the relation 
between the intervening State and the non-State armed group(s). 
In cases in which the territorial State consented to the use of force of 
another State against a non-State armed group in its own territory, it is 
widely agreed that there exists a NIAC between the extraterritorially acting 
State and the non-State armed group. Thus, only the law of NIAC is 
applicable to this situation. In case of a lack of consent by the territorial 
State, however, it is highly controversial whether in addition to the NIAC 
between the intervening State and the non-State armed group(s) there exists 
a parallel IAC between the territorial State and the intervening State. In this 
case then also the law of IAC would apply between the territorial State and 
the extraterritorially acting State, i.e. the conduct of the extraterritorially 
acting State could underlie the law of IAC, too. This debate gained much 
attention after the US-led coalition and Turkey inter alia started to carry out 
air-strikes against ISIS and other Islamic terrorist groups in Syria and to 
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support other non-State armed groups fighting ISIS in the absence of Syria’s 
consent.16 
While some emphasise that the extraterritorial use of force affects the 
local population and the territorial State’s infrastructure to argue for the 
existence of a parallel IAC,17 others mention the lack of practicality of the 
application of the rules of IAC.18 
In addition, the debate concerning the extent of control that a State must 
have over a non-State armed group to render a NIAC between the non-State 
armed group and the territorial State into an IAC between the intervening 
State and the territorial State is still ongoing with no end in sight.19 Whereas 
the ICJ upholds its more restrictive effective control test,20 the ICTY 
follows its broader overall control test.21 
____________________ 
16  See the various blog-posts on this issue eg Adil Ahmad Haque, ‘The United 
States is at War with Syria (according to the ICRC’s New Geneva Convention 
Commentary)’ (EJIL Talk!, 8 April 2016) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-united-
states-is-at-war-with-syria-according-to-the-icrcs-new-geneva-convention-
commentary/> accessed 17 November 2017; Ryan Goodman, ‘Is the United 
States Already in an “International Armed Conflict” with Syria?’ (Just Security, 
11 October 2016) <https://www.justsecurity.org/33477/united-states-interna-
tional-armed-conflict-syria/> accessed 17 November 2017; Ryan Goodman, 
‘International Armed Conflict in Syria and the (Lack of) Official Immunity for 
War Crimes’ (Just Security, 18 October 2016) <https://www.justsecu-
rity.org/33670/international-armed-conflict-syria-lack-of-official-immunity-
war-crimes/> accessed 17 November 2017. 
17  Tristan Ferraro and Lindsey Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the 
Convention’ in ICRC (ed), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field (2nd edn, CUP 2016) paras 257 et seq (hereafter 
Ferraro and Cameron, ‘Article 2’). 
18  For further reading, see Terry D. Gill, ‘Classifying the Conflict in Syria’ (2016) 
92 ILS 353; Claus Kreß, ‘Some Reflections on the International Legal 
Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts’ (2010) 15 JCSL 245, 
255 et seq. 
19  Ferraro and Cameron, ‘Article 2’ (n 17) paras 265 et seq. 
20  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 
43, paras 392–393; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States of America) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 
115. 
21  Prosecutor v Tadic (Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) paras 120 et seq. 
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2) Human rights in areas of limited statehood 
The lack of legal certainty surrounding the question if and to what extent 
IHRL applies to State and non-State actors is exacerbated by all actors’ 
potential incapacity to fully comply with their legal obligations. In areas of 
limited statehood, the States concerned are often incapable to protect 
(certain) human rights, in particular in unstable security situations. If other 
States, international organisations or non-State actors step in and take over 
government functions, the question arises by which (international) legal 
obligations other than IHL they are bound, and how those obligations 
interplay with IHL obligations. In that manner, legal uncertainty and factual 
obstacles to compliance challenge the legitimacy, and in turn the effectivity, 
of international law in areas of limited statehood. 
In the last 15 years, extensive debates on the extraterritorial application 
of intervening States’ human rights obligations have been held.22 Starting 
with the Bankovic decision,23 the ECtHR has, in a long line of 
jurisprudence, developed criteria to establish the extraterritorial application 
of the ECHR.24 The approach basically still focuses on the question of how 
to define the degree of control which a State must exercise abroad so as to 
justify the application of the international or regional human rights 
obligations it has contracted.25 While the extraterritorial application of 
human rights may in principle arise for all State activities in an 
____________________ 
22  UN HRC, ‘Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the United 
States of America’ (23 April 2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/4; Marco 
Milanovic, ‘Harold Koh’s Legal Opinions on the US Position on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties’ (EJIL: Talk, 7 March 
2014) referring to Harold H. Koh, US Department of State, ‘Memorandum 
Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’ (19 October 2010) <https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/up-loads/2014/03/state-department-iccpr-memo.pdf> accessed 19 
October 2017.  
23  Bankovic and others v Belgium and others [GC], App no 52207/99, 12 
December 2001, paras 54 et seq. 
24  See in particular, summarizing the case law, Al-Skeini and others v the United 
Kingdom [GC], App no 55721/07, 7 July 2011, paras 130-142 (hereafter: Al-
Skeini). For further reading see Marco Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application 
of Human Rights Treaties (OUP 2011).  
25  Al-Skeini; see also: Christoph Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human 
Rights (Beck et al 2014), Article 1, paras 13-17; Heike Krieger, ‘Die 
Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands nach der EMRK für seine Streitkräfte im 




interconnected and globalised world, most decisions concerned military 
missions in areas of limited statehood, either in a state of armed conflict, 
situations of occupation, or other activities involving the deployment of 
military forces, such as in counter-piracy operations.26 
This extension of human rights treaties has forced States to adapt their 
extraterritorial conduct to human rights standards. Furthermore, it has raised 
questions concerning the relationship of IHRL to other law regimes, in 
particular IHL,27 and even the very foundations of international law.28 The 
discussions on the legality of detention in NIACs29 or the legality of targeted 
killings30 including drone strikes31 demonstrate the depth of these questions. 
____________________ 
26  Eg Loizidou v Turkey, App no 15318/89, 23 March 1995; Markovic and others 
v Italy, App no 1298/03, 14 December 2006; Medvedyev and Others v France, 
App no 3394/03, 29 March 2010; Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, 
App no 55721/07, 7 July 2011; Pisari v the Republic of Moldova and Russia, 
App no 42139/12, 21 April 2015. 
27  Heike Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship between Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law 265, reprinted in: Robert Cryer and Christian 
Henderson (eds), Law on the Use of Force and Armed Conflict, Cheltenham, 
vol. III (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007).  
28  Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? Lotus, 
Permissions and Restrictions within International Humanitarian Law’ in this 
volume 59 (hereafter Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming 
Flower?’); Manuel Brunner, ‘Security Detention by the Armed Forces of a State 
in Situations of Non-International Armed Conflict: The Search for a Legal 
Basis’ in this volume 89 (hereafter Brunner, ‘Security Detention by the Armed 
Forces of a State in Situations of NIAC’). 
29  Ibid; Vincent Widdig, ‘Detention by Organised Armed Groups in Non-
International Armed Conflicts: the Role of Non-State Actors in a State Centred 
International Legal System’ in this volume 124 (hereafter Widdig, ‘Detention 
by Organised Armed Groups in Non-International Armed Conflicts’); Pia Hesse, 
‘Comment: neither Sunken Vessel nor Blooming Flower! The Lotus Principle 
and International Humanitarian Law’ in this volume 80 (hereafter Hesse, 
‘Neither Sunken Vessel nor Blooming Flower!’); Anton O. Petrov, ‘Comment: 
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict by States – Just a Matter of 
Perspective on Areas of Limited Statehood?’ in this volume 118 (hereafter 
Petrov, ‘Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict by States’). 
30  Luise Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life in armed conflict: does international 
humanitarian law provide all the answers?’ (2006) 88 IRRC 881. 
31  Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson 
Chengeta, ‘The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed 
Drones’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 791. 
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More profoundly, while the extraterritorial application of human rights 
may contribute to the effectiveness of IHRL, it also calls into question the 
legitimacy of human rights law and its judicial institutions. The 
extraterritorial application of human rights challenges the whole concept 
that human rights are primarily meant to regulate the relationship between 
a State and the persons on its territory. As governance becomes 
disconnected from the territorially based political community, so do human 
rights. This, in turn, casts doubt on how regional human rights law can be 
transferred to certain situations, particularly armed conflicts, in which the 
State exercises governance in the territory of another State. As a result, 
human rights obligations need to be applied very flexibly to a very specific 
context, and the basic indeterminacy of human rights law is exacerbated.32 
Moreover, it is argued that the disconnect of human rights from the 
territorial political sovereign, and therefore from a specific national political 
discourse, does not improve the situation in areas of limited statehood.33 In 
fact, the extraterritorial application of human rights in areas of limited 
statehood may affect the societies in which the (human rights) courts are 
based to a much greater extent than the people subject to an extraterritorial 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
II. Armed Non-State Actors 
Regarding non-State actors taking over government functions in areas of 
limited statehood, the questions arise under which conditions these actors 
are bound by international legal obligations and whether these obligations 
may effectively govern non-State actors’ conduct. Up until now, 
international law has addressed these issues mainly in the context of 
obligations of armed groups in NIACs under IHL in general.34 But, in its 
____________________ 
32  Nehal Bhuta, ‘The Frontiers of Extraterritoriality – Human Rights Law as Global 
Law’ in Nehal Bhuta (ed), The Frontiers of Human Rights (OUP 2016) 17. 
33  Ibid, 17 et seq. 
34  For discussions on obligations under IHRL, see Andrew Clapham, Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2010); Sandesh Sivakumaran, The 
Law of Non-international Armed Conflict (OUP 2012) (hereafter Sivakumaran, 
The Law of NIAC); Sassoli and Shany, ‘Should the Obligations of States and 
Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law Really Be Equal?’ (2012) 
93 IRRC 425; Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Armed 




purpose to establish and effectively enforce binding rules that strike an 
appropriate balance between military necessity and humanity, IHL is even 
more directly challenged in areas of limited statehood. The example of the 
terrorist organisation ISIS has given renewed emphasis to the fact that 
armed non-State actors exist which totally reject international legal 
obligations.35  
However, not only the rejection of international legal obligations, total 
or in part, i.e. deliberate non-compliance, challenges IHL in areas of limited 
statehood.36 The limited capability of some non-State armed groups to 
comply with certain IHL rules casts doubt on the ‘governance’-function of 
IHL in such areas and may thwart the humanitarian purpose of IHL.37 For 
example, non-State armed groups might not be able to detain enemy fighters 
either on a factual level or legally, as well as in a manner that meets basic 
rule-of-law requirements.38 As a consequence, the non-State armed group 
might be left with no option but to either release or to kill the enemy fighter. 
Since the release of a fighter would contradict the military advantage of the 
armed group and is therefore unrealistic, the killing of the fighter, while 
constituting a war crime (cf Art. 8 (2) (e) (x) Rome Statute), might seem to 
be an option for the group.39 This example of detention in NIACs 
demonstrates that IHL’s failure to address a phenomenon that is de facto 
part of areas of limited statehood may lead to non-compliance even if non-
compliance is repressively sanctioned. 
____________________ 
35  Annyssa Bellal, ‘Beyond the Pale? Engaging the Islamic State on International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2015) YbIHL 18, 123. 
36  For further reading, see Reed M. Wood, ‘Understanding strategic motives for 
violence against civilians during civil conflict’ in Krieger, Inducing Compliance 
(n 4) 13; Zachariah Mampilly, ‘Insurgent governance in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ in Krieger, Inducing Compliance (n 4) 44.  
37  For a different perspective, see e.g. Jan Willms, ‘Courts of armed groups – a tool 
for inducing higher compliance with international humanitarian law?’ in 
Krieger, Inducing Compliance (n 4) 149. 
38  Widdig, ‘Detention by Organised Armed Groups in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’ (n 29); Marco Sassòli, ‘The Convergence of the International 
Humanitarian Law of Non-International and International Armed Conflicts - 
The Dark Side of a Good Idea’ in Giovanni Biaggini, Oliver Diggelmann and 
Christine Kaufmann (eds), Polis und Kosmopolis - Festschrift für Daniel Thürer 
(Dike/Nomos 2015) 679, 682 et seq (hereafter Sassòli, ‘The Dark Side of a Good 
Idea’). 
39  Sassòli, ‘The Dark Side of a Good Idea’ (n 38) 683 et seq. 
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The increase in NIACs after 1990 has caused numerous legal debates on 
how to best deal with armed groups and make IHL more effective. 
Continuing efforts exist to fill legal gaps in the applicable law of NIAC, e.g. 
the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study of the ICRC,40 other 
expert studies and the work of the NGO Geneva Call, which convinces non-
state armed groups to sign so-called Deeds of Commitment, aiming to 
enhance substantive standards in NIACs.41 These efforts have raised 
questions on whether and to what extent this approach by NGOs on the one 
side, and the practice of non-State armed groups on the other side should be 
included in the law-making processes.  
While some aspects of these questions are still controversially debated 
(e.g. the relevance of agreements between the parties to a NIAC under 
CA 3 (3),42 other attempts, such as the inclusion of the practice of non-State 
actors – inter alia in areas of limited statehood – in the formation of 
customary law, have been entirely rejected by States and forums 
representing a State-centric positivist approach.43 States have become aware 
of a looming shift in power to non-State actors and are now seeking to 
minimise these actors’ influence in international law-making and 
development. Reactions of that kind can, for example, be observed in 
international conferences where States emphasise that the respective 
process is ‘State-driven’.44 The ILC in its recent works on the Identification 
____________________ 
40  Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Luise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (CUP 2005) (hereafter Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 
Customary IHL 
41  For further reading, see Sivakumaran, The Law of NIAC (n 34); Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, ‘Implementing humanitarian norms through non-State armed 
groups’ in Krieger, Inducing Compliance (n 4) 125; Heike Krieger, ‘Conclusion: 
where States fail, non-State actors rise? Inducing compliance with international 
humanitarian law in areas of limited statehood’ in Krieger, Inducing Compliance 
(n 4) 504. 
42  Lars Müller, ‘Comment: Detention by Armed Groups’ in this volume 163 
(hereafter Müller, ‘Detention by Armed Groups’). 
43  See eg the reaction to the methodology underlying the Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study of the ICRC (n 40) XLI by the US government, John 
B. Bellinger and William J. Haynes, ‘A US government response to the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross study Customary International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 IRRC 443, 444 et seq. 
44  Eg Resolution 2 of the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (2016) 97 IRRC 1393 stating ‘1. … recalls the guiding principles of 
the consultation process: the State-driven and consensus-based character of the 




of Customary International Law or Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent 
Practice also rejects the relevance of non-State actors’ conduct in law-
making and development.45 
The maintenance of the State consent-based law paradigm may go at the 
expense of legitimacy of and consequently also compliance with IHL and 
international law in general by non-State armed groups. On the other hand, 
the dangers of giving non-State armed groups a role in the law-making 
process should not be underestimated either. Many of these groups have a 
proven track record of gross violations of the laws of war, and their 
preferences for the development of IHL might not emphasise the protection 
of the individual nor respect for the rule of law at all. Non-State actors might 
also overemphasise their limited capabilities to comply with IHL. 
Examining the question of the inclusion/exclusion of non-State actors 
from a more abstract angle, an opening of the law-making process towards 
non-State actors as well as a denial of participation may challenge 
international law fundamentally. Both approaches may question the 
simplicity, precision, universality and impartiality of international law. 
While the exclusion of non-State actors ignores reality, an inclusion of non-
State actors may lead to a stand-still of the law-making process due to the 
difficulties of determining and identifying e.g. the relevant actors and their 
practice. Both approaches may challenge the legitimacy and the governance 
function of international law in general and IHL in particular.46 
This volume, inter alia, further discusses the efforts to include non-State 
actors in the law-making process for specific topics and elaborates on 
further approaches that seek to accommodate non-State armed groups in the 
____________________ 
of international law … 2. recommends the continuation of an inclusive, State-
driven intergovernmental process based on the principle of consensus after the 
32nd International Conference …’. 
45  ILC, ‘Second report on identification of customary international law by Special 
Rapporteur Michael Wood’ (22 May 2014) UN Doc 1/CN.4/672, para 45; ILC, 
‘Third report on identification of customary international law by Special 
Rapporteur Michael Wood’ (27 March 2015) UN Doc A/CN.4/682, para 79; 
ILC, ‘Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpre-
tation of treaties: Text of the draft conclusions provisionally adopted by the 
Drafting Committee on first reading’ (6 June 2016) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.874, 
Draft conclusion 5(2); ILC, ‘Report on the work of the sixty-eighth session 
(2016)’ UN Doc A/71/10, Chapter VI, 233, paras 9 et seq. 
46  For further reading, see eg Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law Or Not, And 
Does It Even Matter?’ in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters 
(eds), Informal International Lawmaking (OUP 2012) 125. 
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international legal system, in order to improve the law’s legitimacy and 
effectiveness. 
C. International Humanitarian Law’s Lack of Responsiveness 
Ignoring changes that exist on an empirical level could also be an option for 
IHL. While this may preserve the integrity of the law, it would probably 
lead to negative consequences for its legitimacy, effectiveness, and thus the 
functioning of the international legal system as a whole in areas of limited 
statehood.47 
In IHL, empirical phenomena have traditionally been ignored when 
attempts to regulate NIACs were made. The drafting history of CA 348 and 
AP II,49 as well as the brevity of and the high threshold for AP II to apply,50 
demonstrate the general unwillingness of States to regulate internal armed 
conflicts by international law. Attempts by the ICRC to attach some legal 
importance to these conflicts prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions were 
entirely rejected.51 
A more recent example is the outcome of the 32nd International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement with regard to 
the ICRC proposals on the strengthening of compliance with IHL52 and the 
____________________ 
47  Heike Krieger and Georg Nolte, ‘The International Rule of Law – Rise or 
Decline? Points of Departure’ (2016) 1 KFG Working Paper, 15 et seq 
<http://www.kfg-intlaw.de/PDF-ftp-Ordner/KFG%20Working%20Pa-
per%20No.%201.pdf> accessed 16 October 2017. 
48  For further reading, see Jean S. Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949: Commentary, vol. I (ICRC 1952), 38 et seq (hereafter Pictet, 
Commentary); David A. Elder, ‘The Historical Background of Common Article 
3 of The Geneva Convention of 1949’ (1979) 11 Case W. R. JIL 37.  
49  Michael Bothe, Karl J. Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of 
Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 693 
et seq; David P. Forsythe, ‘Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 
Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (1978) 72 AJIL 273. 
50  Cf Art. 1 AP II. 
51  Pictet, Commentary (n 43) 39-41. 
52  ICRC, ‘No agreement by States on mechanism to strengthen compliance with 
rules of war’ (10 December 2015) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/no-
agreement-states-mechanism-strengthen-compliance-rules-war> accessed 16 
October 2017; Resolution 2 of the 32nd International Conference of the Red 




dealing with detentions in NIACs.53 It exemplifies that the international 
community finds it difficult to agree on how to effectively address these 
new phenomena. The already softened ICRC proposals, elaborated 
previously in years of expert meetings under the participation of States, 
were rejected and the process was adjourned. Academic proposals to 
incentivise armed non-State actors to comply with IHL by granting them 
combatant immunity or amnesties have likewise not attracted much 
support.54 
On the other hand, Art. 17 (1) (a) ICC-Statute,55 can be understood as a 
response to the challenges of investigating and prosecuting genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in areas of limited 
statehood. According to this article, a case before the ICC is admissible if 
the State having jurisdiction over it is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution’. 
In sum, areas of limited statehood create a dilemma for the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of IHL. They pose difficulties for the application and 
implementation of IHL on many different levels. But while taking into 
account the factual particularities of these areas might render the law more 
legitimate and thus effective for some actors, it might simultaneously 
imperil its legitimacy for others. Accommodating non-State actors in the 
law-making process might improve the law’s legitimacy for them, but it 
would simultaneously jeopardise its legitimacy among States. Considering 
actors’ capabilities in the application of rules might improve compliance in 
the short run, but might also water down legal stadards for all actors and 
make the law generally less legitimate.  
____________________ 
53  Resolution 1 of the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (2016) 97 IRRC 1390. 
54  See eg the rejection by the Diplomatic Conference of the proposals made by the 
ICRC regarding restrictions of the prosecution of those who participated in 
NIACs in Art. 10 of Draft Protocol II, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, ICRC (June 1973). For a further reading, see 
Ives Sandoz et al (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC 1987) 4397; Jann K. 
Kleffner, ‘From “Belligerents” to “Fighters” and Civilians Directly Participating 
in Hostilities’ (2007) 54 Netherlands International Law Review 315, 322 et seq; 
Marco Sassòli, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their 
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1 Journal of 
International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5. 
55  2187 UNTS 3. 
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In how far can and should the law draw consequences from the 
challenges posed by areas of limited statehood, in order to remain relevant 
to the situation on the ground? At what point is it necessary to draw a line 
that sets standards which may remain counterfactual in the foreseeable 
future? Whether adaptations are necessary – and can be brought about 
lawfully without actually endangering IHL’s overall legitimacy and 
effectiveness –56 is explored from various perspectives in the contributions 
to this volume.  
D. About this Volume 
This volume further examines the implications of areas of limited statehood 
for IHL and inquires whether and to what extent the existing norms of IHL 
are capable of regulating today’s armed conflicts in such areas. Can the law 
be interpreted in a way that is perceived by relevant actors to be legitimate, 
hence inspiring compliance,57 and in how far does the law needs to adapt? 
To appropriately answer these fundamental questions, the first chapter of 
this volume deals with the fundamentals of IHL, and examines its history 
and nature to lay the groundwork for the further debate. Against this 
theoretical background, the following two chapters focus on concrete and 
pressing challenges for IHL in areas of limited statehood, namely the legal 
basis for detention by States as well as non-State actors, and the protection 
of foreign investment. 
Different from Grewe’s political history (Ereignisgeschichte), which 
divides international law into different epochs, each ending with a peace 
treaty,58 Raphael Schäfer argues that it is worthwhile to apply a different 
approach to the history of international law. Instead of focusing on the 
development of international law in its entirety, he examines the connecting 
(i.e. comparable) elements throughout the centuries, beyond any alleged 
epochal boundaries. International law is simply too old for the assumption 
that a problem is completely new and was never seen before. From this 
history-of-ideas approach, Raphael Schäfer analyses the history of IHL, 
____________________ 
56  For a further reading on the interplay of effectiveness, legitimacy and 
compliance in IHL, see Clark et al, ‘Crisis in the laws of war?’ (n 1). 
57  For a further reading on compliance with IHL, see the various perspectives in 
Krieger, Inducing Compliance (n 4).  




particularly how non-State actors were (legally) treated in the past and how 
today’s discourse can be informed by previous ones.59 
Whereas in current debates on the legal basis for detention in NIACs it 
is commonly argued that legal orders cannot be treated in isolation and that 
the focus must be laid on the interplay between the different branches of 
international law as well as domestic law, Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel 
reason that analysing the relationship between legal regimes should not 
occur at the expense of studying each field on its own terms. After all, 
resolving potential conflicts between different legal regimes primarily 
depends on their respective contents. Therefore, Katja Schöberl and Linus 
Mührel inquire whether the norms of IHL were designed to be permissive 
or restrictive and how this understanding evolved over time. They discuss 
the relevance of the Lotus-principle for modern-day IHL and expose the 
influence general public international law’s conception of ‘implied’ 
authority may have on IHL in case an explicit legal basis is missing.60 
Pia Hesse, in her comment, enriches the theoretical discussion by 
broadening the perspective to the creation and development of norms in 
international law. Pia Hesse critically reviews the Lotus-case of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and today’s predominant reading 
of the decision, i.e. the Lotus-principle.61 
The controversial debate on the legal basis for detention in NIACs gained 
ever more pace after States increasingly engaged in extraterritorial military 
action in areas of limited statehood and with the development of the 
extraterritorial application of human rights by the ECtHR. 
Manuel Brunner takes up this debate and, in a first step, along with the 
recent Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defense case series before British 
courts,62 scrutinises the different law regimes applicable in areas of limited 
statehoods regarding restrictions and potential legal bases for security 
detentions by States’ armed forces. He not only examines IHL and IHRL, 
but also domestic legal frameworks in States with longstanding NIACs, like 
Sri Lanka and Nepal, and discusses the interplay between these regimes. 
____________________ 
59  Raphael Schäfer, ‘A History of Division(s): A Critical Assessment of the Law 
of Non-International Armed Conflict’ in this volume 43. 
60  Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower?’ (n 28). 
61  Hesse, ‘Neither Sunken Vessel nor Blooming Flower’ (n 29). 
62  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB); [2014] CN 
1019; Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843; [2015] 
WLR (D) 354 [30]; and Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 
2. 
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Manuel Brunner completes his analysis by pointing out the potential and 
weaknesses of each regime and asks whether and to what extent Security 
Council resolutions or Rules of Engagement could provide authorisations 
for security detentions by States’ armed forces.63  
In his comment, Anton O. Petrov supplements Manuel Brunner’s 
analysis of the relationship of the different legal regimes on a meta-level. 
He traces the historical development of human rights law and IHL and, thus, 
sheds light on the clash of the underlying values of the different regimes. 
Anton O. Petrov illustrates the problem of legal uncertainty in areas of 
limited statehood with a view to the question which nation’s life must be 
threatened to allow for a derogation under the derogation clauses of human 
rights treaties.64 
Since non-State armed groups are major actors in areas of limited 
statehood, but their activities are only cursorily covered by IHL, Vincent 
Widdig reviews how and to what extent non-State armed groups might be 
bound de lege lata to IHL and human rights within the context of detention 
in order to gain some legal clarity. Subsequently, he addresses the questions 
of whether the existing regime of IHL is (still) capable of regulating non-
State armed groups conduct, whether there can be a discussion outside of 
CA 3 GC and AP II, and how non-State armed groups’ conduct may affect 
treaty or customary IHL. Finally, Vincent Widdig argues that, when talking 
about applicable international law, the role of domestic law within the 
debate over the conduct of non-State armed groups should not be forgotten. 
The application of domestic law in the respective State in which the conflict 
occurs might already be a sufficient tool to legally bind non-State armed 
groups to a certain legal standard.65  
In his comment to Vincent Widdig’s analysis, Lars Müller examines 
agreements made between the parties to a NIAC and what they provide, for 
example for detention. He argues that IHL effectively accepts attempts by 
non-State armed groups within areas of limited statehood to adjust the 
existing rules to the specific conflict and to expand the protection provided 
by these rules and, thus, already allows non-State armed groups to influence 
the law as it applies to their specific context. Moreover, Lars Müller 
highlights the benefits of such agreements for areas of limited statehood, as 
____________________ 
63  Brunner, ‘Security Detention by the Armed Forces of a State in Situations of 
NIAC’ (n 28). 
64  Petrov, ‘Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict by States’ (n 29) 




they can raise awareness for IHL, allow to translate the law into the specific 
context and provide a higher degree of legitimacy.66  
The protection of foreign investments in areas of limited statehood has 
still not gained much attention within the international academic legal 
discourse, although it challenges the application and interaction of the 
pertinent fields of law and has caused the initiation of several legal 
procedures. Especially the growing number of pending arbitrations against 
States for compensation for losses sustained by foreign investors in armed 
conflicts in areas of limited statehood demonstrates the need to readdress 
the question of which legal regimes apply to protect foreign investments in 
such situations and to what extent they might coincide. 
To adequately respond to these questions, Ira Ryk-Lakhman Aharonovich 
clarifies the prerequisites for the classification of commercial objects under 
both IIL and, based on the principle of distinction in Art. 48 AP I, IHL, 
which differentiates between protected civilian objects and permissible 
military targets. She further elaborates on under which conditions foreign 
investments may be classified as dual-use targets and revenue-generating 
targets. Finally, Ira Ryk-Lakhman Aharonovich examines the consequences 
of the classification of foreign investments as civilian objects under IHL 
and points out specific norm conflicts between IHL and IIL to be further 
dealt with.67 
With regard to the protection of foreign investment, Charlotte Lülf 
demonstrates that challenges for IHL in areas of limited statehood occur not 
only in situations of NIACs, but also in IACs and in times of occupation, 
i.e. a situation in which the sovereign State has lost control over its own 
territory and hence can no longer guarantee treaty performance and perform 
protective functions. She hypothesises that, although IHL governs conduct 
during times of occupation, investment law provides more specialised 
norms for the matter at hand. Based on contemporary examples of 
occupation, such as in Ukraine or Iraq, Charlotte Lülf analyses the 
protection of foreign investment during times of occupation under IHL 
before turning to the specific regime of bilateral investment treaties, their 
____________________ 
66  Müller, ‘Detention by Armed Groups’ (n 42). 
67  Ira Ryk-Lakhman Aharonovich, ‘Foreign Investments as Non-Human Targets’ 
in this volume 171. 
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applicability during armed conflict and their interaction with the law of 
occupation.68 
This volume provides some observations of and ideas for the formation 
and development of IHL in response to the challenges of areas of limited 
statehood. It shows possible ways to react to an empirical phenomenon, 
which probably was not considered during the genesis of most of the today’s 
applicable treaties to such areas of limited statehood. Furthermore, this 
volume critically discusses recent case law, such as the Serdar Mohammed 
v Ministry of Defence case series before British Courts, as well as influential 
case law from the past, such as the Lotus-decision, and gives 
recommendations on how to understand the interplay of different law 
regimes including IHL, IIL, IHRL and domestic law in areas of limited 
statehood.  
As for the long term, it is still too soon to finally conclude whether the 
implications on the development of international law as observed in this 
volume will prove to be true and how IHL as well as the other law regimes 
concerned will (in an interplay) respond to the challenges caused by areas 
of limited statehood. By contrast, however, what may be finally concluded 
from the perspective of this volume is that IHL is not rigid and 
unreasonable, but legitimate and adaptable to the challenges in areas of 
limited statehood.
____________________ 
68  Charlotte Lülf, ‘The Protection of (Foreign) Investment during Belligerent 
Occupation – Considerations on International Humanitarian and International 











A History of Division(s): a Critical Assessment of the 
Law of Non-International Armed Conflict 
Raphael Schäfer 
A. Introduction  
In recent times, the internal division of IHL into the law applicable to IACs 
and NIACs respectively has come into criticism: authors commented on this 
division using descriptions such as ‘artificial’, ‘arbitrary’, ‘undesirable’, or 
‘difficult to justify’.1 Research projects have been initiated due to the 
‘difficulties arising from the application of this bifurcated system’2 and the 
ICTY in its Tadic decision simply ignored the division with regard to the 
existence of a conflict when it stated:  
we find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.3 
Drawing on this much-cited paragraph of the ICTY, one may ask why 
international law sees itself compelled to distinguish between these two 
types of conflicts, especially as the law of NIAC had been developed 
____________________ 
1  Rogier Bartels, ‘Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts’ (2009) 91 IRRC 35, 40. 
2  Columbia Law School (Human Rights Institute), Harmonizing Standards for 
Armed Conflict <http://www.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/counter-
terrorism/harmonizing-standards-armed-conflict> accessed 19 November 2017. 
See, on this, Sarah Cleveland, ‘Harmonizing Standards in Armed Conflict’ 
(EJIL: Talk! 8 September 2014) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/harmonizing-stan-
dards-in-armed-conflict/> accessed 19 November 2017.  
3  Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) para 70. See also James G. Stewart, 
‘Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian 
Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict’ (2003) 85 IRRC 313; 
Emily Crawford, ‘Unequal before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the 
Distinction between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts’ 
(2007) 20 LJIL 441.  
 
Part I: Fundamental Considerations 
44 
analogously to the rules governing the law of IAC.4 Antony Anghie 
famously argued that  
the formulation and operation of the dynamic of difference … generates the 
concepts and dichotomies – for example, between private and public, between 
sovereign and non-sovereign – which are traditionally seen as the foundations of 
the international legal order.5 
And, indeed, it seems to be true that this division can also be distinguished 
in IHL with its concept of IACs between sovereigns on the one hand and 
NIACs between a sovereign and an organised armed group on the other. If 
we broaden our view and look at international law more generally, it can 
even be read as a history of division: a division between ‘us and them’, or, 
as Anne Orford put it, a division of international law and its others.6 To a 
certain extent, the term ‘international law’ still hints at its infamous imperial 
past.7 The value of critical legal scholars’ analyses identifying not only the 
imperial past of today’s international law, but also its still inherent imperial 
structures cannot be overestimated in order to create a truly ‘global’ law.8  
The (hi)stories in the textbooks concerning international law’s past often 
only serve to legitimise present-day law and, for this reason, only seldom 
contain footnotes: ‘one assumes that the story presented is so obvious or 
well known that [it] speaks itself and requires no proof.’9 This is what one 
may call a narrative or a foundational myth – ‘a benchmark … that is no 
longer called into question.’10 International law is full of these foundational 
myths – just remember the reoccurring declaration of ‘Hugo Grotius as 
Father of International Law’ or the ‘Westphalian Origins of International 
Law’ to name but a few.11 These narratives have indeed been important, as 
____________________ 
4  Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed 
Conflict’ (2011) 22 EJIL 219, 221.  
5  Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(CUP 2004) 9.  
6  Anne Orford (ed), International Law and Its Others (CUP 2006). 
7  Martti Koskenniemi, Walter Rech and Manuel Jiménez Fonseca (eds), 
International Law and Empire. Historical Explorations (OUP 2017).  
8  For more on global law, see Rafael Domingo, The New Global Law (CUP 2006). 
9  Thomas Skouteris, ‘Engaging History in International Law’ in José M. Beneyto, 
David Kennedy (eds), New Approaches to International Law – The European 
and the American Experiences (TMC Asser Press 2012) 99, 105. 
10  Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of 
Thinking (OUP 2016) 293 (hereafter Bianchi, International Law Theories).  
11  See more generally Matthew Windsor, ‘Narrative Kill or Capture: Unreliable 
Narration in International Law’ (2015) 28 LJIL 743, 748 et seq. 
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they safeguarded the functioning of the international legal system because 
of their terminating effect: if a convenient and comprehensible explanation 
for the present is provided,12 why should we then bother with the fact that 
Alberico Gentili was anticipating Grotius13 or that the Holy Roman Empire 
of German Nation was a non-‘Westphalian’ entity up to its dissolution in 
1806?14 Narratives or founding myths work, as long as they can explain the 
present.15 As soon as this is no longer the case, however, inconvenient 
questions will be asked that do not fit into the system.16  
In this contribution, I follow the recently emerging critical reading of 
IHL and argue that today’s IHL also follows a negative distinction. It shall 
be shown that what used to be called ‘laws of war’ is still present in IHL 
and that the overall legal corpus – contrary to what its denomination 
‘international humanitarian law’ might suggest – does not stand in a 
(purely) humanitarian tradition: If IHL were truly humanitarian, why is 
there a need to alter the level of protection depending on the nature of the 
conflict in question?17 Or, to put it even more bluntly: do dum-dum bullets 
cause less atrocious effects in non-international armed conflicts than they 
do in international ones?18 This division, however, is of course no new 
____________________ 
12  Cf Amanda Alexander, ‘A Short History of International Humanitarian Law’ 
(2015) 26 EJIL 109: ‘These histories help to inform the current understanding 
of the nature and purpose of international humanitarian law.’ 
13  See eg Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas 
E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture’ in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, Adam 
Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (OUP 1992) 133.  
14  See eg José-Manuel Barreto, ‘Cerberus: Rethinking Grotius and the Westphalian 
System’ in Martti Koskenniemi, Walter Rech, Manuel Jiménez Fonseca (eds), 
International Law and Empire. Historical Explorations (OUP 2016) 149, 159 et 
seq; Michael Axworthy and Patrick Milton, ‘The Myth of Westphalia’ (Foreign 
Affairs 22 December 2016) <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eu-
rope/2016-12-22/myth-westphalia> accessed 19 November 2017. 
15  Bianchi, International Law Theories (n 10) 292. 
16  Peer Zumbansen, ‘Die vergangene Zukunft des Völkerrechts’ (2001) 34 
Kritische Justiz 46. 
17  For the discussion during the conference, see Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch 
and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary 
on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1982) 605 et seq; Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-
International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2010) 
88. 
18  Deidre Willmott, ‘Removing the Distinction between International and Non-
International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 196, 197. 
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finding, as the debate accompanying the codification of the Additional 
Protocols even witnessed the accusation of engaging in ‘selective 
humanitarianism’.19 
The contribution’s key argument is that the subject protected by the laws 
governing the NIAC is not primarily the human being as such, but the state’s 
integrity. A finding, which is well hidden by the traditional humanitarian 
reading of the discipline. By applying a conceptual history approach, 
however, the contribution aims at showing that the laws-of-war thinking is 
especially predominant in the context of a NIAC. 
B. What’s in a Name? The Different Denominations of the Jus in Bello  
The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously called war ‘a 
true chameleon, because it changes its nature in some degree in each 
particular case.’20 The same might be true for the legal regime which is 
supposed to govern the conduct of belligerents: the jus in bello. 
Traditionally known as the laws of war, this terminus went out of use after 
the Second World War in favour of the terms ‘Law of Armed Conflict’ and 
‘International Humanitarian Law’. Although war as such has de jure been 
abolished, its very concept proves to be unimpressed and de facto keeps 
preoccupying mankind as previously.  
The term ‘International Humanitarian Law’ initially referred to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions,21 but obtained, as Peter Haggenmacher argues, 
‘quasi-official status’ through the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1974 to 1977).22 But it was not until the 
1981 Conventional Weapons Convention that a reference to IHL could be 
____________________ 
19  David P. Forsythe, ‘Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on 
Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (1978) 72 AJIL 279 (hereafter Forsythe, 
‘Legal Management of Internal War’). 
20  Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1873) Book 1, Chapter 1: ‘What is War?’. 
21  Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (200) 94 AJIL 239 
(hereafter Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’).  
22  Peter Haggenmacher, ‘On the Doctrinal Origins of Ius in Bello: From Rights of 
War to the Laws of War’ in Thilo Marauhn and Heinhard Steiger (eds), 
Universality and Continuity in International Law (Eleven International 2011) 
325 (hereafter Haggenmacher, ‘On the Doctrinal Origins of Ius in Bello’). 
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found in an international treaty23 – and then only in a remarkably blurry 
construction of an ‘international humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflict’ (Art. 2).  
Although the terms are often used interchangeably, each of them conveys 
a different message. Haggenmacher uses the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons to illustrate this 
assumption. When the Court refers to ‘the protection of the civilian 
population’, it speaks of ‘international humanitarian law.’24 When referring 
to the ‘deprivation of life’, however, it uses the term ‘law applicable in 
armed conflict.’25 This is remarkable in so far as it reminds us of the very 
essence of war (or ‘armed conflict’): 
the right for both [belligerent parties] to proceed to mutual destructions of life and 
property, until one is overpowered by the other. This hostile relationship is the 
central fact of war, and it should be mentioned first in all its radicality. Humanitarian 
restrictions, eminently desirable as they are, logically come afterwards. To be sure, 
the general idea of restrictions, be they humanitarian or otherwise, is inherent in the 
very idea of a law applying to war.26 
This example should underline that the terms we use also have a strong 
influence on our idea of reality: there is a big difference if one speaks about 
the jus in bello as ‘international humanitarian law’ or as ‘law of armed 
conflict’. As much as the general call for ‘humanised warfare’ is to be 
welcomed, it must never detract from the fact that even an ideal IHL will 
always remain at most only the second-best solution. We must not forget 
that the application of IHL always follows on a previous failure and entails 
the loss of life – however humanely it may be conducted. Additionally, it is 
often neglected that ‘international law consists of a family of professions’ 
and does not exclusively belong to the realm of international legal 
scholars.27 International law, understood in this sense, consists of ‘a group 
____________________ 
23  Cf Page Wilson, ‘The Myth of International Humanitarian Law’ (2017) 93 
International Affairs 563, 564 (hereafter Wilson, ‘The Myth of International 
Humanitarian Law’) 
24  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226, 257, para 78. 
25  Ibid, 240, para 25. 
26  Haggenmacher, ‘On the Doctrinal Origins of Ius in Bello’ (n 22) 326. 
27  Jean d’Aspremont, Tarcisio Gazzini, André Nollkaemper and Wouter Werner, 
‘Introduction’ in Jean Jean d’Aspremont, Tarcisio Gazzini, André Nollkaemper 
and Wouter Werner (eds), International Law as a Profession (CUP 2017) 1.  
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of people pursuing projects in a common professional language’.28 This 
point prominently gained momentum through a letter to Jakob 
Kellenberger, then President of the ICRC, by US Department of State Legal 
Advisors John Bellinger and William Haynes.29  
As the current competition between ‘international humanitarian law’ on 
the one hand and ‘law of armed conflict’ or ‘laws of war’ on the other 
shows, the language of international law can also be used to pursue a 
political agenda by its respective stakeholders.30  
C. The Current Jus in Bello: Its Humanitarian Present and Military Past 
In order to better understand the current conception of the jus in bello, it is 
worthwhile to take a critical look at the structural path it followed. The 
historical analysis of international law, as conducted in the course of the 
‘turn to history’, aims at challenging the master narratives and unveiling 
ideology beyond the norms, thereby explaining ‘why’ (in contrast to ‘how’) 
international law is the way it is today.31 ‘Tradition’ proves to be of crucial 
importance in this regard, as it furthers the perception of progress in 
____________________ 
28  David Kennedy, ‘One, Two, Three Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the 
Cosmopolitan Dream’ (2007) 31 NYU Review of Law & Social Change 641, 
650. 
29  John Bellinger III and William J. Haynes II, ‘A US government response to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross study Customary International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 IRRC 443 (hereafter Bellinger and Haynes, ‘A 
US government response to the ICRC’). 
30  Wilson, ‘The Myth of International Humanitarian Law’ (n 23) 568 et seq. With 
regard to the ‘war’ against terrorism, see Frédéric Mégret, ‘“War”? Legal 
Semantics and the Move to Violence’ (2002) 13 EJIL 361, 363 (hereafter Mégret 
‘Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence’). More generally on international 
law and language with the example of self-determination, see Christopher J. 
Borgen, ‘The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and 
the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia’ 
(2009) 10 Chicago Journal of International Law 1.  
31  For this approach, see eg Olivier Corten, ‘Les Aspects Idéologiques de la 
Codification du Droit International’ in Régine Beauthier and Isabelle Rorive 
(eds), Le Code Napoléon, un ancêtre vénéré? Mélanges offerts à Jacques 
Vanderlinden (Bruylant 2004) 495.  
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international law.32 From this viewpoint, tradition is, to a certain extent, 
always an artificial construct,33 if not even an invention.34  
Martti Koskenniemi, following up on the Kunzian Pendulum,35 famously 
argued that international law would develop between two extremes – 
apology and utopia.36 If we look at IHL and its determining elements from 
this perspective, we see the principles of ‘military necessity’ and 
‘considerations of humanity’ as two corresponding poles. While the former 
is committed to the classical understanding of state sovereignty, the latter 
strives for the final perfection of humanity’s ideal. Even IHL’s two main 
sections37 are roughly attributed accordingly: whereas the ‘law of the 
Hague’ supposedly stands for the military past, the ‘law of Geneva’ 
promises the glorious humanitarian future. Even if ‘Geneva’ seems to have 
displaced ‘the Hague’ in conceptual terms during the narrative efforts to put 
IHL into a humanitarian tradition,38 we (still) see its underlying laws-of-
____________________ 
32  Cf Russell A. Miller and Rebecca M. Bratspies (eds), Progress in International 
Law (Brill 2008); Tilmann Altwicker and Oliver Diggelmann, ‘How is Progress 
Constructed in International Legal Scholarship?’ (2014) 25 EJIL (2014) 427; 
Thomas Skouteris, ‘The Idea of Progress’ in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Theory of International Law (OUP 2016) 
939. 
33  Thomas Kleinlein, ‘International Legal Thought: Creation of a Tradition and the 
Potential of Disciplinary Self-Reflection’ in Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo (ed), The 
Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2016 
(OUP 2017); for an example of tradition building see Georg Schwarzenberger, 
‘A Forerunner of Nuremberg: The Breisach War Crime Trial of 1474’ The 
Manchester Guardian (28 September 1946) and Gregory S. Gordon, ‘The Trial 
of Peter von Hagenbach. Reconciling History, Historiography and International 
Criminal Law’ in Kevin J. Heller and Gerry Simpson (eds), The Hidden History 
of War Crime Trials (OUP 2013) 13. 
34  Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The International Law of Statehood and Recognition: A 
Post-Colonial Invention’ in Thierry Garcia (ed), La Reconnaissance du Statut 
d’Etat à des Entités Contestées (Pedone 2018, forthcoming).  
35  Josef L. Kunz, ‘The Swing of the Pendulum: From Overestimation to 
Underestimation of International Law’ (1950) 44 AJIL 135.  
36  Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (CUP 2006). 
37  Jean Pictet, The Principles of International Humanitarian Law (ICCR 1967) 10 
et seq. 
38  Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (n 21); Thilo Rensmann, ‘Die 
Humanisierung des Völkerrechts durch das Ius in Bello – Von der 
Martens’schen Klausel zur “Responsibility to Protect”’ (2008) 68 ZaöRV 111; 
Marco Sassòli, Antoine A. Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does Law Protect 
in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice 
in International Humanitarian Law (3rd edn, ICRC 2011). For a general 
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war-driven thinking.39 This disparity, however, may lead to severe 
discrepancies between the stakeholders: the above mentioned letter of US 
legal advisors is a luminous example of this matter, as they saw themselves 
obliged to raise their voice in a discourse which had become detached from 
their position and remind the more progressive scholars that also customary 
IHL – be it focused on the principle of humanity as much as it may – still 
indisputably has to rely on state practice and opinio juris as a source of 
international law.40 This is exactly where the special difficulty of law 
regimes operating between extremes lies: to provide a satisfactory and 
feasible solution for both sides, as the most utopian rules will never prevail 
if its apologetic element fails.  
Were this not already difficult enough, the task is further complicated by 
another, temporal division: little scrutiny is needed to realise that IHL was 
made in ‘and’ for different times.41 It is not without reason that the joke 
arose concerning the law which always comes one war late into existence. 
Even if it is not any longer visible in its denomination, IHL was designed 
on the 19th century prototype of conflict: the war between two sovereign 
nation States in a classical Westphalian sense. The 1859 Battle of Solferino, 
famously built up to IHL’s founding myth by Henry Dunant,42 is an early 
example of the ensuing industrialised warfare.43 However, this conflict, 
which served as the blueprint for the developing IHL, has always been more 
the exception than the rule.44 
From today’s point of view, it can be seen as the product of a time which 
had significant and clear distinctions like the ones between a State and a 
non-State, a combatant and a civilian, or an international conflict and an 
____________________ 
perspective cf Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terrence O. Ranger (eds), The Invention 
of Tradition (CUP 1983). 
39  Scott Horton, ‘Kriegsraison or Military Necessity? The Bush Administration’s 
Wilhelmine Attitude towards the Conduct of War’ (2006) 30 Fordham 
International Law Journal 576. 
40  Bellinger and Haynes, ‘A US government response to the ICRC’ (n 29) 443 et 
seq. 
41  With regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see Rosa Brooks, ‘The Politics 
of the Geneva Conventions: Avoiding Formalist Traps’ (2005) 46 VJIL 197 
(hereafter Brooks, ‘The Politics of the Geneva Conventions’). 
42  Henry Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solférino (1862).  
43  Michael Howard, War in European History (OUP 2009) 97 et seq (hereafter 
Howard, War in European History).  
44  Arthur van Coller, ‘The History and Development of the Law of Armed Conflict 
(Part 1)’ (2014) 17 African Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 44. 
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internal one,45 all of which are being questioned today.46 IHL, despite the 
reforms of 1949 and 1977, is still operating on this basis. Especially when 
it comes to the regulation of NIACs, States are reluctant to grant too many 
concessions, as the principle of reciprocity known from IACs will most 
probably not function. Antonio Cassese explains this in the following:  
On the contrary, Governments are much less, if at all, interested in having rebellions 
within their territory governed by international law. Their main concern is to retain 
enough freedom to crush promptly any form of insurrection. Their sovereignty and 
territorial integrity cannot but oppose any sweeping encroachment by international 
law. This is why so few international rules govern internal conflicts.47 
It is therefore not surprising that the ICRC’s first attempt to also extend IHL 
to civil wars on occasion of the 1949 conferences led only to CA 3 as a 
minimum yardstick.48 The accompanying controversy also left its traces in 
the wording of this ‘convention in miniature’ as its very last sentence 
contains, what Cassese calls, a ‘legal enigma’:  
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflict. 
It seems to be rather obvious from a political perspective that  
international law-makers wanted to dispel the fear expressed by States that such a 
norm on civil wars would give more power, and to some extent a promotion, to the 
rebels by having them gain international legitimacy.49  
However, this is diametrically opposed to the fact that CA 3 established 
certain obligations with corresponding rights of the rebels, thereby 
declaring them – very limited – subjects of international law.50  
____________________ 
45  Jed Odermatt, ‘Between Law and Reality: “New Wars” and Internationalised 
Armed Conflict’ (2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 19.  
46  Rosa E. Brooks, ‘War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law 
of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror’ (2004) 153 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 675, especially 711 et seq.  
47  Antonio Cassese, ‘Current Trends in the Development of the Law of Armed 
Conflict’ in Paolo Gaeta and Salvatore Zappalà (eds), The Human Dimension of 
International Law (OUP 2008) 3, 6 (hereafter Cassese, ‘Current Trends in the 
Development of the Law of Armed Conflict’). 
48  Antonio Cassese, ‘Civil War and International Law’ in Paolo Gaeta and 
Salvatore Zappalà (eds), The Human Dimension of International Law (OUP 
2008) 110, 116 et seq. 
49  Ibid, 119. 
50  Ibid. 
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From this perspective, IHL can even be seen – from a highly 
nonconformist and controversial point of view – as a means to support 
warfare, as it provides an ever-adapting regime to what seems to be 
inseparable from mankind:  
International humanitarian law in particular has this universal vocation, since it 
applies to all men and countries. In formulating and perfecting this law, to which it 
gave birth and of which it encourages the promotion and dissemination, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross has sought precisely this common ground 
and put forward rules acceptable to all because they are fully consistent with human 
nature. This is, moreover, what has ensured the strength and durability of these 
rules.51  
‘Formulating and perfecting this law’ has been one of the central concerns 
of IHL since the famous Martens Clause stated: ‘until a more recent code 
of the laws of war is issued.’52 Amounting to an already ‘theological-like’ 
promise53 of IHL, it mainly makes us endure the cruelties of warfare instead 
of questioning them. ‘International humanitarian law as an accomplice of 
warfare’ and ‘the Geneva Conventions as the Magna Charta of the war time 
criminal’ are suspicions which are hard to endure.  
Interestingly and somewhat tellingly, however, a reality in which there 
would be no need for this legal corpus anymore – as utopian as it might 
seem – is never considered in the progress-influenced accounts of IHL.54 
What is regularly omitted in the standard founding myth is that the 1864 
Geneva Convention’s (unintentional) side effect on warfare is, in a certain 
sense, comparable to the usage of the railway: According to Michael 
Howard, the Battle of Solferino was the ‘first war in Europe to demonstrate 
____________________ 
51  Jean Pictet, ‘Humanitarian Ideas Shared by Different Schools of Thought and 
Cultural Traditions’ in Henry Dunant Institute (ed), International Dimensions 
Humanitarian Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 3. 
52  Regarding the controversy of the meaning of the Martens Clause, cf Rupert 
Ticehurst, ‘The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict’ (1997) 37 
IRRC 125; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in 
the Sky?’ (2000) 11 EJIL 187. 
53  On this concept, see further Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law as Political 
Theology: How to Read Der Nomos der Erde?’ (2004) 11 Constellations 492. 
54  The only exception this author was able to find is Yves Sandoz and Jérôme 
Massé, ‘Values Worth Fighting for: The Additional Protocols at 40’ 
(Humanitarian Law & Policy, 8 July 2017), <http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-pol-
icy/2017/06/08/values-worth-fighting-additional-protocols-40/> accessed 19 
November 2017: ‘It is indeed only when the promise of world peace has been 
reached – and therefore the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
cease to be relevant – that we can all truly celebrate’. 
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the value of railways’, which had the advantage that the ‘forces could be 
maintained in good condition: the sick and wounded could be evacuated to 
base hospitals and replaced by fit men.’55 This is one of the examples which 
strongly further the argument that the laws of war ‘have been formulated, 
and in fact have served, to legitimate ever more destructive methods of 
combat.56 IHL, ‘with its soothing, almost effete touch,’57 is only easing our 
conscience. 
With this reading, it is comprehensible, although still lamentable, why 
IHL proves to be weakest when it comes to NIACs, which is where it is 
needed the most. AP II, which was supposed to confirm and clarify CA 3,58 
is the outcome of an intense diplomatic struggle and therefore necessarily a 
compromise.59 Accordingly, the scholarly assessment was rather critical:  
Protocol II, as it emerged from the Diplomatic Conference in 1977, is a markedly 
debilitated instrument. Sovereignty and the fragility of many new States cast a 
blight over this embryonic development in humanitarian law in an area where it was 
particularly needed.60 
The above mentioned very restricted international legal character of rebels 
in the end emerges as a false friend, as rebels, in contrast to peoples  
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes 
in the exercise of their right of self-determination … [are] not confer[red] any 
special status … [and] therefore retain, even from the standpoint of international 
law, the legal qualification impressed on them by municipal law – that of 
criminals.61  
In doing so, IHL de facto condemns the rebels to victory and maybe even 
forces them to apply all means they deem necessary.  
____________________ 
55  Howard, War in European History (n 43) 97 et seq.  
56  Chris af Jochnik and Roger Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical 
History of the Laws of War’ (1994) 35 Harv. Int’l L. J. 49, 51 (hereafter Jochnik 
and Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence’). 
57  Mégret ‘Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence’ (n 30) 363. 
58  Yves Sandoz et al, Commentary on the Additional Protocols (ICRC 1987) 1326 
para 4365.  
59  Forsythe, ‘Legal Management of Internal War’ (n 19).  
60  Gerald I. A. D. Draper, ‘The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and the Additional Protocols of 1977’ in Michael A. Meyer and Hilaire 
McCoubrey (eds), Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts. The Selected Works 
on the Laws of War by the Late Professor Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, OBE 
(Kluwer 1998) 102, 109.  
61  Cassese, ‘Current Trends in the Development of the Law of Armed Conflict’ 
(n 47) 6. 
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Although the strict separation between the application of jus in bello and 
the underlying reasons of the conflict is one of the fundamental principles 
of IHL,62 the suspicion arises that IHL distinguishes between IACs and 
NIACs in two protocols not only because of the formal different nature of 
those conflicts, but also because of the different material assessment when 
it comes to the ‘legitimacy’ of the conflict. Of course, an IAC is only legal 
under the very strict requirements of the UN-Charter. However, the 
traditional thinking in terms of State sovereignty involuntarily leads to a 
different evaluation: whereas wars between States have always been a legal 
reality in international affairs, internal conflicts have long been considered 
to fall within the very core of a State’s black box, shielding it from 
international law’s influences and leaving it to the sole discretion of the 
nation State – which, of course, is keen to secure its internal stability. This 
sovereignty-conditioned tension between the classification of a conflict as 
a ‘mere’ riot or a NIAC proper is perceptible in Art. 3 (1) AP II, which 
reads:  
Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the 
sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate 
means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national 
unity and territorial integrity of the State. 
It is hardly surprising, consequently, that States are regularly eager to 
classify a conflict as a domestic one below the threshold of a NIAC.63 In 
sum, this is another example of the focus on sovereignty of an allegedly 
humanised international legal system. In a sense, therefore, the NIAC is a 
jus in bello counterpart to the illegal secessionist movement in general 
international law. This, together with the (of course to be welcomed) 
absorption of ‘fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination’ by AP I, leads to the somehow outlandish outcome that a 
proper application of AP II is only possible when several powers are 
fighting for the predominance in a country with a government incapable of 
acting (i.e. a failed state). CA 3, which was framed under the lasting 
impressions of the Russian, Spanish, and Greek Civil Wars (which are also 
examples of the aforementioned type of conflicts which AP II can address 
____________________ 
62  François Bugnion, ‘Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’ (2003) 6 YbIHL 167, 188 (hereafter Bugnion, ‘Jus ad Bellum’). 
63  Benjamin Zawacki, ‘Politically Inconvenient, Legally Correct: A Non-
International Armed Conflict in Southern Thailand’ (2013) 18 JCSL 151. 
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properly),64 therefore remains ‘the sole source of humanitarian regulation 
of internecine strife.’65 
Bearing in mind the findings of this part, it is fair to second Rotem Giladi 
in touching the sore spot and showing quite plainly the dangers of the 
inherent problem of the very existence of IHL and its canonical history and 
narratives:  
Rather than deny that legal moderation of war does in fact lend it legitimacy, 
entrench the divorce between the projects to humanise war and to eliminate it, or 
theorise the service the former renders to the latter, proponents of humanity must 
constantly question the very legitimacy, the very morality and efficacy, of their own 
enterprise. Rather than celebrate the law’s humanity – In its nomenclature and 
institutions, interpretation and theory – they must be committed to a sober, and 
sobering, accounting of its history, its effect, the costs it exacts and its inhumanity. 
To do that, IHL professionals need to turn to history that tells of errors, roads not 
travelled, and tasks yet to be accomplished.66 
D. In Lieu of a Conclusion: Thoughts on the Global War on Terror and the 
Search for a New Concept  
The importance of giving something a name can be seen in the context of 
the tremendous problems concerning the legal scope of the so-called 
‘Global War on Terror’. What seems to be common ground is that ‘the 
formal framework of the Geneva Conventions does not fit the struggle 
against terrorism well’, as too many of its threshold distinctions, inter alia 
the one between IACs and NIACs, ‘are premised on the continued existence 
of a rapidly vanishing world.’67 
But how do we then deal with a situation that is, allegedly, neither nor?68 
Many efforts have been made in international legal scholarship to give it 
____________________ 
64  Bugnion, ‘Jus ad Bellum’ (n 62) 182.  
65  David A. Elder, ‘The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949’ (1979) 11 Case W. R. JIL 37, 69. 
66  Rotem Giladi, ‘Rites of Affirmation: Progress and Immanence in International 
Humanitarian Law Historiography’ (unpublished manuscript; the paper can be 
requested from rotem.giladi@helsinki.fi). See also Jochnik and Normand, ‘The 
Legitimation of Violence’ (n 56) 51. 
67  Brooks, ‘The Politics of the Geneva Conventions’ (n 41) 199.  
68  Kevin J. Heller, ‘The Use and Abuse of Analogy in IHL’ in Jens D. Ohlin (ed), 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 232 
(hereafter Heller, ‘Analogy in IHL’).  
 
Part I: Fundamental Considerations 
56 
some kind of name: ‘Global Armed Conflict’,69 ‘Global Civil War’,70 
‘Transnational NIAC’,71 or ‘Extraterritorial Armed Conflict’72 are but only 
a few examples of a long list. What is common to all the suggested 
denominations is that they do not explain what their added value is to the 
law as it stands. This author has much sympathy for Tawia Asnah’s 
conclusion that the newly (re)emerging ‘language of war shapes and creates 
the international legal norms governing the use of force’73 and believes the 
same phenomenon to be operating in the jus in bello. They all aim at 
creating a convenient legal concept for a reality which, allegedly, cannot be 
grasped therefore remains outside the existing legal language. However, a 
‘legal acceptance’ – ex factis jus oritur – of a global armed conflict would 
yield to the attempt of the ‘transnational terrorist’ to destabilise the 
international legal order74 and the US-led response of creating ‘legal black 
holes’ in the fight against terrorism.75 Detaching international law from the 
ordering function its spatial limitation76 provides can pose a severe risk, as 
Carl Schmitt already pointed out with regard to the partisans:  
[The 1949 Geneva Conventions’] foundations remain the conduct of war based on 
the state and consequently a bracketing of war, with its clear distinctions between 
____________________ 
69  Jonathan Horowitz, ‘Reaffirming the Role of Human Rights in a Time of 
“Global” Armed Conflict’ (2015) 30 Emory International Law Review 2041.  
70  Nehal Buta, ‘States of Exception: Regulating Targeted Killing in a “Global Civil 
War”’ in Philip Alston and Euan Macdonald (eds), Human Rights, Intervention, 
and the Use of Force (OUP 2008) 243 (hereafter Buta, ‘States of Exception’).  
71  Heller, ‘Analogy in IHL’ (n 68) 245 et seq.  
72  Sasha Radin, ‘Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-
International Armed Conflicts’ (2013) 89 ILS 696.  
73  Tawia Asnah, ‘War: Rhetoric & Norm-Creation in Response to Terror’ (2003) 
43 VJIL 797, 851. 
74  Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories 
of International Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL 993.  
75  S. Borelli, ‘Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and 
Detentions Abroad in the “War on Terror”’ (2005) IRRC 39, referring inter alia 
to the English Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Ferroz Abbasi and 
another) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] 
EWCA Civ. 1598, which expressed its concern (at para 64) as to the manner in 
which the applicant was detained at Guantánamo Bay, noting that ‘in apparent 
contravention of fundamental principles recognised by [US and English] 
jurisdictions and by international law, Mr. Abbasi is at present arbitrarily 
detained in a “legal black-hole”’. 
76  On the territorial question, see further Noam Lubell and Nathan Derejko, ‘A 
Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict’ 
(2013) 11 JICJ 65.  
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war and peace, military and civilian, enemy and criminal, war between states and 
civil war. When these essential distinctions fade or are even challenged, they create 
the premises for a type of war that deliberately destroys these clear distinctions. 
Then, many cautiously stylized compromise norms appear only as the narrow 
bridge over an abyss, which conceals a profound modification of the concepts of 
war, enemy and partisan – a modification full of consequences …77 
Attempts such as the recent decision of the ICC’s Prosecutor, Fatou 
Bensouda, to ‘request judicial authorisation to commence an investigation 
into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,’78 reminding the 
conflict parties of the existing – and applicable – law, can therefore only be 
strongly welcomed.79 
IHL is a legal discipline which heavily operates on the basis of divisions. 
These divisions regularly aim at a positive effect like the ‘positive 
discrimination’ between combatants and civilians, but also open loopholes 
as the so-called ‘War on Terror’ has shown. Moreover, IHL can be 
addressed with several pre-assumptions, causing it to appear in a slightly 
different light – the competing denominations of ‘international 
humanitarian law’ and ‘law of armed conflict’ being the most distinctly 
recognisable example.  
However, these different understandings also lead to disparate histories 
of IHL, creating differing traditions and narratives as well as aiming at 
another future for the legal system. The divisions going through IHL, not 
only in terms of legal principles, but also on a meta-level, presumably play 
a decisive role in explaining why there is a ‘persistent violation’ of IHL 
____________________ 
77  Carl Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan – Intermediate Commentary on the 
Concept of the Political (1963), translated and published in Telos (2005) 11, 32, 
cited by Buta, ‘States of Exception’ (n 70) 243. 
78  Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, regarding her decision to request 
judicial authorisation to commence an investigation into the Situation in the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (3 November 2017) <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171103_OTP_Statement> accessed 19 Novem-
ber 2017. 
79  For further information, see Kevin J. Heller, ‘Initial Thoughts on the ICC’s De-
cision to Investigate Afghanistan’ (Opinio Juris, 3 November 2017) 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2017/11/03/otp-decides-to-investigate-the-situation-in-
afghanistan/> accessed 19 November 2017; Elvina Pothelet, ‘War Crimes in Af-
ghanistan and Beyond: Will the ICC Weigh in on the “Global Battlefield” De-
bate?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 9 November 2017) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/war-crimes-
in-afghanistan-and-beyond-will-the-icc-weigh-in-on-the-global-battlefield-de-
bate/> accessed 19 November 2017. 
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despite its ‘remarkable development’.80 It is tempting to demand a new 
codification in situations like these,81 but the fate of AP II and the unbroken, 
overarching significance of CA 3 have shown that this will always result in 
new disappointment as long as the pre-existing distortions have not been 
eliminated.  
Placing the entire debate about the future of IHL in a historical context 
reminds us of the fact that we are currently observing a realignment of an 
entire branch of international law. International law has so far witnessed 
only a few, if any, true ‘Grotian Moments’ – change is normally an insidious 
development. It is the task of the legal historian to detect such changes and 
to analyse the accompanying hidden forces. International legal scholarship 
should be reminded once more that the turn to the better has never been a 
given, as the comforting narrative of progress in international law can too 
easily be unveiled as what it is: a tale created to safeguard the power 
interests in maintaining the status quo.
____________________ 
80  Dietrich Schindler, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable 
Development and Its Persistent Violation’ (2003) 5 Journal of the History of 
International Law (2003) 165. 
81  Bugnion, ‘Jus ad Bellum’ (n 62) 191. 
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Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? Lotus, 
Permissions and Restrictions within International 
Humanitarian Law 
Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel 
A. Introduction 
The permissive or restrictive ‘nature’ of IHL is currently receiving 
considerable attention, in particular in debates surrounding the legal basis 
for detention in NIACs.1 
Unlike the law of IAC,2 which provides for explicit legal bases on which 
to deprive both POWs and civilians of their liberty,3 treaty law governing 
NIAC stipulates no such basis. CA 3 and AP II regulate the treatment of 
persons who have been placed hors de combat by detention, among other 
reasons, and hence seem to presume that persons may at least factually be 
detained in NIAC.4 The awareness that ‘deprivation of liberty is an ordinary 
____________________ 
1  See generally Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed 
Conflict (OUP 2012) 301; Els Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in 
Armed Conflict (Editions Pedone/Hart 2013) or Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, 
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict (OUP 2016).  
2  See especially Hassan v The United Kingdom, App no. 29750/09, 16 September 
2014; and commentary, such as Diane Webber, ‘Hassan v United Kingdom: A 
New Approach to Security Detention in Armed Conflict?’ (ASIL Insight, 2015) 
<https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/7/hassan-v-united-kingdom-
new-approach-security-detention-armed-conflict> accessed 30 October 2017. 
3  See Art. 21 GC III, Art. 42 / Art. 78 GC IV and 68 GC IV. Note that while GC 
III is generally considered a sufficient legal basis for interning POWs, some 
controversy exists as to whether GC IV, on its own, suffices for the internment 
of civilians or whether an additional domestic legal basis must provide for it. 
The ICRC maintains that no distinction between GC III and GC IV should be 
made in this regard and that GC IV constitutes a sufficient legal basis without 
additional domestic law, see ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules 
and Challenges’ (Opinion Paper, November 2014) 5   
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-
and-challenges> accessed 30 October 2017 (hereafter ICRC, ‘Internment in 
Armed Conflict’). 
4  See CA 3, Art. 2 (1) AP II, Art. 4 AP II, Art. 5 AP II and Art. 6 AP II. 
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and expected occurrence in armed conflict’,5 both international and non-
international, is shared by many in the meantime.6 However, it only assists 
in the quest for a legal basis for detention if its ‘ordinariness’ constitutes ‘a 
general practice accepted as law’7 to form an international customary legal 
rule. The ICRC has indeed concluded that both customary and treaty IHL 
contain an inherent power to detain in NIAC.8 With respect to customary 
international law, it bases its position on the fact that ‘internment is a form 
of deprivation of liberty which is a common occurrence in armed conflict’.9 
This position has been challenged, most recently in the Serdar 
Mohammed case before British courts.10 The case, which has been 
frequently commented on,11 addresses the detention of an assumed Taliban 
____________________ 
5  32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Resolution 1 
‘Strengthening International Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of 
their Liberty’ (December 2015) preamble, para 1. 
6  See also The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International 
Military Operations (The Process): Principles and Guidelines (19 October 2012) 
preamble, para III, which formulates that ‘[participants] recognised that 
detention is a necessary, lawful and legitimate means of achieving the objectives 
of international military operations’ while explaining that the Guidelines 
themselves cannot constitute a legal basis for such detention, Principle 16 and 
Chairman’s Commentary 16.2. 
7  Art. 38 (1) (b) ICJ-Statute. 
8  Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al, ‘Article 3: Conflicts not of an International 
Character’ in ICRC (ed), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field (2nd edn, CUP 2016) para 671.  
9  ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict’ (n 3) 7. Rule 99 of the ICRC’s Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study merely states that ‘arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty is prohibited’ without positioning itself on the existence of any ‘non-
arbitrary’ grounds of detention under IHL, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Luise 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I: Rules (CUP 
2005) (hereafter Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary IHL). 
10  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB); [2014] CN 
1019 (hereafter Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014]); Serdar 
Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843; [2015] WLR (D) 354 
[30] (hereafter Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2015]), and Serdar 
Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2 (hereafter Serdar Mohammed 
v Ministry of Defence [2017]).  
11  See for each decision eg Marko Milanovic, ‘High Court Rules that the UK Lacks 
IHL Detention Authority in Afghanistan’ (EJIL: Talk!, 3 May 2014) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/high-court-rules-that-the-uk-lacks-ihl-detention-au-
thority-in-afghanistan> accessed 30 October 2017; Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari, 
‘The Authority to Detain in NIACs Revisted: Serdar Mohammed in the Court of 
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leader by British armed forces in Afghanistan in 2010 and raises various 
issues, such as the scope of application of the ECHR, its relationship with 
IHL, and, most relevantly, the power to detain under IHL, UN SC 
resolutions and domestic law.12 The courts have denied the existence of a 
power to detain under customary IHL for lack of uniformity of State 
practice and evidence of opinio juris13; the lack thereof is explained, inter 
alia, by the difficulties and uncertainties in identifying the scope of such 
power, i.e. ‘who may be detained, on what grounds, subject to what 
procedures and for how long’.14 More importantly, the courts have engaged 
in the ongoing discussion about ‘inherent’/‘implied’ IHL treaty powers.15 
The position taken by the ICRC and others is that treaty IHL contains an 
inherent power to detain in NIAC, as internment is a form of deprivation of 
____________________ 
Appeal’ (EJIL: Talk!, 5 August 2015) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-authority-to-
detain-in-niacs-revisited-serdar-mohammed-in-the-court-of-appeal> accessed 
30 October 2017; and Marko Milanovic, ‘A Trio of Blockbuster Judgments from 
the UK Supreme Court’ (EJIL: Talk!, 17 January 2017) <http://www.ejil-
talk.org/a-trio-of-blockbuster-judgments-from-the-uk-supreme-court> accessed 
30 October 2017. 
12  The possibility of domestic law, IHRL or UN SC Resolutions to provide such 
authority (and their relationships) is disregarded for the purpose of this analysis. 
Note, however, that the debate regarding a legal basis to detain under IHL is 
prevalent mostly with respect to internationalised NIACS or NIACs with an 
extraterritorial element, in which the detaining power’s ability to rely on own 
domestic law, informed by IHRL, cannot easily be assumed. 
13  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 10) [254]; Serdar 
Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2015] (n 10) [241]. The Supreme Court 
majority deemed it unnecessary to express a concluding view while expressing 
a preference for rejecting the current existence of a customary legal basis, see: 
Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] (n 10) [14]. For an analysis of 
customary IHL arguments to which the majority refers, see the dissenting 
opinion of Supreme Court Judge Lord Reed, Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of 
Defence [2014] (n 10) [271]. The Supreme Court’s hesitance to contribute to 
emerging customary IHL has been described as a possible ‘form of deliberate 
judicial conservatism’, see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘To Detain Lawfully or Not to 
Detain: Reflections on UK Supreme Court Decision in Serdar Mohammed’ (Just 
Security, 2 February 2017) <https://www.justsecurity.org/37013/detain-law-
fully-detain-question-reflection-uk-supreme-court-decision-serdar-moham-
med> accessed 30 October 2017. 
14  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 10) [258]. 
15  For an in-depth analysis of the Mohammed-cases see Manuel Brunner, 
‘Detention for Security Reseons by Armed Forces of a State in Situations of 
Non-International Armed Conflict: the Quest for a Legal Basis’ in this volume 
89. 
 
Part I: Fundamental Considerations 
62 
liberty which is not prohibited, but regulated by CA 3 and referred to 
explicitly in AP II.16 It is supported by authors who have commented on the 
Serdar Mohammed case specifically or on the legal basis for detention in 
NIAC more generally.17 However, the arguments opposing this position are 
manifold and currently seem to cumulatively be considered more persuasive 
by most.18 The extent of these arguments exceeds the scope of this analysis; 
nonetheless, they can be succinctly summarised as follows:19 (1) if the 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols had intended 
to provide a power to detain in NIAC, they could have done so similar to 
IAC; (2) CA 3 and AP II should be understood as only referring to a factual 
reality; (3) their mere purpose is to provide minimum standards of 
treatment; (4) regulation and authorisation need to be legally distinguished; 
i.e. to argue that, as IHL requires the humane treatment of detainees, it 
authorises their detention, rests on a non sequitur;20 (5) States which have 
been and continue to be unwilling to provide non-State armed groups, to 
which CA 3 and AP II apply reciprocally, authority and hence power to 
____________________ 
16  See especially ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict’ (n 3) 7. For comment on 
the Internment Opinion Paper, see Kevin Jon Heller, ‘What Exactly Is the 
ICRC’s Position on Detention in NIAC’ (Opinio Juris, 6 February 2015) 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2015/02/06/exactly-icrcs-position-detention-niac> 
accessed 30 October 2017. 
17  See for example, Jann K. Kleffner, ‘Operational Detention and the Treatment of 
Detainees’ in Terry Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the 
International Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010) 465, 471; Ryan 
Goodman, ‘The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 103 AJIL 48; 
Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari, ‘IHL Does Authorise Detention in NIAC: What 
the Sceptics Get Wrong’ (EJIL: Talk!, 11 February 2015) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/ihl-does-authorise-detention-in-niac-what-the-scep-
tics-get-wrong> accessed 30 October 2017. 
18  See also Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] (n 10) [274]. 
19  The following summary is based on the courts’ analyses in the Serdar 
Mohammed-case, supplemented by additional considerations especially in the 
footnotes; see Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 10) [241], 
Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2015] (n 10) [178], Serdar 
Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] (n 10) [258]. 
20  Commentators have added that the distinction between regulation of conduct 
and authorisation of conduct is of particular importance to IHL, which regulates 
the use of force without providing legal grounds for it (jus ad bellum), Lawrence 
Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, ‘Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for 
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 7 May 2014) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-
international-armed-conflicts> accessed 30 October 2017.  
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detain cannot rely on any implied powers of detention themselves; (6) a 
legal basis for detention cannot be implied without specification of the 
scope of the power; (7) the prohibition of ‘arbitrary deprivation of liberty’ 
requires that any legal basis authorising detention must define the 
circumstances to which it applies with sufficient precision;21 (8) an 
authorisation, or absence of prohibition,22 to use lethal force against certain 
individuals does not imply a power to detain, at least because the categories 
of people who may be lawfully killed or detained arguably differ. 
Finally, and most relevantly to this analysis, (9) the ICRC’s proposition 
that treaty law contains an inherent power to detain because internment is 
‘not prohibited by Common Article 3’23 has been rejected as an obsolete 
application of the Lotus principle.24 The UK Court of Appeals not only 
observes that ‘in this statement, the ICRC derives a positive power to intern 
from an absence of prohibition’,25 but the court supports a view of the nature 
of modern international law according to which the ‘absence of prohibition 
equals authority’ approach is criticised and considered to be outdated.26 
____________________ 
21  To counter this specific (sub-)argument, the ICRC suggests that, in case of 
internationalised NIACs, either an international agreement between the 
international, detaining forces and the host State or the domestic law of the host 
State should address the scope of the detention power as ‘additional authority’, 
see ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict’ (n 3) 8. The ICRC has furthermore 
indicated that it considers ‘imperative reasons of security’ to be the minimum 
legal standard that should inform internment decisions in NIAC, see ICRC, 
‘Internment in Armed Conflict’ (n 3) Annex I; Jelena Pejic, ‘Procedural 
Principles and Safeguards for Internment / Administrative Detention in Armed 
Conflict and Other Situations of Violence’ (2005) 87 IRRC 375. 
22  On the similar, related debate regarding whether IHL provides a legal basis to 
use lethal force (including whether a lack of prohibition to kill combatants or 
‘fighters’ implies a permission to do so), see for example Ryan Goodman, ‘The 
Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 24 EJIL 819 and Michael 
N. Schmitt, ‘Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’ (2013) 24 
EJIL 855. 
23  ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict’ (n 3) 7. 
24  See generally Ryan Goodman, ‘Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2015) ILS 155; Matthias Lippold, 
‘Between Humanization and Humanitarization? Detention in Armed Conflicts 
and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 76 ZaöRV 53. 
25  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2015] (n 10) [202]. 
26  Ibid, [197]. For support of the Court’s conclusion regarding this aspect, see Alex 
Conte, ‘The UK Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed: Treaty and Customary 
IHL Provides No Authority for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ 
(EJIL: Talk!, 6 August 2015) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-uk-court-of-appeal-
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On the contrary, the court considers and rejects the possibility of IHL 
having ‘reached the stage’ where it provides for a legal basis for detention 
in NIAC,27 hence thereby requiring an explicit legal authority. 
This contribution aims to both analyse the current relevance of the Lotus 
principle to IHL and expose the influence of the conception of public 
international law on IHL’s ‘implied’ authorities in cases of missing explicit 
legal bases.28 
B. Theoretical Background 
In the first section, a brief overview of the most relevant theories of 
international law is given in order to embed the following discussion in the 
appropriate context. 
Since the very beginning of international law, a broad range of theories 
of international law has existed, all of which seek to explain the nature of 
international legal rules.29 Concepts such as realism, sociological theories 
or critical theories have offered insights into the political and sociological 
factors contributing to the development of international law.30 However, the 
main debate in both public international law and IHL in particular remains 
between proponents of a positivist and a natural law approach, both 
advocating for the dominance of each theory in interpreting the 
____________________ 
in-serdar-mohammed-treaty-and-customary-ihl-provides-no-authority-for-
detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts> accessed 30 October 2017, 
who not only notes that the Court was correct in rejecting an ‘absence of 
prohibition equals authority’ approach, but who rather unapologetically remarks 
that ‘[n]o credible lawyer could genuinely assert that lack of an express 
prohibition constitutes authority to deprive persons of their liberty’. 
27  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2015] (n 10) [9]. 
28  A recent EJIL: Debate! demonstrates the importance of a deeper reflection on 
the theories of international law. See (2017) 28 EJIL No. 1. 
29  For an inspiring insight into the theories of international law, see Andrea 
Bianchi, International Law Theories: An Inquiry into different Ways of Thinking 
(OUP 2016). 
30  See eg Ingo Venzke, ‘Contemporary Theories and International Law-Making’ 
(2013) 59 Amsterdam Law School Research Paper 12 <https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2342175#> accessed 30 October 
2017; Steven Ratner, ‘Legal Realism School’ in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP July 
2007); Anthony Carty, ‘Sociological Theories of International Law’ in MPEPIL 
(online edn, OUP March 2008); Günter Frankenberg, ‘Critical Theory’ in 
MPEPIL (online edn, OUP October 2010). 
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international legal system. This appears to be the case despite the ostensible 
recognition that none of the theories can convincingly explain all aspects of 
the existing order.31 
I. Positivism 
Positivism is a generic term that describes a legal theory and covers a wide 
spectrum of partially competing positions which have been developed since 
the 19th century.32 In a traditional positivist understanding, international law 
is defined as law laid down through the consent and agreement of sovereign 
States that are equally entitled to create norms.33 Accordingly, law-making 
in international law requires two complementary elements: a ‘voluntarist’- 
and a ‘unity of sources’-element.34 Whereas the former is needed to express 
that law originates from States’ will,35 the latter recognises as law only those 
norms that can be traced back to one ultimate source36 and that are generated 
____________________ 
31  See generally: Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Legal Theory and Doctrine’ 
in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP November 2007) para 17; and specifically, 
Andreas von Arnauld, Völkerrecht (3rd edn, C.F. Müller 2016) 6, who cites the 
Münchhausen Trilemma according to which each theory leads to a circular 
argument, a regressive argument, or an axiomatic argument. 
32  For further reading on positivism, see Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont 
(eds), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (CUP 2014) or 
Robert Kolb, Theories of International Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2016) 105-
10 (hereafter Kolb, Theories of International Law). 
33  James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, 
OUP 2012) 9 (hereafter Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles). Note that some 
modern positivist approaches are open for the possibility of including non-State 
actors as ‘law-makers’, eg Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus, ‘The 
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A 
Positivist View’ (1999) 93 AJIL 302, 306 (hereafter Simma and Paulus, 
‘Responsibility of Individuals’); Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Non-state actors from the 
perspective of the Pure Theory of Law’ in Jean d’Aspremont (ed), Participants 
in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in 
International Law (Routledge 2011) 54, 59-60. 
34  Frauke Lachenmann, ‘Legal Positivism’ in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP July 
2011) para 3 (hereafter Lachenmann, ‘Legal Positivism’). 
35  Ibid. 
36  Depending on the branch of positivism, the ultimate source is to be found in 
State consent (consensualism) or notions such as pacta sunt servanda (neo-
positivism) or a rule of recognition. See eg Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre 
(Deuticke, 1934) 129, who describes the ultimate source as ‘Grundnorm’. 
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by a pre-set legal procedure.37 Consequently, international law is not 
described as law above States, but as law between States and can be 
differentiated from ‘non-law’ as well as national law by its sources, 
procedures, and doctrine.38 
The Lotus principle has been considered to reflect a traditional positivist 
approach towards international law. According to the Lotus principle, States 
are free in their decisions unless acts or omissions are prohibited by 
international law.39 Thus, international law is seen to possess a prohibitive 
character.40 Positivism, as reflected in the Lotus principle, has been 
criticised especially with regard to the ‘undesired’ consequences which may 
result from the absence of prohibitive rules41 and for its inability to provide 
adequate answers to contemporary challenges.42 The adherence to State 
sovereignty and State will has raised questions concerning the sources of 
____________________ 
37  Lachenmann, ‘Legal Positivism’ (n 34) para 3. 
38  Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 33) 9; Jutta Brunnée, ‘Consent’ in MPEPIL 
(online edn, OUP October 2010) para 3; Lachenmann, ‘Legal Positivism’ (n 34) 
para 30. 
39  The Lotus principle was developed from the so-called Lotus decision of the 
PCIJ, see The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Series A 
No 10, in particular the Court’s statement at 8: ‘International law governs 
relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in 
order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions 
upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.’ 
40  For an alternative interpretation of the Lotus decision, see eg Jörg Kammerhofer, 
‘Gaps, the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the Structure of 
International Legal Argument between Theory and Practice’ (2010) 80 BYIL 
333, 341-43; Pia Hesse, ‘Comment: neither Sunken Vessel nor Blooming 
Flower! The Lotus Principle and International Humanitarian Law’ in this 
volume 80 (hereafter Hesse, ‘Neither Sunken Vesserl nor Blooming Flower!’). 
41  With respect to domestic (German) law, see Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches 
Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ (1946) 1 SJZ 105 (hereafter Radbruch, 
‘Gesetzliches Unrecht’); regarding international law, see especially Martti 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (2nd edn, CUP 2006). 
42  Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Introduction: the future of 
international legal positivism’ in Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont 
(eds), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (CUP 2014) 1, 4-
7. 
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international law43 and the permissibility of analogies to fill perceived 
‘gaps’ in international law.44 Regardless of the criticism, positivism seems 
to currently remain the dominant theory of international law45 since it, inter 
alia, offers coherence and predictability.46 This continued reliance on 
positivism hence suggests a generally restrictive nature of international 
(humanitarian) law. 
II. Natural Law 
The concept of natural law refers to norms and principles deduced from 
god, nature, reason, the idea of justice, or some social or historical necessity, 
i.e. from something not laid down by any human authority.47 According to 
natural law theory, international law is law above States and may not be 
superseded by law made by States or other actors.48 While natural law does 
not exclude the possible creation of positive norms through State consent,49 
it foresees the prerogative to ‘correct’ positive law where needed.50 Despite 
a resurgence of natural law theory in public international law,51 one of 
natural law’s most important challenges remains the lack of an 
acknowledged methodology for the identification and verification of natural 
____________________ 
43  With regard to customary international law, the general principles of 
international law and jus cogens, see eg Lachenmann, ‘Legal Positivism’ (n 34) 
paras 35-37, 44, 47. 
44  See Silja Vöneky, ‘Analogy in International Law’ in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP 
February 2008) paras 13-14, 24. 
45  See generally Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Appraising the 
Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 AJIL 291, 
293; and specifically on human rights issues Simma and Paulus, ‘Responsibility 
of Individuals’ (n 33) 302, who note that ‘in reflecting on our day-to-day legal 
work, we realized that, for better or for worse, we indeed employ the tools 
developed by the “positivist” tradition’. 
46  Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Legal Process School’ in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP 
November 2006) para 22. 
47  Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Natural Law and Justice’ in MPEPIL (online edn, 
OUP August 2007) para 1. 
48  Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 
2007) 11. 
49  Kolb, Theories of International Law (n 32) 117.  
50  See eg Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht’ (n 41). 
51  Kolb, Theories of International Law (n 32) 116-18. 
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law norms,52 which would allow international legal actors to authoritatively 
rely on them.53 Natural law theory neither follows a Lotus approach towards 
international law nor does it abstractly determine whether it is generally 
permissive or restrictive in nature. Instead, it follows a case-by-case 
approach and balances different norms and principles to reach a legal 
conclusion54 which may be permissive or restrictive in character, e.g. 
allowing or prohibiting/limiting detention in armed conflict. 
C. Existence of an International Humanitarian Law-Specific Approach? 
IHL is a branch of public international law governing armed conflicts by 
protecting those who are not or no longer participating in hostilities and by 
restricting the means and methods of warfare. Whereas it must, as such, be 
interpreted in accordance with general public international law, it 
constitutes a distinct body of law with several specificities.55 This section 
hence considers the possible existence of an IHL-specific approach towards 
permissiveness and restriction based on a positivist approach, also due to 
lack of accepted natural law methodology. It not only assesses the Lotus 
principle’s perception within IHL, but also examines its norm structure, 
including the significance and meaning of the principle of military necessity 
and the Martens Clause. 
I. Perception of the Lotus Principle within International Humanitarian Law 
The extent to which the Lotus principle applies to IHL has been debated 
predominately in the context of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
____________________ 
52  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International Law’ in MPEPIL (online 
edn, OUP November 2007) para 6. A prominent example which has been 
discussed as a possible natural law norm is the ‘inherent right’ to self-defence. 
53  International courts as the ICJ and PCIJ have rarely based their judgments and 
opinions on norms or principles attributable to natural law, but reinforce their 
findings by invoking such notions by way of obiter dicta, see Lachenmann, 
‘Legal Positivism’ (n 34) para 56. 
54  See eg Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie: Studienausgabe (2nd edn, C.F. 
Müller 2003). Radbruch describes a pyramid of natural law principles with the 
principle of justice on top.  
55  Note for example the legally uncontested binding nature of IHL for non-State 
actors in NIAC. 
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Opinion.56 Given that the Court was asked if ‘the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons [is] in any circumstances permitted under international law’,57 
intervening States argued over the necessity of an authorisation under 
international law permitting the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Some 
States criticised that the formulation of the question was incompatible with 
international law, which protects States’ sovereignty and freedom to act that 
is only restricted by prohibitive rules under international customary or 
treaty law. If the Court were to answer the question, the word ‘permitted’ 
should be replaced by ‘prohibited’.58 Other States asserted that the 
invocation of the Lotus principle was inappropriate under contemporary 
international law and in the circumstances of the present case.59 The Court, 
however, simply noted that 
... the nuclear-weapons States appearing before it either accepted, or did not dispute, 
that their independence to act was indeed restricted by the principles and rules of 
international law, more particularly humanitarian law …, as did the other States 
which took part in the proceedings.60 
It hence concluded that ‘the argument concerning the legal conclusions to 
be drawn from the use of the word “permitted” [is] without particular 
significance for the disposition of the issues before the Court’.61 The Court 
thereby ‘brushed aside’62 any meaningful debate about the Lotus principle’s 
application within IHL and diverted it to the judges’ Separate and 
Dissenting Opinions. 
The Opinions primarily reveal a dissent regarding the continued 
relevance of the Lotus principle for today’s international legal order in 
general. Critics of a permissive approach to international law (1) stress the 
____________________ 
56  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226 (hereafter Nuclear Weapons).  
57  The question upon which the Advisory Opinion had been requested was set forth 
in UN GA Res UN Doc A/RES/49/75K (15 December 1994). The French text 
equally reads as follows: ‘Est-il permis en droit international de recourir à la 
menace ou à l’emploi d’armes nucléaires en toute circonstance?’. 
58  Nuclear Weapons (n 56) 238-39, paras 21 et seq. 
59  Ibid, para 21. 
60  Ibid, 239, para 22. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Christopher Greenwood, ‘The Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons and the 
Contribution of the International Court to International Humanitarian Law’ 
(1997) IRRC 66, 67, who also demonstrates that the Court, in its subsequent 
analysis, considered if certain rules prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, and not 
whether they authorise such use.  
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evolution of the international legal system from co-existence to 
community,63 (2) emphasise the specific context of the Lotus decision, i.e. 
the delimitation of criminal jurisdiction,64 and (3) support natural law 
approaches instead of, or in addition to, legal positivism.65 In relation to a 
later Advisory Opinion, the continued endorsement of the Lotus principle 
was additionally criticised for ignoring ‘the possible degrees of non-
prohibition, ranging from “tolerated” to “permissible” to “desirable”’66 and 
for failing to explore ‘whether international law can be deliberately neutral 
or silent on a certain issue.’67 
Regarding the application of the Lotus principle to IHL specifically, 
dissenting judges have distinguished the context of the Lotus decision (i.e. 
the collision of two vessels on the high seas in peacetime) from situations 
to which IHL applies (e.g. the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict) in 
order to argue that IHL was already a well-established concept at the time 
of the decision, but simply not relevant to it. The PCIJ’s decision should 
thus not be used to negate IHL and to override its basic principles, such as 
the Martens Clause.68 In other, more drastic, words: a case dealing with the 
delimitation of criminal jurisdiction, being ‘scarcely an earth-shaking 
issue’,69 should not be seen as governing ‘any act which could bring 
civilization to an end and annihilate mankind’.70 More fundamentally, it is 
contended that the Lotus principle does not apply to acts or omissions which 
‘by reason of their essential nature, cannot form the subject of a right’, as 
these threaten the international community’s very own existence and, thus, 
the international legal order protecting State sovereignty.71 
Despite individual judges’ doubts about the continued relevance of the 
Lotus principle in international law and concerns about the appropriateness 
of its application to IHL, the ICJ has so far not decided to abandon its mainly 
____________________ 
63  Declaration of President Bedjaoui in Nuclear Weapons (n 56) 48, para 12. 
64  Ibid. On this aspect, see also Hesse, ‘Neither Sunken Vessel nor Blooming 
Flower!’ (n 40).  
65  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Nuclear Weapons (n 56) 494.  
66  Declaration of Judge Simma in Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory 
Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, 480, para 8. 
67  Ibid, 480-481, para 9. 
68  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Nuclear Weapons (n 56) 495. 
69  Dissenting Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen in Nuclear Weapons (n 56) 395. 
70  Ibid, 394. 
71  Ibid, 392. For an analysis of the Lotus principle’s compatibility with the UN 
Charter and the law of neutrality, see also 391. 
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positivist view. An analysis of the norm structure of IHL might therefore 
complement the judges’ considerations. 
II. Norm Structure of International Humanitarian Law 
As far as the first codifications of IHL – such as the Paris Declaration of 
1856,72 the Lieber Code of 1863,73 the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 
1868,74 and the Oxford Manual of 188075 – are informative, IHL initially 
served to limit the belligerents’ exercise of power and to generate restrictive 
effects by relying on certain overarching principles based on natural law.76 
As codification progressed, the formulation of and relationship between 
such principles was framed in positive legal rules,77 making IHL one of the 
first branches of public international law to be comprehensively codified. 
The norm structure of modern treaty IHL as well as its drafting history 
suggests that States primarily agreed on restrictive rules. The current rules 
of IHL treaties are generally prohibitory in wording and manner.78 Only a 
few rules use permissive wording, e.g. Art. 21 GC III on the restriction of 
liberty of movement of prisoners of war and Art. 43 (2) AP I which grants 
‘[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict … the right to 
____________________ 
72  Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (entered into force 16 April 1856) in 
British State Papers vol. LXI (1856), 155. 
73  Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (24 
April 1863) in Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts 
(3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher 1988) 3 (hereafter Lieber Code). 
74  Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight (entered into force 11 December 1868) in Dietrich 
Schindler and Jiri Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts (3rd edn, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publisher 1988) 102. 
75  The Laws of War on Land (Oxford, 9 September 1880) in Dietrich Schindler 
and Jiri Toman (eds), The Laws of Armed Conflicts (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publisher 1988) 36. 
76  Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (CUP 2001) 70-88. 
77  See Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance’ (2010) 50 VJIL 796, 796 
(hereafter Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity’); Yoram Dinstein, ‘Military Necessity’ 
in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP September 2015) para 7 (hereafter Dinstein, 
‘Military Necessity’). 
78  This contribution perceives rules expressing obligations in IHL such as 
Art. 10 (2) GC I or Art. 12 (1) AP I as restrictive rules as they prohibit any 
behaviour which is not in compliance with the obligation. 
 
Part I: Fundamental Considerations 
72 
participate directly in hostilities’. Taking into account the travaux 
préparatoires, commentators argue that the permissive wording was chosen 
only for reasons of clarification.79 According to them, the prerequisite of a 
permissive norm for belligerents’ conduct was not intended.80 As 
conventional IHL is expanding, in particular with respect to limitations and 
prohibitions of means of warfare,81 it may well be argued that these treaties 
demonstrate a continued intention of States to regulate warfare by imposing 
restrictions, which is equally reflected in their practice contributing to the 
formation of customary IHL. An examination of the rules of customary 
IHL, as formulated in the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Study,82 reveals that they too have been phrased in a mostly prohibitory 
way with only few rules formulated in permissive wording.83 However, 
according to the context of and the commentaries to the rules, these 
permissions either constitute exceptions to general prohibitions or provide 
clarifications.84 
For a more thorough analysis of the norm structure of IHL, the following 
subsections discuss the contemporary significance and meaning of the 
principle of military necessity and of the Martens Clause for the permission 
or restriction of conduct in IHL. 
____________________ 
79  Jean S. Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, 
vol. III (Geneva 1960) 178 (hereafter Pictet, Commentary); Yves Sandoz et al 
(eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) 515-16 
(hereafter Sandoz et al, Commentary). 
80  Pictet, Commentary (n 79) 178; Sandoz et al, Commentary (n 79) 515-16. 
81  See eg the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(adopted 7 July 2017) UN GA A/RES/71/258 (Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons). 
82  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary IHL (n 9). 
83  Ibid, Rules 1, 49, 51, 66, 68 and 128. 
84  Ibid, Rule 1 which, in the first sentence, obliges parties to a conflict to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants. In the second and third sentence, 
the rule clarifies that thus, ‘[attacks] may only be directed against combatants’, 
but ‘must not be directed against civilians.’  
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1. Principle of military necessity 
When the principle of military necessity was first codified in the Lieber 
Code in 1863,85 it drew in part upon morality and a responsibility ‘to one 
another and to God’ in conducting warfare.86 However, it also established 
the weakening of enemy forces as the only legitimate purpose of the conduct 
of warfare and linked the necessity of measures ‘indispensable for securing 
the ends of the war’ to their legality according to ‘the modern law and 
usages of war’. Whereas the principle has since been understood as only 
permitting measures ‘in accordance with law’, its permissive or restrictive 
nature remains controversial.87 
Concerning the principle’s relation to treaty and customary rules of 
positive law, States, academia and jurisprudence such as the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’s Hostage case have rejected the German nineteenth century 
doctrine of Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier (‘the necessities of war take 
____________________ 
85  See Art. 14-16 Lieber Code (n 73): ‘Art. 14: Military necessity, as understood 
by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which 
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful 
according to the modern law and usages of war’; ‘Art. 15: Military necessity 
admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other 
persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of 
the war … Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease 
on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.’ and 
‘Art. 16: Military necessity does not admit of cruelty – that is, the infliction of 
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge … and, in general, military 
necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace 
unnecessarily difficult.’ 
86  The principle of military necessity and the Martens Clause are therefore often-
cited examples of concepts containing notions of natural law; see Rupert 
Ticehorst, ‘The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict’ (1997) 37 
IRRC 125, 132-33 (hereafter Ticehorst, ‘Martens Clause’); Michael Salter, 
‘Reinterpreting Competing Interpretations of the Scope and Potential of the 
Martens Clause’ (2012) 17 JCSL 403, 433-34 (hereafter Salter, ‘Reinterpreting 
Competing Interpretations’); David Turns, ‘Military Necessity’ (Oxford 
Bibliographies, 2012) <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/> accessed 30 
October 2017; David Luban, ‘Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military 
Law’ (2013) 26 LJIL 315, 340 (hereafter Luban, ‘Military Necessity’). This 
analysis considers them from a positivist perspective only. 
87  See, among others, Burrus M. Carnahan, ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: 
The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity’ (1998) 92 AJIL 
213; Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity’ (n 77); and Nils Melzer, ‘Targeted Killing or 
Less Harmful Means? – Israel’s High Court Judgment on Targeted Killing and 
the Restrictive Function of Military Necessity’ (2006) 9 YbIHL 87. 
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precedence over the rules of war’88). The Tribunal provided that ‘[m]ilitary 
necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules’89 and 
that the prohibitions contained in the Hague Regulations ‘control and are 
superior to military necessities of the most urgent nature except where the 
Regulations themselves specifically provide the contrary’.90 Examples of 
contemporary rules providing for the possibility to invoke military necessity 
in exceptional circumstances include Art. 8 GC I and GC II, Art. 53 GC IV, 
Art. 52 (2) AP I, Art. 62 (1) AP I and Art. 71 (3) AP I as well as Rules 38 
(B), 39, 43 (B), 50, 51, 56 and 156 of the ICRC’s Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study.91 These articles support the conclusion that the 
principle of military necessity only permits departure from prohibitive rules 
if the rules foresee such a possibility.92 
The role of the principle of military necessity in situations not explicitly 
covered by rules of positive IHL remains a subject of debate93 and practical 
relevance, e.g. with respect to the legal basis for detention in NIAC, as 
illustrated above. Some argue that the principle is not limited to rules of 
positive law specifically foreseeing its application, but may serve as an 
independent rule – either as customary law or as a general principle of law 
within the meaning of Art. 38 (1) (c) ICJ-Statute – in the absence of explicit 
rules of positive law (i.e. providing a basis for detention).94 Others maintain 
____________________ 
88  Luban, ‘Military Necessity’ (n 86) 341. 
89  The United States of America v Wilhelm List, et al (1948) Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, vol. VIII, 66 (hereafter US v Wilhelm List, et al). 
90  Ibid, 69. 
91  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary IHL (n 9). For an example of 
domestic regulation reflecting this position, see Office of General Counsel, 
Department of Defence, Law of War Manual, (Washington 2016) paras 1.3.3.2, 
2.1.2.3 and 2.2. (hereafter DoD Manual), which defines military necessity as 
‘the principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as 
quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war’. 
92  On the IHL-specific approach towards State responsibility (i.e. necessity as a 
possible circumstance precluding wrongfulness according to Art. 25 (2) (a) 
ASR), see eg Marco Sassòli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2002) 84 IRRC 401. 
93  For an early discussion, see US v Wilhelm List, et al (n 89) 63-64, in which the 
Tribunal discussed under which circumstances violations of rules derived from 
fundamental concepts of justice, humanity and the rights of individuals may be 
justified (which were, however, not met in the case). 
94  See eg DoD Manual (n 91) 2.2.1.  
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that the principle may never be invoked as an independent rule, but only if 
a norm explicitly foresees its application.95 
Ultimately, the existence or non-existence of the principle of military 
necessity as an independent rule of IHL seems to be of only limited 
significance for the purpose of this analysis. If the principle was an 
independent rule of IHL, its existence would only be relevant for the 
examination of an IHL-specific approach towards the Lotus principle if its 
nature was permissive. Such an independent permissive rule would imply 
that States are not free in their belligerent conduct, but are dependent on 
permission and are obliged to act at least within the limits of the principle 
of military necessity’s scope of permission. Otherwise (i.e. if the principle 
of military necessity was restrictive in nature), it would in principle 
reinforce the application of the Lotus principle within IHL, but serve to 
restrict belligerents’ freedom to conduct that is militarily necessary. 
Currently, there seems yet to be insufficient support for the existence of 
an independent rule of the principle of military necessity, either permissive 
or restrictive in nature, within positive IHL. Therefore, it seems unjustified 
to, firstly, conclude that the principle of military necessity affirms or 
constrains the application of the Lotus principle within IHL or to, secondly, 
derive a humanitarian law-specific approach from it. 
2. Martens Clause 
Due to its uncommonly broad wording and drafting history, the Martens 
Clause has been subject to a variety of interpretations. In general, four main 
approaches for the interpretation of the Clause can be identified. These 
consider it as: (1) irrelevant/inapplicable, (2) a reminder that customary and 
conventional international law apply in parallel, (3) an affirmation of the 
existence of a separate source of international law to be distinguished from 
customary and conventional international law, and (4) a prevention of an a 
contrario argument based on the Lotus principle.96 
____________________ 
95  See eg Dinstein, ‘Military Necessity’ (n 77) paras 8-10, who refers to war crime 
trials after World War II; Nobuo Hayashi, ‘Requirements of Military Necessity 
in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law’ (2010) 28 
Boston University International Law Journal 39. 
96  See generally Jochen von Bernstoff, ‘Martens Clause’ in MPEPIL (online edn, 
OUP December 2009); Ticehorst, ‘Martens Clause’ (n 86); Salter, 
‘Reinterpreting Competing Interpretations’ (n 86). 
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Whereas some have argued that the Martens Clause has lacked normative 
status since its inception, others have put forward that the Clause has lost 
legal significance over time. The former position is based on the Clause’s 
(historical) context. It stresses that the inclusion of the Clause, proposed by 
Russian diplomat Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, into the legally non-
binding preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention II97 was a compromise 
between the great powers and smaller States over a dispute on the inclusion 
of rules of the 1874 Brussels Declaration dealing with combatant status for 
resistance fighters during belligerent occupation, and therefore only 
constituted a ‘diplomatic ploy’.98 The latter position submits that the 
wording of the Martens Clause (‘until a more complete code of the laws of 
war is issued’) implied a temporary restriction to the Clause’s scope of 
application which was triggered when ‘a more complete code of the laws of 
war’ was issued with the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols of 1977.99 Both arguments, considered in 
isolation, ignore that the Martens Clause has not only been reaffirmed in 
subsequent conventions, but legally revalued when included in the 
substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions and AP I.100 
____________________ 
97  Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 
29 July 1899, entered into force 04 September 1900) in Dietrich Schindler and 
Jiri Toman (eds), The Laws of Armed Conflicts (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publisher 1988) 69-93. The Preamble notes that ‘[until] a more complete code 
of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare 
that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of 
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized 
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public 
conscience’. 
98  Antonio Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ 
(2000) 11 EJIL 187, 193-94 and 197 (hereafter Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause’). 
99  See especially the position of the Russian Federation in Nuclear Weapons (n 56), 
‘Written Statement and Comments of the Russian Federation on the Issue of the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (19 June 1995) 13 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/8796.pdf> accessed 30 October 
2017. 
100  See common Art. 63/62/142/158 GC, Art. 1 (2) AP I, the preamble to AP II and 
compare the wording of Art. 1 (2) AP I: ‘In cases not covered by this Protocol 
or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of 
public conscience.’ 
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The submissions of the UK and the US to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion reflect a second interpretative approach, according to 
which the Martens Clause only serves as a reminder that customary 
international law continues to apply after the adoption of a treaty norm, but 
has no normative content of its own.101 Yet, it is not apparent why a 
reminder (legally binding or not) should be necessary, given that 
international law knows no hierarchy in the sources of legal obligations. 
Moreover, the Clause’s wording is not limited to ‘custom’, but extends to 
the ‘principles of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of public conscience’, which 
can hardly be reduced to mean customary international law. 
In a third interpretative approach, it has therefore been suggested that the 
Martens Clause affirms the existence of separate sources of international 
law that are to be distinguished from conventional and customary 
international law. Not only does the drafting history of the relevant treaties 
not support such a conclusion,102 but it also remains unclear which rules 
would be deducible from the ‘principles of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of 
public conscience’ in the absence of conventional or customary 
international law. 103 It must thus be noted that in international and national 
____________________ 
101  See eg the position of the UK in Nuclear Weapons (n 56) ‘Statement of the 
Government of the United Kingdom’ (16 June 1995) 48, para 3.58 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/8802.pdf> accessed 30 October 
2017: ‘The terms of the Martens Clause themselves make it necessary to point 
to a rule of customary international law which might outlaw the use of nuclear 
weapons. Since the existence of such a rule is in question, reference to the 
Martens Clause adds little.’ 
102  Compare the ICRC draft preamble to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949 and their Commentary (Geneva, October 
1973), 5 (‘Recalling that, in cases not covered by conventional or customary 
international law, civilian population and the combatants remain under the 
protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience’) with the final wording of Art. 1 (2) AP I. The Drafting Committee 
did not follow the ICRC’s proposal and located the principles of humanity and 
dictates of the public conscience within the Martens Clause-formulation 
requiring the existence of ‘principles of international law derived from … the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience’, see Michael 
Bothe et al, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 
1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1982) 44. 
103  For a discussion about possible ways to identify the dictates of public 
conscience, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in Nuclear 
Weapons (n 56) 410, who proposes to look to sources which speak ‘with 
authority’, like resolutions of the UN GA. See also the Treaty on the Prohibition 
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jurisprudence, in State practice or academic writings, it has never been 
found that a rule has emerged only as a result of these notions, but that 
conventional or customary international law was required for a positive rule 
to exist.104 
Based on these considerations, a fourth approach to interpreting the 
Martens Clause seems preferable. It supposes that the Martens Clause 
prevents an a contrario argument based on the Lotus principle and that it 
provides that something which is not explicitly prohibited by a treaty is not 
ipso facto permitted in IHL.105 The notions referred to in the Clause at least 
prevent a strict application of the Lotus principle: States are not entirely free 
to do what is not expressly prohibited by treaty or custom. More 
specifically, they must consider the principles of humanity and the dictates 
of public conscience, which may or may not provide guidance restricting or 
____________________ 
of Nuclear Weapons (n 81) which in its preamble ‘[reaffirms] that any use of 
nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the 
dictates of public conscience’ and hence takes a more affirmative stance than 
previous drafts which had reaffirmed ‘that in cases not covered by this 
convention, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority 
of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience’. 
104  See generally The Prosecutor v Kupreskic et al (Judgment) ICTY-95-16-T-14 
(14 January 2000) 525 and Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause’ (n 98) 202-8 and 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in Dieter 
Fleck (ed), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (3rd ed, 
OUP 2013) 1, para 131. See also Jean-Philippe Lavoyer and Louis Maresca, 
‘The Role of the ICRC in the Development of International Humanitarian Law’ 
(1999) 4 International Negotiation 501, 511-17, who (partially dissenting) note 
with respect to the Ottawa process to ban anti-personnel landmines: ‘This 
process affirmed for many what the ICRC and others had always known to be 
true: that humanitarian law has its roots in the public perception about the 
acceptable limits of warfare. It has long been a maxim of humanitarian law that 
even in the absence of positive or customary rules, the conduct of armed conflict 
is limited by the “laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience”. Public 
conscience was a vital element in creating the necessary political will for action 
against anti-personnel mines in government, military and international circles. 
As a result, it became a stigmatised weapon, and the norm against its use was 
established before the adoption of the ban treaty. This element was an important 
factor in the decision of countries to continue developing a ban in a new context, 
closely linked with civil society.’ 
105  Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons’ (1997) 79 IRRC 37, 49. 
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permitting certain conduct – such as detention – but which open up IHL to 
further development and other areas of international law. 
D. Conclusion 
The discussion about detention in NIAC illuminates the persistently diverse 
perceptions of international law and its treatment of situations which are not 
addressed by explicit legal rules. The issue whether and to what extent the 
Lotus principle applies to IHL is of fundamental importance in this 
context.106 An analysis of the jurisprudence of the ICJ confirms a positivist 
approach which foresees the application of the Lotus principle within IHL. 
An examination of the norm structure of treaty and customary IHL also 
suggests that IHL is mainly restrictive in nature and compatible with a 
positivist vision of international law, meaning that belligerent conduct is 
permitted, if not prohibited by law. The principle of military necessity, if 
interpreted to constitute an independent legal rule of permissive nature and 
the Martens Clause, however, constrain the application of the Lotus 
principle within IHL. The Martens Clause especially serves to prevent 
a contrario arguments and to limit States’ freedom in conducting armed 
conflict by introducing notions possibly inspired by natural law, such as the 
principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience. Forcedly vague, 
the notions require further legal interpretation to provide better guidance. 
However, it is foreseeable that a case-by-case approach to the application 
of a ‘Martens Clause-restricted Lotus principle’ (however well informed) 
does not produce pragmatic solutions to military and humanitarian needs 
which IHL seeks to balance with both resolve and caution. Thus, States are 
well advised to fill possible gaps in positive law and to work towards greater 
legal clarity.107
____________________ 
106 More generally, the operation of the Lotus principle within other branches of 
public international law seems worthy of more scholarly attention. 
107 For scholarly contributions, see eg Brian Orend, ‘The Next Geneva Convention: 
Filling a Law-of-War Gap with Human Rights Values’ in Jens David Ohlin (ed), 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 363. 
  
80 
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The Lotus case of the PCIJ is one of the most cited cases in international 
law. Formulating the voluntarist paradigm with international law as rules 
emanating from the free will of independent States, Lotus serves as an 
important point of reference for deliberations on legal positivism. From the 
appraisal that it is State consent that gives international law its binding 
force, the Court infers that  
… [t]he rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will 
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-
existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common 
aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.1  
This Lotus formula is often invoked as a meta-concept attesting 
international law a prohibitive nature and thereby reflecting a rigid 
positivist approach to international law. In their paper, Katja Schöberl and 
Linus Mührel essentially analyse the relevance of this concept to IHL. 
In this comment, I argue that this frequently referenced passage of the 
PCIJ’s case cannot be read in isolation, but must rather be understood in its 
context. In this way, the Lotus principle loses its significance as a doctrine 
to explain the nature of international law as a whole. To use Katja 
Schöberl’s and Linus Mührel’s words: The flower is not in full bloom, but 
it is much more than a sunken vessel. The Lotus formula is part of the PCIJ’s 
more detailed elaborations on the broader question of jurisdiction in 
international law. Its relevance thus spans beyond the single case of the 
collision between a French and a Turkish steamer back in 1926. In fact, 
jurisdiction is the gist of the Lotus case. Understanding the Lotus formula 
____________________ 
1  The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Series A No 10, 
para 44 (hereafter ‘The Case of the SS Lotus’). 
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cited above as one statement of the Court’s larger deliberations on 
jurisdiction, this comment claims that the Lotus formula is not readily 
applicable to IHL. 
As a first step, I will turn to the international law on jurisdiction in more 
general terms. On this basis, I will then demonstrate how it relates to IHL 
and thereby underpin my assertion that Lotus is not apt to determine the 
nature of IHL. 
B. The International Law on Jurisdiction 
International law on jurisdiction is a vast field. It is basically a procedural 
mechanism to determine the application ratione loci of different substantive 
regulations.2 In 1927, when the PCIJ was asked to resolve the dispute 
between the French and the Turkish government, substantive regulations 
were predominantly found in the domestic legal orders of States. In a 
decentralised international system of independent States, the key role of 
international law was to delimit spheres of competence between co-existing 
States. The substantive legal framework to then govern the given situation 
was the domestic law of the competent State. International law as a legal 
order performing a task of co-ordination between sovereign States: This 
was ‘the spirit of the times’3 and this is the image of international law 
adopted by the PCIJ in the Lotus case. 
The question the PCIJ was confronted with was whether States actually 
need to ‘point to some title to jurisdiction’4 or whether States are free to 
exercise jurisdiction unless there is a rule of international law prohibiting 
it5. The exercise of jurisdiction can be performed by prescribing rules, or by 
enforcing these rules either through the executive branch or through courts. 
Here, and this is central to this comment, it is essential to make a 
differentiation. There is a distinction between the rules that are prescribed 
or enforced and the rules that provide the authorisation to prescribe or 
____________________ 
2  Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 2 
(hereafter ‘Ryngaert, Jurisdiction’).  
3  Declaration of President Bedjaoui in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 12 (hereafter 
‘Declaration Judge Bedjaoui’). 
4  This was the position of the French Government in the Lotus case, see The Case 
of the SS Lotus (n 1) para 41; emphasis added. 
5  The position of the Turkish Government in the Lotus case, ibid. 
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enforce – the title ‘to’ jurisdiction. Whereas the former usually is found 
among domestic laws of States, the latter is one of international law. The 
Lotus formula, however, exclusively refers to the latter type of rules – those 
granting or not granting a title to jurisdiction.  
International law on jurisdiction thus aims at demarcating the fields of 
competence between sovereign States and, thereby, at reducing conflicts 
between them.6 As a consequence, the decision of the PCIJ that is put in a 
nutshell by the above cited Lotus formula can, originally, only apply to 
international rules concerning the ‘if’ of the exercise of jurisdiction by 
States in their international relations. The essential phrase supposedly 
explaining the nature of international law, ‘[r]estrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed’, is to be taken as 
meaning ‘[r]estrictions upon the exercise of jurisdiction by States cannot 
therefore be presumed’. 
However, this statement, reflecting the consent theory underlying the 
positivist paradigm, is only half of the truth. The PCIJ made a distinction 
between different forms of exercising jurisdiction and established different 
relationships of rules and exceptions for them. Whereas States are generally 
free, if not restrained by a prohibitive rule of international law, to prescribe 
rules (prescriptive jurisdiction) even concerning situations and persons 
outside their territorial boundaries, the enforcement of its rules 
(enforcement jurisdiction) using coercive power in another State’s territory 
is generally prohibited, unless a permissive rule to the contrary exists.7 The 
international law of jurisdiction, however, has since developed and other 
principles have emerged, especially under customary international law.8 
But these need not be further elaborated here, as international law of 
jurisdiction is not the topic of this comment. This brief digression served 
only to demonstrate that the Lotus formula first and foremost is concerned 
with international jurisdiction and that the PCIJ in its decision adopted a 
view that regards international law as inter-State law, a system that operates 
in the horizontal dimension, regulating the relationship between 
independent entities.9 
____________________ 
6  John E. Ferry, ‘Towards Completing the Charm: The Woodpulp Judgment’ 
(1989) 10 European Competition Law Review 58. 
7  The Case of the SS Lotus (n 1) para 45. 
8  See Ryngaert, Jurisdiction (n 2). 
9  Roman Kwiecien, ‘On Some Contemporary Challenges to Statehood in the 
International Legal Order: International Law Between Lotus and Global 
Administrative Law’ (2013) 51 Archiv des Völkerrechts 281. 
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IHL, however, is the best illustration of the fact that international law is 
more than inter-State law, which, at the same time, disqualifies it from being 
subject to the Lotus doctrine.  
C. The International Law on Jurisdiction and International Humanitarian 
Law 
As has been shown, an allocation of competence by the law of international 
jurisdiction determines a State’s scope of action and, as a corollary, the 
scope of application ratione loci of its laws. How does IHL relate to this 
differentiation between rules of international law that provide the ground of 
jurisdiction and a State’s rules that are prescribed or enforced in exercising 
that jurisdiction?  
As Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel point out, IHL ‘constitutes a distinct 
body of law with several specificities’. IHL’s particularity within the 
international legal order also becomes evident when compared to 
international law on jurisdiction. IHL is an example of successful 
substantivism10 and, as such, is quite the opposite of an instrument of co-
ordination. IHL does not allocate competences in the sense of Lotus, but it 
presents a branch of international law that regulates a particular subject 
matter in substantive terms – the means and methods of warfare. This, of 
course, is due to the fact that, traditionally, the nature of the object of 
regulation of IHL – war – had a purely international character. As IHL is 
the applicable law to armed conflict in substantive terms, there is no need 
to (1) determine the competent State that then (2) applies its laws to the 
situation. The applicable substantive law can be found in international law 
itself, in IHL. Put bluntly, there is no room for Lotus. Whereas the law of 
jurisdiction is a procedural mechanism managing action of independent 
States within a decentralised system, IHL is a branch of international law 
providing for substantive regulation of a subject matter in a centralised 
manner. Lotus and international jurisdiction are concerned with territoriality 
and sovereignty. Non-State values, like the protection of those not 
participating in hostilities as is the case for IHL, are not addressed. 
Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel put forward the example of the alleged 
Taliban fighter Serdar Mohammed to accentuate the necessity of either 
____________________ 
10  Cedric Ryngaert, ‘The Limits of Substantive International Economic Law: In 
Support of Reasonable Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ in Bert Keirsbilck et al 
(eds), Facing the Limits of the Law (Springer 2009) 242. 
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‘fill[ing] possible gaps in positive law’ or alternatively determining the 
nature of IHL in order to be able to make sense of perceived gaps in positive 
law. This case provoked the debate about whether IHL provided for an 
authorisation to detain in NIACs and, as a consequence, evoked a debate 
about the nature of IHL itself. 
Seen through the Lotus lens, the detention of Serdar Mohammed in 
Afghanistan carried out by the British armed forces in 2010 was an exercise 
of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. Of course, this exercise of 
jurisdiction required an international principle of law to allow for this 
otherwise unlawful violation of Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. The 
international principle of law, here, is the legal basis for the UK’s overall 
military engagement in Afghanistan (initially the right of collective self-
defence in support of the US, later the resolution of the UN SC mandating 
ISAF). However, the authorisation of foreign States was not required in 
order to identify the domestic law applicable to govern the situation, as 
international law itself provides for the substantive laws for situations of 
armed conflicts: IHL. As mentioned above, Lotus does not say anything 
about the actual exercise of jurisdiction by a State; rather, it concerns the 
permission/prohibition to exercise jurisdiction in the first place. Once the 
sovereignty hurdle has been overcome, here in the form of jus ad bellum 
norms, the Lotus principle is satisfied. The next step, namely the question 
of which law governs this exercise of jurisdiction, is based on other 
considerations, especially on those inherent to IHL, as offered by the 
humanitarian-law-specific approach of Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel. 
D. Conclusion 
When claims are made that the Lotus principle is outdated as it is reflective 
of ‘the spirit of an international society which as yet had few institutions 
and was governed by an international law of strict co-existence, itself a 
reflection of the vigour of the principle of State sovereignty’,11 I agree. I do 
not agree, though, that this is the reason why Lotus is unable to explain the 
nature of IHL. Whether Lotus is still the leading doctrine to regulate 
international jurisdiction or not is not of concern to this comment. The 
important finding is rather that this was its initial purpose. As shown above, 
the rule that ‘[r]estrictions … cannot therefore be presumed’ only applies to 
those international laws that qualify as rules allocating competences 
____________________ 
11  Declaration Judge Bedjaoui (n 3) para 12. 
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between States. IHL does not qualify as such. It is true that the distinction 
between the two categories of rules established above is not always easily 
made. In fact, rules of international law may, at the same time, contain 
coordinating elements determining the State that is competent to exercise 
power, and are thus to be categorised as principles of international law 
within the meaning of Lotus on the one hand, and, on the other hand, may 
contain substantive elements that are applied by the State in the execution 
of its jurisdiction. IHL, however, clearly pertains to the second set of rules, 
which is also mirrored in the strict dichotomy of the jus ad bellum and the 
jus in bello. 
When claims are made ‘that international humanitarian law is mainly 
restrictive in nature, … meaning that belligerent conduct is permitted if not 
prohibited by law’, I agree. I do not agree, though, that this is so because 
IHL, as a branch of international law, follows the logic of Lotus. As 
elaborated above, the Lotus formula provides the starting point in the law 
of international jurisdiction. As such, it has a meaning beyond the specific 
case before the PCIJ. It is more than the sunken vessel in the Mediterranean 
Sea. However, it does not serve to explain the nature of all international 
law. Especially developments discussed under the catchwords 
‘institutionalisation’, ‘integration’, and ‘globalisation’, that advance the 
shift from an international society of co-existence to one of co-operation, 
prevent Lotus from coming to full bloom. The legal order increasingly 
emerges from one of allocating competences between independent States to 
one addressing global phenomena in substantive terms. 
This, of course, is not to say that the question about the nature of IHL as 
either permissive or restrictive as Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel raise it, 
is irrelevant. Exactly the opposite is true. But the answer to this question 
cannot be drawn from the Lotus doctrine. For this reason, Katja Schöberl’s 
and Linus Mührel’s analysis of the norm structure of IHL provides a very 
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Detention for Security Reasons by the Armed Forces of 
a State in Situations of Non-International Armed 
Conflict: the Quest for a Legal Basis 
Manuel Brunner 
A. Introduction 
During times of armed conflict, individuals are detained for security reasons 
by the armed forces of the State or States involved. In fact, this is a central 
feature of such situations. While such detention may last only for some 
hours or days in some cases, in others it may last for a much longer period. 
In any case, detentions in armed conflict give rise to a situation in which 
detainees are immensely vulnerable to the actions and omissions of their 
captors, and in which the detaining authorities are responsible for 
safeguarding the health and dignity of those in their custody.1 However, the 
international law on detention in armed conflicts for security reasons is not 
entirely clear. A highly-disputed point in this respect is the legal basis for 
detentions in situations of NIACs. The different questions relating to this 
problem were discussed by Single Justice Leggatt of the High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales in the judgment in the case of Serdar 
Mohammed v Ministry of Defence of 2 May 2014.2 The case involved the 
detention of a person during the conflict in Afghanistan by British Armed 
Forces. The work by Justice Leggatt in the case was so remarkable that one 
commentator called it ‘a heroic effort, with the single judge grappling with 
a host of complex, intertwined issues of international law and acquitting 
himself admirably in the process’.3 The decision was later upheld in almost 
____________________ 
1  See ICRC, ‘Strengthening international humanitarian law protecting persons 
deprived of their liberty: Concluding report’ (October 2015) Conf. Doc 
32IC/15/19.1, 8 <http://rcrcconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/32IC-
Concluding-report-on-persons-deprived-of-their-liberty_EN.pdf> accessed 13 
October 2017 (hereafter ICRC, ‘Concluding Report’). 
2  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) (hereafter 
Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014]). 
3  Marko Milanovic, ‘High Court Rules that the UK Lacks IHL Detention Authori-
ty in Afghanistan’ (EJIL: Talk!, 3 May 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/high-
 
Part II: Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict 
90 
every aspect by the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal for England and 
Wales.4 The last judgment in the case so far was delivered by the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom in early 2017.5 
Along the lines of the judgments in the Serdar Mohammed case, this 
contribution explores the questions relating to the legal basis for detentions 
for security reasons in NIACs. The analysis begins with an inquiry into IHL 
(II.), where it will be shown that neither treaty-based law nor customary law 
applicable to NIACs provide a legal basis for detentions. In a second step 
(III.), the relevance and role of human rights law in respect to such 
detentions is explored. The third step (IV.) is dedicated to the potential 
legislation on which detentions in NIACs could be based. The analysis is 
rounded off by a summary and concluding remarks (V.).  
B. Does International Humanitarian Law Provide a Legal Basis for 
Detentions for Security Reasons? 
I. The Situation under International Humanitarian Law Applicable to 
International Armed Conflicts 
The treaty law applicable in situations of IAC provides different grounds 
for detention or internment. Art. 21 (1) GC III permits that ‘the Detaining 
Power may subject prisoners of war to internment’. Furthermore, according 
to Art. 27 (4) GC IV, ‘the parties to the conflict may take such measures of 
control and security as may be necessary as a result of the war’. Such 
measures also include the power to detain protected persons. In relation to 
aliens in the territory of a party to an IAC, Art. 42 GC IV provides that ‘the 
internment or assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only 
if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary’ and 
that ‘if any person, acting through the representatives of the Protecting 
Power, voluntarily demands internment, and if his situation renders this step 
necessary, he shall be interned by the Power in whose hands he may be’. 
Moreover, Art. 43 GC IV grants several safeguards to an interned protected 
person. Lastly, according to Art. 78 GC IV, if, in an occupied territory, ‘the 
____________________ 
court-rules-that-the-uk-lacks-ihl-detention-authority-in-afghanistan> accessed 
13 October 2017. 
4  Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843 
(hereafter Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015]). 
5  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2 (hereafter Serdar 
Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017]). 
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Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, 
to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may at the most, 
subject them to assigned residence or to internment’. In addition to this, the 
second and third paragraphs of Art. 78 GC IV provide several safeguards 
for the affected persons. 
The legal logic behind incorporating those reasons for detention in the 
treaties concerning IACs is connected to the nature of such conflicts. In an 
IAC, a minimum of two sovereign States are pitted against each other.6 
Military operations by one or the other State take place on the territory of a 
foreign State and with respect to persons who are nationals of the foreign 
State in question. If rules to detain persons in IACs did not exist in 
international law, detention on foreign territory would be unlawful as States 
are prohibited to take such actions under general international law.7 
Therefore, only explicit provisions of international law can provide the 
State which is exerting military force on the territory of another State during 
an IAC with the legal authority to detain.8 
II. The Situation under International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Non-
International Armed Conflicts 
1. Treaty-based International Humanitarian Law 
In the treaty law applicable in situations of NIACs, no explicit provision 
can be found upon which the armed forces of a State could legally base the 
detention of individuals.9 However, CA 3 as well as Art. 5 and 6 AP II 
contain several provisions both on the minimum treatment of individuals 
____________________ 
6  Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict (3rd edn, CUP 2016) 35.  
7  Lawrence Hill-Cawthrone and Dapo Akande, ‘Locating the Legal Basis for 
Detention on Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Rejoinder to Aurel Sari’, 
(EJIL: Talk!, 2 June 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/locating-the-legal-basis-for-
detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts-a-rejoinder-to-aurel-sari/> ac-
cessed 13 October 2017 (hereafter Hill-Cawthrone and Akande, ‘Rejoinder to 
Sari’). 
8  Ibid. 
9  Emily Crawford and Alison Pert, International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2015) 
161.  
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who are subject to detention or internment and on criminal proceedings 
against such individuals in the context of a NIAC.10 
Therefore, the British Ministry of Defence in the Serdar Mohammed case 
as well as some commentators in academic writing have argued that CA 3 
and AP II provide inherent powers to detain.11 Indeed, CA 3 explicitly refers 
to ‘detention’ and Art. 2, 4 (1), 5 (1) and (2) as well as 6 AP II refer to those 
‘deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons 
related to the conflict’, ‘detention’ and ‘internment’. The argument goes 
that  
… the premise of those references and the existence of rules in Common Article 3 
and AP II for the protection of those detained in non-international armed conflict 
[is] that there [is] an inherent power to detain provided that [it] is done in accordance 
with those rules.12 
This interpretation of the law was met with opposition by Justice Leggatt in 
the Serdar Mohammed case for five convincing reasons: 
(1) As a first reason, Justice Leggatt argued that, if CA 3 or AP II had 
been intended to provide a power to detain, the drafters of the provisions 
would have done so expressly, as is the case in GC III and GC IV. Justice 
Leggatt further correctly explained that it is not to be readily supposed that 
the parties to an international treaty have agreed to establish a power to 
deprive individuals of their liberty indirectly by implication and without 
saying so explicitly.13 This is a reasonable argument as a power to detain is 
a coercive power; therefore, such powers should not too readily be read into 
applicable treaty rules without clear evidence of this being the collective 
intention of the State parties to the respective treaty.14 Such evidence can 
neither be found in the travaux préparatoires of CA 3 nor of AP II. 
____________________ 
10  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] (n 5) para 12.  
11  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) paras 232; Jelena Pejic, 
‘Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment / Administrative 
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence’ (2005) 87 IRRC 
375, 377.  
12  Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] (n 4) para 200.  
13  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 242.  
14  Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, ‘Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis 
for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 7 May 2014) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-
international-armed-conflicts> accessed 13 October 2017 (hereafter Hill-
Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Legal Basis for Detention in NIAC’). 
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This position is not inconsistent with the view taken, for instance, in an 
often-referred-to article of Goodman, who notes that the logical structure of 
IHL is such that what is permitted in IACs should, a fortiori, also be 
considered permitted in NIACs as States would never have intended to 
restrict them more in the latter than in the former.15 It needs to be taken into 
account that IHL does not restrict States with regard to detention in NIACs 
any more than it restricts their ability to detain in IACs. Detention is nothing 
that is prohibited for States in NIACs, as States may detain individuals in 
such conflicts; however, IHL simply does not provide a legal basis for such 
detentions.16 
(2) Justice Leggatt’s second argument was that CA 3 and AP II recognise 
the fact that people are detained during NIACs, but, aside that, the law 
remains silent. Such detentions may be lawful under the law of the State on 
whose territory the armed conflict is taking place, or under another 
applicable law, otherwise the detention may be entirely unlawful. Nothing 
in the language in CA 3 and AP II suggests that those provisions are 
intended to authorise or confer legality on any such detention.17 This 
argument is convincing, as it is largely recognised that the regulation of a 
specific conduct by international law does not imply authorisation or 
acceptance of the legality of that conduct.18 Commentators Hill-Cawthorne 
and Akande underline this finding with a good example from the sphere of 
IHL itself: They put forward that the distinction between recognition and 
regulation of conduct, on the one hand, and authorisation or acceptance of 
the legality of that conduct on the other hand, constitute a key feature of 
IHL as a legal regime. This is due to the fact that IHL regulates the use of 
force by States in situations of armed conflict. However, IHL remains silent 
on the legality of the use of force under the jus ad bellum. The use of force 
that IHL recognises and regulates is not rendered lawful simply by virtue of 
____________________ 
15  Ryan Goodman, ‘The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 103 
AJIL 48. 
16  Hill-Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Legal Basis for Detention in NIAC’ (n 14); for an 
examination of the permissive/restrictive nature of IHL see Katja Schöberl and 
Linus Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? Lotus, Permissions and 
Restrictions within International Humanitarian Law’ in this volume 59 
(hereafter Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower?’). 
17  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 243. 
18  Hill-Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Legal Basis for Detention in NIAC’ (n 14). 
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the fact that it is regulated by IHL. Rather, IHL simply accepts that armed 
conflicts exist and seeks to regulate various aspects of such conflicts.19  
(3) In his third argument, Justice Leggatt explored the telos of CA 3 and 
Art. 5 AP II. He argued that the aim of the two provisions was to guarantee 
certain minimum standards of treatment to all individuals who are deprived 
of their liberty for reasons relating to the respective armed conflict. The 
need to observe those minimum standards is equally relevant to all people 
who are detained, and does not depend on whether or not their detention is 
legally justified. Leggatt therefore concluded that the clear purpose of CA 
3 and Art. 5 AP II was inconsistent with the notion that these provisions 
provide a legal power to detain.20  
(4) The fourth reason Justice Leggatt brought forward to support his 
argument follows from the fundamental principle that IHL applies without 
distinction to all parties to an armed conflict, both State and non-State actors 
alike. He argued that States subscribing to the four Geneva Conventions and 
the two Additional Protocols hereto would not have agreed by treaty to 
establish a power to detain in the circumstances of a NIAC. Given that CA 3 
applies to ‘each Party to the conflict’ and AP II applies to organised armed 
groups who are able to implement it,21 providing a power to detain would 
have meant authorising detention by dissident and rebel armed groups. That 
would be an anathema to most States dealing with a NIAC on their territory 
and who do not wish to confer any legitimacy to rebels and insurgents or 
accept that such groups have any right to exercise a function which is a core 
aspect of State sovereignty. This conclusion is backed by the travaux 
préparatoires of CA 3 and AP II as they contain plentiful references to this 
concern by the various delegates.22 
(5) The fifth and last argument of Justice Leggatt related to the content 
of the power to detain.23 He argued that he did not see how CA 3 or AP II 
could possibly have been intended to provide a power to detain, nor how 
they could reasonably be interpreted as doing so, unless it were possible to 
identify the scope of such a power. Justice Leggatt further correctly 
observed that neither CA 3 nor AP II specify who may be detained, on what 
grounds, in accordance with which procedures, or for how long. This 
____________________ 
19  Ibid. 
20  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 244. 
21  Ibid, para 245. 
22  See Hill-Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Legal Basis for Detention in NIAC’ (n 14). 
23  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 246.  
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argument is also convincing. From a rule of law perspective, clarity, 
predictability, transparency and authority are important attributes when the 
State’s interest interferes with the position of the individual.24 An explicit 
legal basis for detentions in situations of NIACs would undoubtedly serve 
those attributes. 
A further argument that was presented by the British Ministry of Defence 
in the Serdar Mohammed case was that the ability to detain insurgents 
whilst hostilities are ongoing would be an essential corollary of the 
authorisation to kill them. Those engaged in military operation must be able 
to both accept the surrender of somebody who poses a threat to them and 
their mission and must be able to engage an adversary without necessarily 
having to use lethal force. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence pointed out 
that it would be a serious violation of IHL to deny quarter.25 Justice Leggatt 
convincingly responded to this argument by stating that it would justify the 
capture of a person who may lawfully be killed; however, the argument 
would not go further than that. As soon as an individual had been detained, 
the use of lethal force against him would have no longer provided a basis 
for the detention of this individual.26  
2. Customary International Humanitarian Law 
If no legal basis for detention can be found in treaty-based IHL applicable 
to NIACs, such a legal basis may be found in the applicable customary IHL. 
Art. 38 (1) (b) ICJ-Statute describes customary law as ‘a general practice 
accepted as law’. In this respect, the existence of a rule of customary 
international law requires the presence of two elements.27 The first of these 
elements is the existence of a general State practice. There is no requirement 
regarding any particular duration; however, the practice must be extensive, 
representative and virtually uniform.28 The second requirement is the opinio 
____________________ 
24  ICRC, ‘Concluding Report’ (n 1) 29. 
25  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 252.  
26  Ibid, para 253. 
27  On the formation of customary international law in general, see James Crawford, 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 23. 
28  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 43, 
para 74.  
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juris sive necessitatis, the belief that the practice is a matter of right or 
obligation.29 
It seems that in the law of NIACs, no customary basis for detentions has 
been formed as yet in the way described above. In the Serdar Mohammed 
case, Justice Leggatt found that no evidence of any recognition by States 
involved in NIACs as providing a legal basis for detention was produced by 
the British Ministry of Defence.30 Furthermore, the Justice correctly 
concluded that  
… to demonstrate general practice of detention in non-international armed conflict 
recognised as a matter of legal right, it would need to be possible to identify with 
reasonable certainty the scope of the alleged rule of law in terms of who may be 
detained, on what ground, subject to what procedure and for how long.31 
Important work in the field of IHL on the international scene has so far been 
unhelpful in the demonstration of the existence of such a rule containing all 
the features described above. For instance, the ICRC’s Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study identifies 161 rules of customary 
nature in IHL.32 Rule 99 is dedicated to the deprivation of liberty and reads 
very clearly: ‘Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited’. While these 
rules are merely the result of an academic study and are therefore in no way 
binding, it is clear that, if a rule like Rule 99 exists, it cannot serve as a legal 
basis for detention as the rule is prohibitive and therefore requires States to 
abstain from the conduct regulated in the rule and in no way allow it. The 
Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military 
Operations is another international forum which dealt with detention in the 
context of NIACs. It enjoys a certain degree of legitimacy as it was initiated 
by the government of Denmark and 24 States participated in it with the 
African Union, NATO, the European Union, the UN and the ICRC as 
observers. In October 2012, the Copenhagen Process was concluded with 
the publication of principles and guidelines which are intended to apply to 
international military operations in the context of NIACs and peace 
operations.33 Principle 1 of the Copenhagen Process Principles applies to 
‘the detention of persons who are being deprived of their liberty for reasons 
related to an international military operation’. According to this principle, 
____________________ 
29  Ibid, 44, para 77.  
30  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 257. 
31  Ibid, para 258.  
32  Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, vol. I: Rules (CUP 2005) 344.  
33  The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military 
Operations (The Process): Principles and Guidelines (19 October 2012). 
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‘detention of persons must be conducted in accordance with applicable 
international law’; furthermore, several conditions for detentions are laid 
down in the principle, but there are no conditions mentioned under which 
an individual can actually be detained. In fact, according to Principle 16: 
… nothing in The Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines affects the 
applicability of international law to international military operations conducted by 
the states or international organisations; or the obligations of their personnel to 
respect such law; or the applicability of international or national law to non-state 
actors.  
The official commentary to this principle clarifies it, as it reads: 
… the saving clause … recognise[s] that The Copenhagen Principles and Guidelines 
is not a text of legally binding nature and thus, does not create new obligations or 
commitments. Furthermore, The Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines 
cannot constitute a legal basis for detention. … Since The Copenhagen Process 
Principles and Guidelines were not written as a restatement of customary 
international law, the mere inclusion of a practice in The Copenhagen Process 
Principles and Guidelines should not be taken as evidence that states regard the 
practice as required out of a sense of legal obligation.  
Lastly, the problem of identifying a legal basis for detentions in NIACs was 
discussed at the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, held in Geneva from 8 to 10 December 2015, which was dedicated 
to the strengthening of IHL protecting persons deprived of their liberty. The 
results of the conference confirmed that, currently, no customary IHL 
applicable to situations of NIACs exists upon which detentions for security 
reasons might be legally based. In the concluding report it was held that 
‘neither existing treaties nor customary law’ applicable to NIACs ‘expressly 
provide grounds or procedures for carrying out’ detentions, and that 
… although States had divergent views on the relevance of the principle of legality 
to IHL, the ICRC has understood them to believe that the specific grounds and 
procedures for internment should be set down in a source, or combination of 
sources, that is capable of safeguarding arbitrary internment.34 
III. Conclusion 
In consequence, the legal basis for the authority to detain individuals for 
security reasons in NIACs lies neither in treaty-based IHL nor in customary 
____________________ 
34  ICRC, ‘Concluding Report’ (n 1) 15, 29.  
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IHL.35 This, however, does not imply that detention is prohibited or not 
allowed in situations of NIACs; it simply means that a legal basis for 
detentions must be identified in another corpus of law.36 State practice 
supports this result, as States often rely on domestic law to provide the legal 
basis for detention practices in situations of NIACs. Examples include the 
‘Terrorism and Disruptive Activities Act and Ordinance’,37 which was 
applied in the conflict between the Nepalese Government and communist 
insurgents, or the ‘Prevention of Terrorism Act’38, which was applied in the 
conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam.39 
The divergent approaches to the problem of detention (and other fields 
of application) in IHL applicable to IACs and to NIACs are rooted in the 
differences between the regulated types of conflict. While the former type 
of conflict, as explained above, involves military operations of two or more 
sovereign States, NIACs (mainly) take place in an environment of intra-
State relations. Therefore, firstly, the rights of other States will, on a regular 
basis, not be engaged by NIACs and, secondly, the intra-State nature of 
NIACs entails that they take place within a pre-existing legal system, 
namely domestic law, which is applicable to the situation of the conflict.40  
____________________ 
35  Hill-Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Legal Basis for Detention in NIAC’ (n 14). 
36  For a different assessment, see Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or 
Blooming Flower?’ (n 16). 
37  Nepalese Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, ‘Ordinance No. 1 
of the year 2058 (2001)’ Nepal Gazette (Kathmandu, 26 November 2001) 
<http://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org/files/docs/2001-11-26_legal_govt-of-ne-
pal_eng.pdf> accessed 13 October 2017.  
38  Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ‘Prevention of 
Terrorism’ (20 July 1979) Act No 48 of 1979 <http://www.satp.org/sat-
porgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/actsandordinance/prevention_of_ter-
rorism.htm> accessed 13 October 2017. 
39  Hill-Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Legal Basis for Detention in NIAC’ (n 14). 
40  Hill-Cawthrone and Akande, ‘Rejoinder to Sari’ (n 7). 
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C. Human Rights Law Applicable to Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts 
I. Rules on the Deprivation of Liberty in Human Rights Law 
In the sphere of human rights law, detentions are in conflict with the right 
to liberty. The term liberty refers to the physical liberty of an individual as 
opposed to a mere restriction of the freedom of movement.41 Confinement 
to a certain limited place for a not negligible length of time without valid 
consent constitutes a deprivation of the physical liberty of an individual.42 
Rules regulating the deprivation of liberty can be found in several 
universally and regionally applicable human rights treaties. According to 
Art. 9 (1) ICCPR, Art. 5 (1) ECHR, Art. 7 (2) ACHR, and Art. 6 ACHPR, 
a person may be deprived of his or her liberty only ‘on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law’43. 
The most detailed and restrictive of the aforementioned provisions is 
Art. 5 (1) ECHR, which allows the deprivation of liberty of an individual 
only in six cases. Three of those cases are of interest in situations of NIACs, 
namely: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;  
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by 
law;  
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person affected by the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed 
an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing 
an offence or fleeing after having done so. 
Therefore, under human rights law, a legal basis for detention is required. 
If such a legal basis to deprive a person of his or her physical liberty is not 
in place, the detention is unlawful. Furthermore, human rights treaties 
provide for a number of legal safeguards for the affected individual whose 
liberty has been deprived. These safeguards include, for instance, the right 
____________________ 
41  Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice 
(2nd edn, CUP 2016) 369 (hereafter Bantekas and Oette, Human Rights Law). 
42  Ibid. 
43  This is the wording used in Art. 9 (1) ICCPR. The rules on the deprivation of 
liberty in regional human rights treaties display a slightly different wording; 
however, the content is identical.  
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to be informed about the reasons for the deprivation of liberty,44 or the right 
to take proceedings before a court in order for the court to decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of the detention and order release if the detention is 
not lawful.45 
II. The Applicability of Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict 
Only if human rights law applies in situations of armed conflict, its rules on 
the deprivation of liberty may have an influence on the problem of detention 
in NIACs. While it is clear that IHL is the body of international law that 
regulates armed conflict, it was disputed whether human rights law also 
applies in the context of such situations. The main argument was that IHL 
is designed especially to regulate times of war, while human rights law 
protects the individual in times of peace.46 However, international legal 
practice has not followed this line of argumentation. For example, in 1996, 
the ICJ stated in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons that 
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in 
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of live, however, then falls to 
be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.47 
Later, in the advisory opinion of the Court concerning Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004), 
it was stated:  
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law, there are thus three possible solutions: some rights may be exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of 
human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international 
law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into 
____________________ 
44  Art. 9 (2) ICCPR, Art. 5 (2) ECHR, Art. 7 (4) ACHR. 
45  Art. 9 (4) ICCPR, Art. 5 (4) ECHR, Art. 7 (5) ACHR. 
46  For approaches to the relationship between IHL and human rights law, see 
Daniel Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context 
(AIL-Pocket 2011) 125. 
47  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226, 240, para 25. 
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consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law 
and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.48  
Furthermore, the UN GA – already in its 25th session – stated in the 
resolution of 9 December 1970 on the ‘Basic principles for the protection 
of civilian population in armed conflicts’ that ‘[f]undamental human rights, 
as accepted in international law, and laid down in international instruments, 
continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict.’49 These quotes 
demonstrate that both bodies of law generally continue to apply in armed 
conflicts as such, while the exact details of the relationship between IHL 
and human rights law must be determined according to the specific rules 
governing a particular situation. Therefore, the rules on the deprivation of 
liberty, as laid down in human rights treaties, also continue to apply to 
situations of detention in NIACs. As the law of NIACs does not provide for 
a legal basis for detentions which are carried out for security reasons, the 
only applicable rules here are the ones of human rights law. Therefore, in 
the context of NIACs, a legal basis is required in order to make such a 
detention lawful under international law.50 
III. The Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law 
While it is clear that the guarantees enshrined in a specific human rights 
treaty apply to the persons on the territory of a State that is a party to the 
respective treaty,51 the question arises whether this is also true for States 
which act on the territory of another State. In the context of a NIAC, this is 
of importance in cases of ‘internationalised’ internal armed conflicts when 
the government of a State is aided by foreign armed forces to suppress the 
activities of non-State armed groups. The extraterritorial applicability of 
human rights treaties has, in general, been affirmed by the ICJ,52 regional 
____________________ 
48  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 2004, 178, para 106 (hereafter 
Wall Advisory Opinion). 
49  UN GA Res 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970) UN Doc A/RES/2675 (XXV), 
para 1 of the operative part of the resolution.  
50  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 293. 
51  Bantekas and Oette, Human Rights Law (n 41) 82. 
52  Wall Advisory Opinion (n 48) 178, paras 107. 
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human rights courts,53 and UN institutions54. However, the details are 
debated extensively. The focal point of the problem is the interpretation of 
the term ‘jurisdiction’ as it can be found for instance in Art. 1 ECHR. Under 
this provision, the parties to the Convention guarantee the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the treaty to all persons under their jurisdiction. 
Therefore, only if troops were to exercise ‘jurisdiction’ when detaining a 
person in a NIAC abroad, the relevant provisions of human rights law would 
become applicable. 
One can understand the term ‘jurisdiction’ as relating primarily to the 
territory over which a State has sovereign authority.55 This was the position 
taken for instance by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the case of 
Bankovic et al v Belgium et al in 2001.56 The Court took the position that 
Art. 1 ECHR reflects an essentially territorial notion of ‘jurisdiction’ and 
that an extraterritorial application is an exception.57 However, the Court 
indicated that extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ECHR can be 
established if a State has established ‘effective control’ over an area of 
foreign territory and its inhabitants. In the words of the Court, this requires 
that a State, ‘as a consequence of military occupation or through consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory exercises all 
or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that 
government’.58 With this argumentation, the Court appeared to reject the 
notion that ‘jurisdiction’ can be based on effective control over an 
individual as this would render the scope of application of the ECHR 
limitless and jurisdiction would arise whenever an act imputable to a 
contracting State of the Convention had an adverse effect on anyone 
anywhere in the world.59 Furthermore, the Court rejected the contention that 
a State’s obligation under the ECHR could be ‘divided and tailored in 
accordance with the particular circumstances of the extraterritorial act in 
question’.60 The Court therefore took the position that the rights enshrined 
____________________ 
53  Loizidou v Turkey, App no 15318/89, 18 December 1996, para 52. 
54  UN HRC, Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos v Uruguay in ‘Communication no 
52/1979’ UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (1981) para 12. 
55  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 120.  
56  Bankovic et al v Belgium et al, App no 52207/99, 12 December 2001 (hereafter 
Bankovic et al v Belgium et al). 
57  Ibid, para 57. 
58  Ibid, para 69. 
59  Ibid, para 71. 
60  Ibid, para 73. 
 
Detention for Security Reasons by the Armed Forces of a State 
103 
in the ECHR constitute ‘a single, indivisible package’.61 It further 
emphasised the regional nature of the Convention and indicated that its 
extraterritorial application is limited to acts executed on the territory of a 
State which is, or would, ‘but for the specific circumstances’ be covered by 
the Convention.62 The Court also seemed to limit the scope for a more 
extensive and progressive interpretation of ‘jurisdiction’ in future cases by 
implying that Art. 1, unlike the provisions of the ECHR defining substantive 
rights, cannot be interpreted as a ‘living instrument’ in accordance with 
changing conditions.63 
The narrow reading and interpretation of Art. 1 ECHR by the ECtHR in 
the Bancovic case was, however, not upheld in later cases before the Court. 
In its judgment in the case of Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom 
in 2011, the Court set out a comprehensive restatement of the general 
principles, which determine when a State’s jurisdiction under Art. 1 ECHR 
extends to actions outside its own territory.64 While the Court in this 
judgment repeated its earlier position that jurisdiction under Art. 1 ECHR 
is primarily territorial in nature and that extraterritorial acts can give rise to 
jurisdiction only in exceptional cases,65 it went on to explain that such an 
exceptional case is a situation where a contracting State of the Convention, 
‘as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action exercises “effective 
control” of an area’ outside of its own territory. Jurisdiction in such a case 
‘derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, 
through the Contracting State’s own armed force, or through a subordinate 
local administration’. Where the requisite degree of control exists  
… the controlling state has the responsibility under Art. 1 to secure, within the area 
under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and 
those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It will be liable for any violations 
of those rights.66  
However, in the Al-Skeini case, the Court recognised that, where a 
contracting State does not have effective control over an area of territory 
such that the State is required to secure to the inhabitants of that territory all 
____________________ 
61  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 122. 
62  Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (n 56) para 80. 
63 Ibid, paras 62. 
64  Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, App no 55721/07, 7 July 2011 
(hereafter Al-Skeini v UK); see Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) 
para 129.  
65  Ibid, para 131.  
66  Al-Skeini v UK (n 64) para 138.  
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the rights set out in the ECHR, extraterritorial jurisdiction may still arise on 
a principle of responsibility for acts of the State’s agents operating outside 
of its territory.67 Such a case can inter alia be given in situations where, 
through the ‘consent, invitation or acquiescence’ of the government of the 
territory, a State ‘exercises all or some of the public powers normally 
exercised by that government’68; this case can also be given ‘in certain 
circumstance[s]’ in which ‘the use of force by a state’s agents operating 
outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under the 
control of the state’s authorities into the state’s art. 1 jurisdiction’. To 
underline the application of the principle, the Court cited four post-
Bankovic cases of its case law ‘where an individual is taken into the custody 
of state agents abroad’69. Firstly, in the case of Öcalan v Turkey (2005), 
jurisdiction of Turkey arose when its officials took custody of the applicant 
from Kenyan officials on the territory of Kenya.70 Secondly, in Issa and 
Others v Turkey (2004), where it had been established – which in the facts 
of the case it was not – that Turkish soldiers had taken the applicants’ 
relatives into custody in Northern Iraq, brought them to a nearby cave and 
killed them; the deceased would have therefore been within Turkish 
jurisdiction ‘by virtue of the soldiers’ authority and control over them’.71 
Thirdly, in Al-Sadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom (2009), where two 
individuals detained in military prisons in Iraq which were under British 
control fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, since it 
‘exercised total and exclusive control over the prisons and the individuals 
detained in them’.72 Lastly, in Medvedyev v France (2010), French naval 
forces exercised ‘full and effective control’ over a ship and its crew, which 
was intercepted in international waters.73 The Court went on to explain in 
the Al-Skeini case that the decisive element which led to jurisdiction in the 
aforementioned cases ‘is the exercise of physical power and control over 
the person in question’74. Furthermore, it explained that  
____________________ 
67  Ibid, para 133.  
68  Ibid, para 135.  
69  Ibid, para 136.  
70  Öcalan v Turkey, App no 46221/99, 12 May 2005. 
71  Issa and Others v Turkey, App no 31821/96, 16 November 2004 (hereafter Issa 
and Others v Turkey). 
72  Al-Sadoon and Mufhdi v the United Kingdom, App no 61498/08, Decision on 
admissibility of 3 July 2009.  
73  Medvedyev and Others v France, App no 3394/03, 29 March 2010. 
74  Al-Skeini v UK (n 64) para 136. 
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… it is clear that, whenever the state through its agents exercises control or authority 
over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the state is under an obligation under art.1 
to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms of that individual. In this sense, 
therefore, the Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’.75 
While the Al-Skeini case leaves several important questions relating to the 
application of the ECHR in extraterritorial settings unanswered,76 it is now 
at least clear that jurisdiction can be established in cases in which ‘an 
individual is taken into the custody of state agents abroad’.77 This 
argumentation was later reaffirmed by the ECtHR for instance in the 
Chagos Islanders v the United Kingdom case (2013), in which the Court 
deemed that the circumstances in which ‘state agents authority’ gives rise 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction include ‘using force to take a person into 
custody or exerting full physical control over a person through 
apprehension or detention’.78 
The recent case law of the ECtHR shows that human rights law is 
applicable in extraterritorial situations in which a contracting party 
exercises control or authority over an individual abroad. The decisive 
element, according to the Court, is the ‘exercise of physical power and 
control’ over an individual; in general, detentions by the armed forces of 
States party to the ECHR in situations in which these forces are acting on 
the territory of another State to aid the government during a NIAC are 
covered by the Convention. Moreover, Art. 5 ECHR must be observed. The 
possibility to ‘divide and tailor’ the Convention rights does not alter this 
observation. When the conduct of a State gives rise to jurisdiction, in this 
case namely the exercise of physical control over an individual through 
arrest and detention, it is not possible to divide and tailor the basic 
obligation under Art. 5 (1) ECHR that any deprivation of liberty must be 
lawful and fall within one of the cases specified in Art. 5 (1).79 
IV. Conclusion 
All major human rights treaties in which civil and political rights are 
enshrined contain specific rules on the deprivation of liberty of an 
individual. All of these rules require a legal basis for such deprivations and, 
____________________ 
75  Ibid, para 137.  
76  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 141. 
77  Al-Skeini v UK (n 64), para 136. 
78  Chagos Islanders v the United Kingdom, App no 35622/04, 11 December 2012.  
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therefore, for detentions; this also applies in situations of NIACs. While this 
is certainly true for ‘traditional’ NIACs, in which the government of a State 
is fighting against one or more non-State armed actors, States which are 
party to one of the human rights treaties mentioned above are equally bound 
by the rights laid down in those treaties when troops are acting abroad, as 
those instruments also apply extraterritorially. 
D. Potential Legal Bases for Detentions for Security Reasons in Situations 
of Non-International Armed Conflict 
While, on the one hand, IHL does not provide States with a legal basis for 
detention in NIACs, human rights law, on the other hand, requires one. This 
leads to the question of where such a legal basis might be found, how it can 
be implemented and if human rights rules may be displaced in specific 
circumstances. Depending on the context, domestic law and international 
law have a potential role to play in the prevention of arbitrary or unlawful 
detention.80 
I. Domestic Law 
The domestic law of the State on whose territory a NIAC is fought provides 
an important source of law for the detention of individuals. Legal grounds 
for such detentions may be found in domestic criminal and criminal 
procedure statutes, general statutes concerning the use of military forces, 
the police or other security forces or in special legislation concerning 
situations of large-scale violence. If no provision which suits the needs of 
the forces in respect to detentions in NIACs is in place in the domestic legal 
system or if the existing rules do not suffice, the national legislator is not 
hindered in introducing such rules or altering the existing rules. However, 
such legal reforms may be restricted by the constitutional law of the 
respective State. Restrictions might include time limits or the exclusion of 
specific grounds for detentions in the constitutional regulations providing 
the right to liberty. The requirements of the relevant provisions might also 
be altered on a constitutional basis if a state of emergency is declared in the 
respective State in case of large-scale internal violence amounting to a 
____________________ 
80  ICRC, ‘Concluding Report’ (n 1) 29. 
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NIAC.81 In these cases, the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in 
the constitution of the respective State might be restricted much more easily 
than in times of non-emergency. Furthermore, the national legislation on 
detention in times of war must comply with the requirements of the human 
rights instruments which the respective State is a party to.82 
In situations of ‘internationalised’ armed conflicts, a legal basis for 
detentions could also be established in the domestic legislation of the State 
who sends troops aborad. However, in order to fulfil the validity 
requirements established by the ECtHR, this legislation must meet several 
conditions: the text of the respective piece of legislation must expressly 
provide for its applicability to situations of NIAC as well as its 
extraterritorial applicability; furthermore, the procedural safeguards 
provided must be sufficiently comprehensive.83 
II. Application of Rules on Derogation/Suspension in Human Rights 
Treaties 
While domestic constitutional law might allow the derogation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in the constitution in the context 
of a national emergency, several human rights treaties also allow for 
derogation or suspension of several rights enshrined in those instruments. 
These are, for instance, Art. 4 (1) ICCPR: ‘in time of public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation’; Art. 15 (1) ECHR: ‘in time of war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, or Art. 27 (1) 
ACHR: ‘in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens 
the independence or security of a State Party’.  
As none of the lists of non-derogable rights in the second paragraphs of 
the quoted articles contain the right to liberty, it is clear that this right can 
be made subject to derogation/suspension.84 Therefore, the possibility of 
derogating/suspending from the obligations concerning the right to liberty 
____________________ 
81  See David Dyzenhaus, ‘States of Emergency’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András 
Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 
2012) 442. 
82  Hill-Cawthorne and Akande, ‘Legal Basis for Detention in NIAC’ (n 14). 
83  Claire Landais and Léa Bass, ‘Reconciling the rules of international 
humanitarian law with the rules of European human rights law’ (2015) 97 IRRC 
1295, 1307 (hereafter Landais and Bass, ‘Reconciling’). 
84  Bantekas and Oette, Human Rights Law (n 41) 81.  
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under the respective human rights treaties may both provide a solution to 
the problem of complying with the obligations under these human rights 
instruments and, at the same time, allow for the use of detention in situations 
of NIAC.85  
However, such a solution encounters several obstacles. The first of these 
obstacles lies in the applicability of the derogation/suspension rules to 
situations of NIAC. It is not entirely clear whether the term ‘war’ used in 
Art. 15 (1) ECHR and Art. 27 (1) ACHR only applies to situations of IACs 
or also to NIACs; the latter may also be understood as public emergencies 
or public dangers. Yet, the situation must also ‘threaten the life of the 
nation’ or ‘the independence or security of a State Party’. For instance, in 
1961, the ECtHR already defined a situation which threatenes the life of a 
nation in the case of Lawless v Ireland as ‘an exceptional situation of crisis 
or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to 
the organised life of the community of which the State is composed.’86 
While this requirement may be met by a State in which a NIAC is actually 
taking place, the situation is different for a State which intervenes in an 
‘internationalised’ NIAC abroad with its armed forces on behalf of a foreign 
government. It was rightly observed that, in this regard, ‘it would appear 
that recent armed conflicts involving ECtHR countries in the territory of a 
third “host” State could not be deemed to have reached the requisite threat 
level to them’.87 Indeed, it is, for instance, not easy to imagine that a NIAC 
in Central Asia, in which some forces from Western European States are 
fighting, might constitute a threat to organised life in the respective 
European States. 
However, the ECtHR made reference to Art. 15 ECHR in the cases of Al-
Jedda v the United Kingdom (2011) and Hassan v the United Kingdom 
(2014).88 Both cases concerned human rights violations during the British 
military presence in Iraq. This could be read as an indication that the Court 
does not rule out the validity of a derogation in cases which concern a 
situation of an extraterritorial ‘internationalised’ NIAC. However, it is 
obvious that the Court must then move away from the case law it had 
____________________ 
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previously established regarding the criteria relating to ‘the whole 
population’ being affected and the ‘threat to the organised life of the 
community’ as those criteria could not be met a priori.89 
Another problem arises with regard to the issue discussed above 
concerning extraterritorial ‘jurisdiction’. In the case of Issa and Others v 
Turkey (2004), the ECtHR stated that ‘Article 1 of the Convention cannot 
be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Convention on the territory of another State which it could not perpetrate 
on its own territory’.90 Under this case law of the ECtHR, it does not seem 
possible for a State to derogate from its obligations under the ECHR only 
for an extraterritorial situation: If a State wants to derogate, it must also do 
so for its own territory.91 However, it is politically unlikely that a State 
which sends a contingent of its armed forces into another country will 
derogate from certain human rights laid down in the ECHR for the people 
living on its own territory only for the benefit of human rights compliance 
in faraway places. 
Furthermore, even if a State could derogate from its obligations under 
Art. 5 ECHR in a situation of extraterritorial NIACs, the application of 
Art. 15 ECHR would not release this State completely from various 
safeguards. The first of these safeguards is the duty to notify the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe of the measures which are taken and the 
reasons thereof.92 The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR interpreted Art. 15 
ECHR in the case of A and Others v the United Kingdom (1998) in the way 
that it allows States ‘a wide margin of appreciation to decide on the nature 
and scope of the derogating measures necessary to avert the emergency.’ At 
the same time, the Court stated that ‘it is ultimately for the Court to rule 
whether the measures were “strictly required”’. It further declared that,  
where a derogating measure encroaches upon a fundamental Convention right, such 
as the right to liberty, the Court must be satisfied that it was a genuine response to 
____________________ 
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the emergency situation, that it was fully justified by the special circumstances of 
the emergency and that adequate safeguards were provided against abuse.93  
This leads to the situation that, assuming that Art. 15 ECHR allows States 
to derogate from the provisions of Art. 5 ECHR only in relation to 
detentions for security reasons which are carried out on the territory of a 
State that is not a party to the Convention, the ECtHR could nevertheless 
verify that the measures taken by that State are strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation in question.94 
Furthermore, the safeguards which are installed to the benefit of a person 
that is detained by the agents of a State party to the ECHR are decisive in a 
situation of derogation. The ECtHR has already treated such cases brought 
before it. For instance, in the cases of Brannigan and McBride v the United 
Kingdom (1993), which dealt with derogations at the domestic level 
providing measures which authorised the detention of individuals suspected 
of terrorist activities, the Court accepted a lack of judicial control for a 
maximum period of seven days. On the other hand, the Court did not accept 
a similar derogation in relation to a fourteen-day detention in the case of 
Aksoy v Turkey (1996). Other safeguards were discussed in those cases as 
well. For instance, in the cases of Brannigan and McBride v the United 
Kingdom, it was stated by the Court that ‘the remedy of habeas corpus was 
available to test the lawfulness of the original arrest and detention’ and that 
there is ‘an absolute and enforceable right to consult a solicitor forty-eight 
hours after the time of the arrest and detainees were entitled to inform a 
relative or friend about their detention and to have access to a doctor’95. 
Furthermore, in the case of Aksoy v Turkey, the Court stated that  
… the denial of access to a lawyer, doctor, relative or friend and the absence of any 
realistic possibility of being brought before a court to test the legality of the 
detention meant that he was left completely at the mercy of those holding him.96 
In sum, it seems that, under the ECHR with the relevant case law established 
by the ECtHR, Art. 15 does not provide a sufficient solution to entirely 
overcome the lack of a legal basis with regard to detentions for security 
reasons in NIACs, especially in extraterritorial ones.  
____________________ 
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III. Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council 
A legal basis for detention for security reasons in NIACs might also be 
found in a resolution by the UN SC. Under Art. 24 UN Charter, the UN SC 
has the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security’. Furthermore, under Art. 25 UN Charter, the Member States 
of the UN have a duty to carry out the decisions of the UN SC in accordance 
with the Charter. When the UN SC is acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter (Art. 39 et seq), it possesses immense powers. The most prominent 
power is the authorisation of the use of force by Member States. Measures 
taken by the UN SC under Chapter VII are a cornerstone of the present 
international legal order.97 While a resolution adopted by the UN SC is 
neither a treaty nor is it legislation, it is well established that such a 
resolution may constitute an authority binding in international law to do that 
which would otherwise be illegal in international law.98  
A UN SC resolution which allows for the use of ‘all necessary 
measures/means’ is best suited to serve as a basis for detention in a NIAC; 
an example of this is Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001,99 which 
authorised the Member States of the UN participating in the International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in the post-9/11 conflict to take 
all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate. This is due to the fact that it 
authorises the use of the full range of measures available to the UN itself to 
maintain or restore international peace and security under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Normally this involves the use of force under Art. 42 UN 
Charter. This is, however, subject to the requirement that such measures are 
necessary. The necessity of a measure depends primarily on the specific 
mandate as well as on the general context and any conditions or limitations 
laid down in the resolution.100 While a resolution of the UN SC might not 
expressly allow for detention, the ‘all necessary measures/means’ formula 
can be interpreted in a way that it encompasses operational detention as one 
of such means, if necessary and might therefore constitute a legal basis for 
such detentions.101 However, it is not clear what kind of detention is allowed 
under such a UN SC resolution. This point was disputed in the Serdar 
____________________ 
97  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] (n 5) para 23.  
98  Ibid, para 25.  
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Mohammed case. On the one hand, Justice Leggatt argued in the first 
instance that a UN SC resolution which authorises the use for ‘all necessary 
measures/means’ only allows for detention for a very short period of time. 
He argued that once a prisoner was captured and disarmed, he no longer 
represented an imminent threat to security; he exemplified this through the 
role of the British Armed Forces and the civilian population in the case 
before him. Detention thereafter could not be justified under a UN SC 
resolution.102 This argument was not followed by Lord Sumption of the UK 
Supreme Court on the other hand. He argued that if a person constituted a 
sufficient threat to the British Armed Forces and the civilian population to 
warrant detention in the first place, he would be likely to present a sufficient 
threat to warrant his continued detention after being disarmed. Unless the 
armed forces (of the UK) were in a position to transfer the detainee to the 
civil authorities for possible prosecution or further detention, the only 
alternative would be to release him and allow him to present the same threat 
to the armed forces or the civilian population as he did before, if one follows 
the argument of Justice Leggatt. Lord Sumption concluded his argument 
with the statement that this would undermine the missions, which constitute 
the whole purpose of the armed forces.103 It cannot be denied that the 
argument of Lord Sumption seem to better reflect the realities of the fight 
against insurgencies and asymmetric warfare. However, which of the two 
views will prevail in future cases remains to be seen.  
Furthermore, it needs to be considered that human rights law may also 
interact with UN SC resolutions. It may be a possibility that a resolution by 
the UN SC might have the effect of displacing provisions which protect 
human rights. This follows from Art. 25 and 103 UN Charter. Pursuant to 
these provisions, decisions by the UN SC are binding on Member States of 
the UN and override any other conflicting obligations the Member States 
might carry under other treaties; this also includes treaties protecting human 
rights.104 However, in the recent decision of the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR in the case of Al Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v 
Switzerland (2016) it was observed that  
____________________ 
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… where a Security Council resolution does not contain any clear or explicit 
wording excluding or limiting respect for human rights …, the Court must always 
presume that those measures are compatible with the Convention. In other words, 
in such cases, in a spirit of systematic harmonization, it will in principle conclude 
that there is no conflict of obligations capable of engaging the primacy rule in 
Art. 103 of the UN Charter.105  
This confirms the presumption the Court had previously established in the 
judgment in the case of Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom (2011).106 It follows 
from this case law that the inclusion of a simple reference to detention in a 
resolution of the UN SC, without an explicit exclusion of Art. 5 ECHR, is 
not sufficient to displace this provision.107 Furthermore, in the judgment in 
the case of Hassan v the United Kingdom (2014), the ECtHR established 
that a resolution of the UN SC would have to provide certain legal 
safeguards in order to be deemed constitutive as a legal basis for 
administrative detention; this could be ‘accommodated’ with the list of 
permitted grounds for deprivation of liberty laid down in Art. 5 (1) ECHR, 
which, however, does not include detentions that are solely carried out for 
security reasons.108 
If these standards are applied to the resolutions of the UN SC, it is very 
unlikely that such a resolution might serve as a legal basis for detention. 
This is because the drafting of resolutions in the UN SC can be and regularly 
is subject to a highly delicate political negotiating process. As a result, 
precise language, as would be necessary to fulfil the standards laid down in 
the aforementioned case law of the ECtHR, is likely to be missing in the 
respective resolutions.109 Furthermore, such a solution must be activated in 
every occurrence of a NIAC. This would bear two disadvantages: First, it is 
by no way guaranteed that the UN SC would adopt a resolution with the 
desired content for every conflict and, second, a resolution that needs to be 
activated prior to each operation is highly problematic from the perspective 
of the principle of legal certainty.110 
____________________ 
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IV. International Agreements or Treaties 
Other possibilities from the sphere of international law that might provide 
a legal basis for detention in situations of extraterritorial ‘internationalised’ 
NIACs are international agreements or treaties.111 An example of this is a 
Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is signed between the 
government of a State which is about to send its troops to the territory of 
another State and the government of the host State at the beginning of the 
military operations. In such an agreement, an explicit reference to the power 
of the sending State to use detention for security reasons whilst 
guaranteeing the required safeguards is possible. Only the sending State 
would need to undertake it to provide all the safeguards guaranteed to a 
detained individual, but not the host State. The host State would only 
undertake it to refrain from subjecting individuals transferred to it by the 
sending State to treatment that would violate basic human rights, for 
instance the right to life, enshrined in Art. 2 ECHR, and the prohibition of 
torture, enshrined in Art. 3 ECHR.112 An example of a SOFA regulation in 
which such guarantees can be found in international practice is Art. 10 of 
the SOFA signed between France and Mali in 2013 relating to the military 
operation ‘Serval’, which was initiated to oust militants from the north of 
Mali:113  
La Partie française traite les personnes qu’elle pourrait retenir et dont elle assurerait 
la garde et la sécurité conformément aux règles applicables du droit international 
humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l’homme, notamment le Protocole 
additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des 
victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (Protocole II) adopté le 8 juin 1977, 
et la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains 
ou dégradants du 10 décembre 1984. 
La Partie malienne, en assurant la garde et la sécurité des personnes remises par la 
Partie française, se conforme aux règles applicables du droit international 
humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l’homme, notamment le Protocole 
____________________ 
111  Medvedyev and Others v France, App no 3394/03, 29 March 2010, paras 82 
(hereafter Medvedyev v France). 
112  Landais and Bass, ‘Reconciling’ (n 83) 1306. 
113  Décret n° 2013-364 du 29 avril 2013 portant publication de l'accord sous forme 
d'échange de lettres entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le 
Gouvernement du Mali déterminant le statut de la force ‘Serval’, signées à 
Bamako le 7 mars 2013 et à Koulouba le 8 mars 2013 (1), Journal officiel de la 
République Française no 0101 du 30 avril 2013 (1), 7426 <https://www.le-
gifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027376103> acces-
sed 13 October 2017. 
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additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des 
victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (Protocole II) adopté le 8 juin 1977, 
et la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains 
ou dégradants du 10 décembre 1984. 
Compte tenu des engagements conventionnels et constitutionnels de la France, la 
Partie malienne s’engage à ce que, dans le cas où la peine de mort ou une peine 
constitutive d’un traitement cruel, inhumain ou dégradant serait encourue, elle ne 
soit ni requise ni prononcée à l’égard d’une personne remise, et à ce que, dans 
l’hypothèse où de telles peines auraient été prononcées, elles ne soient pas 
exécutées. 
Aucune personne remise aux autorités maliennes en application du présent article 
ne peut être transférée à une tierce partie sans accord préalable des autorités 
françaises. La Partie française, le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR), 
ou, après approbation de la Partie malienne, tout autre organisme compétent en 
matière de droits de l’homme, dispose d’un droit d’accès permanent aux personnes 
remises. 
Les représentants de la Partie française, du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge 
et, le cas échéant, d’un autre organisme mentionné à l’alinéa précédent, sont 
autorisés à se rendre dans tous les lieux où se trouvent les personnes remises; ils 
auront accès à tous les locaux utilisés par les personnes remises. Ils seront également 
autorisés à se rendre dans les lieux de départ, de passage ou d’arrivée des personnes 
remises. Ils pourront s’entretenir sans témoin avec les personnes remises, par 
l’entremise d’un interprète si cela est nécessaire. 
Toute liberté sera laissée aux représentants susmentionnés quant au choix des 
endroits qu’ils désirent visiter ; la durée et la fréquence de ces visites ne seront pas 
limitées. Elles ne sauraient être interdites qu’en raison d’impérieuses nécessités 
militaires et seulement à titre exceptionnel et temporaire. 
La Partie malienne s’engage à tenir un registre sur lequel elle consigne les 
informations relatives à chaque personne remise (identité de la personne remise, 
date du transfert, lieu de détention, état de santé de la personne remise). 
Ce registre peut être consulté à leur requête par les Parties au présent accord, par le 
CICR ou, le cas échéant, par tout autre organisme compétent en matière de droits 
de l’homme mentionné au cinquième alinéa du présent article. 
Les dispositions précédentes sont sans préjudice de l’accès du Comité international 
de la Croix-Rouge aux personnes remises. Les visites du CICR aux personnes 
remises s’effectueront en conformité avec ses modalités de travail institutionnelles. 
However, such a solution might face problems regarding the necessary 
foreseeability and accessibility requirements for constituting a legal basis 
for detention in conformity with human rights law.114 The ECtHR considers 
legal certainty as particularly important in cases where deprivation of 
____________________ 
114  Landais and Bass, ‘Reconciling’ (n 83) 1306. 
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liberty is concerned; therefore, the conditions for deprivation of liberty must 
be clearly defined under domestic law or under international law. Moreover, 
the law itself must be foreseeable in its application to meet the standard of 
‘lawfulness’ set by the advice in order to foresee, to a degree that is 
reasonable in the circumstance of a given case, the consequences which a 
given action may entail.115 The quoted provision from the Agreement 
between France and Mali for instance does not fulfil this standard, as it does 
not lay down the reasons under which a person may be detained. Therefore, 
it is not foreseeable for the affected person at which point he or she can be 
made subject to detention for security reasons by the external power.  
IV. Conclusion 
It is possible to base detentions in NIACs either on domestic legislation or 
international legislation; moreover, one can also set aside the relevant 
human rights provisions on grounds of derogation/suspension or a 
resolution by the UN SC. However, in cases of States bound by the ECHR 
in light of the text of the Convention and the presented relevant case law of 
the ECtHR, the manoeuvring space for such legislation is extremely limited, 
especially as Art. 5 (1) ECHR does not explicitly mention detention for 
security reasons as a reason for lawful detention.  
E. Summary and Conclusions 
IHL applicable to situations of NIACs does not, at the present stage of its 
development, provide a legal basis for the armed forces of a State to detain 
individuals for security reasons.116 This, however, does not mean that 
detention is prohibited or illegal in NIACs; one must merely look for the 
legal basis either in international or domestic law. Furthermore, a legal basis 
for detention is required by the rules enshrined in universal und regional 
human rights instruments, as the right to liberty of the individual is affected. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of adequate legislation faces several 
obstacles in the light of human rights law. The situation is especially 
complex regarding States bound by the EHCR, as the wording of this human 
____________________ 
115  Medvedyev v France (n 111) paras 80; see also Landais and Bass, ‘Reconciling’ 
(n 83) 1306. 
116  See also Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] (n 2) para 293.  
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rights instrument does not allow a detention for security reasons. 
Additionally, the case law of the ECtHR is very strict with regard to the 
legal requirements of domestic and international legislation in relation to 
detention. It remains to be seen how the future human rights jurisprudence 
will both handle and solve the various problems involved.
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Comment: Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflict by States – Just a Matter of Perspective on 
Areas of Limited Statehood? 
Anton O. Petrov 
Manuel Brunner’s well-elaborated contribution illustrates how detention in 
NIACs by States is permeating practice as much as legal discourse. It also 
demonstrates how much of a pressing issue it has become for lawyers 
approaching the issue from various angles of international and domestic 
law. In fact, detention is one of IHL’s predominant aspects that receives 
legal attention and adjudication nowadays. From an IHL perspective, 
however, the approach usually taken in these fora raises a number of 
concerns. 
In this regard, there are three themes of Manuel Brunner’s contribution 
that I would particularly like to comment on: the quest for legal 
authorisation (1.), the doctrinal pitfalls of addressing detention in NIACs 
through the lens of human rights treaties (2.), and finally, the implications 
of addressing the issue from a human rights perspective for areas of limited 
statehood on the meta-level (3.). It will be shown that the conceptual 
understanding of areas of limited statehood lays open the underlying 
structures of the doctrinal questions surrounding a legal basis for States to 
detain in NIACs. 
A. Rule of Law and the Need for Legal Authorisation 
Manuel Brunner’s contribution addresses the question of whether there is a 
legal basis for detention in IHL itself. Notably, it is not asked whether 
detention is permitted in IHL, but whether IHL provides a legal 
authorisation for it. Framing the research question in this particular way is 
based on a premise which warrants some consideration. 
In fact, requiring a legal authorisation does not correspond to the 
traditional concept of international law. Despite the doctrinal controversy 
surrounding the Lotus principle, discussed already in other contributions of 
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this volume,1 international law was not built on the notion that sovereign 
exercise of power would ipso facto require a legal basis to authorise it. Quite 
the contrary, international law, as a basic principle, was rather indifferent to 
State action vis-à-vis individual persons, as this was the inherent domain of 
the State rooted in its international sovereignty.2 Hence, the traditional 
question an international lawyer asks is whether something is not 
prohibited, and thus permitted.3 
The question of legal authorisation is rather known from the domestic 
legal context. In German administrative law, for instance, the legal basis of 
authorisation to act is called Ermächtigungsgrundlage – it provides the 
basis for empowering the State to act face to face with its citizens, 
particularly to intervene in their individual rights. These individual rights 
create the need for such authorisation by law, the principle of statutory 
reservation.4 IHL, in contrast, is usually thought of in restrictive terms.5 
Why Manual Brunner nonetheless chose to apply this mode of thinking 
to IHL with a view to detention becomes apparent further into his 
contribution; there, he offers the interim conclusion that, ‘under human 
rights law, a legal basis for detention is required’. This is a crucial statement 
as it reveals that the question of the legality of detaining in NIACs is 
approached from a human rights perspective. The individual right to liberty 
of the person detained makes it necessary that an authorisation in law exists 
as a basis.6 
____________________ 
1  See Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? 
Lotus, Permissions and Restrictions within International Humanitarian Law’ in 
this volume 59 (hereafter Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming 
Flower?’); Pia Hesse, ‘Comment: neither Sunken Vessel nor Blooming Flower! 
The Lotus Principle and International Humanitarian Law’ in this volume 80 
(hereafter Hesse, ‘Comment’). 
2  Cf Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP April 2011) 
para 70. 
3  Cf Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert in Case concerning the 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 
(Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, para 51. 
4  See Peter Lerche, ‘Vorbehalt des Gesetzes und Wesentlichkeitstheorie’, in 
Detlef Merten and Hans-Jürgen Papier (eds), Handbuch der Grundrechte, vol. 
III (C.F. Müller 2009) 301. 
5  Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law’ in MPEPIL (online edn, 
OUP December 2015) paras 1, 3. 
6  Oliver Dörr, ‘Arbitrary Detention’ in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP March 2007) 
paras 12 et seq (hereafter Dörr, ‘Arbitrary Detention’). 
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It is, of course, in no way wrong to apply this requirement to detention in 
NIACs. However, one needs to be conscious of the fact that it is a deliberate 
move to search for authorisation, not simply permission, in international 
law.7 At least, on the international plain there is no abstract rule of law that 
requires an authorising legal basis for State action. This requirement 
surfaces when human rights are concerned. With this in mind, some of the 
doctrinal questions appear in a different light. 
B. Concerns Regarding the Human Rights Paradigm 
The question of whether IHL provides an express authorisation for 
detention in NIACs is a priori alien to IHL as a legal system. 
Unsurprisingly, neither Justice Leggatt nor the judges at the ECtHR or any 
other court could find such a provision in international humanitarian treaty 
or customary law. Of course they were not able to, as IHL does not provide 
an express authorisation to kill non-civilians in NIAC either.8 Yet, one can 
hardly claim that killing a non-civilian in a NIAC would be illegal under 
international law due to a lack of express authorisation.9 
The simple reason for this, as Manuel Brunner delineates in the 
beginning, is that the original lawmakers of IHL considered NIACs a 
(largely) internal affair of the State. At that time, it would have been 
completely beside the point to consider that international law could bar a 
sovereign State from killing or detaining members of armed non-State 
groups in a NIAC. There was no need to provide for positive authorisation 
in international law. As Manuel Brunner points out, IHL addresses only 
some aspects of how detention in NIACs may be conducted. In fact, 
addressing the ‘if’ of such acts – even if this meant authorising them – 
would have been more intrusive to States’ sovereignty than leaving it 
unaddressed. Excluding it upheld the original freedom of States. Hence, the 
contemporary quest for express authorisation by IHL in the context of 
NIACs runs fully counter to this legal regime’s original conception and 
raison d’être. 
____________________ 
7  The doctrinal twists of this difference are addressed with a view to the infamous 
Lotus principle by Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower?’ 
(n 1) as well as by Hesse, ‘Comment’ (n 1). 
8  See also Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari, ‘Targeting and Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 91 ILS 60, 88-89. 
9  Cf Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), Targeted Killing in Pakistan Case, 
Case No 3 BJs 7/12-4, 157 ILR 722, 748. 
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There is also a methodological concern in this regard. It pertains, on a 
first level, to the relationship between IHL and IHRL. The traditional bold 
lex specialis displacement of IHRL as the general regime by IHL as the 
special one is obsolete. The debate seems to have settled on a situation-
specific case-by-case analysis: this means that it needs to be inquired in 
each instance whether there is a particular lex specialis of IHL that can 
partially displace human rights law or inform its interpretation.10 Taken as 
such, these case-specific approaches can provide reasonable solutions. 
However, the problem starts when the demanding requirements of 
contemporary IHRL are applied to the rather antique treaty rules of IHL 
without the necessary interpretive sensitivity. If the circumstances have 
changed from a Lotus-inspired world to a rule-of-law-based one, this 
change must be reflected in how IHL provisions are interpreted. Yet, this is 
often not sufficiently done. IHL is – foreseeably without result – frequently 
scanned in search for sufficiently clear, predictable and transparent rules. In 
effect, the lack of regulation by IHL in NIACs is used to incorporate the 
much more restrictive IHRL regime although this restraint of IHL was 
originally intended to guarantee States’ freedom. 
C. Areas of Limited Statehood as a Challenge to the Dichotomy of 
International Armed Conflicts and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
An explanation for this push for international regulation of NIACs via IHRL 
can be found in the pluralistic setting of areas of limited statehood. It is, 
however, in this context that the benefits of applying the requirements posed 
by IHRL indiscriminately to NIACs become doubtful. 
When a consolidated State is involved in a NIAC on a foreign State’s 
territory, IHL’s essential dichotomy of international and non-international 
armed conflicts dissolves. This dichotomy, however, had been the rationale 
behind the structurally different regimes of IHL applying to IACs and 
NIACs. IACs required comprehensive international legal rules because two 
sovereign States clashed; thus, authorisation by international law was 
needed to infringe upon another State’s sovereignty. This was a completely 
____________________ 
10  For an overview of the three main concepts, i.e. total displacement, partial 
displacement as the norm conflict resolution and an interpretive solution, see 
Marko Milanovic, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the 
Relationship between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’, in 
Jens D. Ohlin (ed), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights 
(OUP 2016) 78, 103-14. 
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different case in an internal conflict: there, IHL only needed to prohibit 
certain acts out of humanitarian considerations. The law of NIAC thus gave 
States much more liberty in conducting warfare because other States were 
not directly affected. An extraterritorial NIAC involves an inter-State 
element which potentially calls for more international regulation, arguably 
also authorisation. 
Yet, is the approach taken convincing with a view to detention? The 
mechanical application of the human rights regime to extraterritorial NIACs 
in areas of limited statehood leads, to some extent, to absurd results. I would 
also question that the formal insistence on an expressly authorising black-
letter rule benefits those concerned. 
My first concern regards derogations. Derogations have been proposed 
as a solution to the conflict of the various legal regimes; in particular, the 
UK is considering derogating from the ECHR.11 However, a closer scrutiny 
of the requirements of derogation clauses in human rights treaties reveals 
that they do not fit the situation. Is it a threat to the life of the host State’s 
nation, for instance Afghanistan’s, which would allow the United Kingdom 
to derogate from its own human rights obligations as Justice Leggatt has 
suggested in Serdar Mohammed,12 or is it only a threat to that of the sending 
State’s, in that case the United Kingdom’s, which would allow it not to 
comply with its human rights obligations when fighting a war on Afghan 
soil as Lord Bingham proposed in Al-Jedda13? Case law and scholarship 
diverge on these questions, which does not come as a surprise as every 
answer appears arbitrary. 
Another concern relates to detention itself. It seems rather odd that 
British troops could act on the basis of Afghan law to comply with their 
obligations under the ECHR. Although such relationships are not unknown 
in the realm of legal and administrative cooperation, particularly in law 
enforcement, they must fulfill a specific purpose, namely to ‘allow the 
persons concerned to foresee the consequences of their actions’14. Would 
any of the potential sources that Manuel Brunner discusses in this regard 
____________________ 
11  See the website of the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights regarding the 
Government’s proposed derogation from the ECHR inquiry, <https://www.par-
liament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/government-proposed-echr-derogation-
16-17> accessed 30 October 2017. 
12  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) para 156. 
13  Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] 1 AC 332 para 38. 
14  Dörr, ‘Arbitrary Detention’ (n 6) para 12. 
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substantively improve the protection of persons engaged in areas of limited 
statehood? 
In the end, detention in NIAC is a paradigm example in which the 
underlying values and structures of the law of IAC, the law of NIAC and 
IHRL clash. Reconciling them is a worthwhile effort, but will not be 
achievable in all instances. Understanding the guiding values and structures 
involved can, at least, allow to make more prudent doctrinal choices.
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Detention by Organised Armed Groups in Non-
International Armed Conflicts: the Role of Non-State 
Actors in a State-Centred International Legal System 
Vincent Widdig 
A. Introduction 
Following the swift change in nature of armed conflicts in recent history, 
the number and importance of NIACs and non-State actors especially has 
grown significantly.1 Conflicts are also increasingly taking place in areas 
where State influence is limited or even absent. Especially the recent 
conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Congo have 
powerfully illustrated which devastating impact armed groups can have on 
the lives and livelihoods of the respective civilian populations.2 Although it 
is well-established by now that non-State actors / OAGs are bound by IHL 
to a certain extent, the scope of applicable norms remains very much unclear 
when dealing with the conduct of hostilities in the context of NIACs.3 When 
touching upon human rights obligations of OAGs, the ‘fog of law’, in 
concreto the question of applicable norms, becomes even more obscure.4 
____________________ 
1  See Annyssa Bellal (ed), The War Report – Armed Conflict in 2014 (OUP 2015) 
23-25 (hereafter Bellal, War Report) for a comprehensive overview of currently 
existing conflicts. 
2  Daragh Murray, Human Rights obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart 
2016) 1-6 (hereafter Murray, Human Rights obligations), with further examples. 
3  Yoram Dinstein, Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law (CUP 
2014) para 200 et seq (hereafter Dinstein, NIAC); for an analysis of IHL and its 
early relationship with human rights, see Charles Lysaght, ‘The Scope of 
Protocol II and Its Relation to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments’ (1983) 33 American University 
Law Review 9 et seq; René Provost, International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law (CUP 2002); UN SC Res 1564 (8 September 2004) UN Doc 
S/RES/1564. 
4  For a detailed discussion, see: Andrew Clapham, ‘Focusing on Armed Non-State 
Actors’ in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014), 766 (hereafter Clapham, 
‘Focusing on Non-State Actors’); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations 
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Notwithstanding their individual character and other issues in NIACs, 
OAGs5 possess one common denominator in all conflicts: They all capture 
or detain individuals in a variety of situations. After the experiences in 
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the international community still 
struggles both practically and conceptually with the detention of 
belligerents in NIACs; moreover, it is still very much unclear which legal 
obligations those groups actually are subject to when dealing with 
detainees.6 In other words, to which standards of treatment must these 
groups adhere after having captured or detained individuals in the context 
of an armed conflict? The legal question that follows this debate, is 
inevitably linked to the role of a distinct legal personality, which may or 
may not be awarded to OAGs in order to assert their possible legal 
obligations under international treaty and customary law.7 
Bearing in mind that there is an urgent need to improve the protection of 
civilians and those detained or deprived of their liberty in armed conflicts, 
____________________ 
of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) (hereafter Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations). However, this uncertainty largely stems from the fact that, 
although armed conflicts and the deprivation of liberty are inexorably linked, 
IHL itself does not offer a specific internment regime in NIACs for States; 
moreover, States seem to be in considerable disagreement over the applicability 
of human rights law in those situations. For arguments on the legal basis of 
detention by States in NIACs, see Manuel Brunner, ‘Security Detention by the 
Armed Forces of a State in Situations of Non-International Armed Conflict: the 
Quest for a Legal Basis’ in this volume 89 (hereafter Brunner, ‘Security 
Detention’); Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, ‘The relationship between 
international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible 
killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts’ (2008) 
90 IRRC 871.  
5  Although the terms ‘armed non-State actor’, ‘insurgents’, etc. are used in 
differing manners to describe those involved in armed conflicts acting outside 
of State control, this contribution will refer to the terminology of organised 
armed groups following the Tadić-jurisprudence of the ICTY, see Prosecutor v 
Dusko Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) (hereafter Prosecutor v Tadić).  
6  Chris Jenks, ‘Detention under the law of armed conflict’ in Rain Liivija and Tim 
McCormack (eds), The Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict 
(Routledge 2016) 301 (hereafter Jenks, ‘Detention’). 
7  In order to apply any legal rights and duties under international law, OAGs must 
possess an international legal personality. Since the question of legal personality 
is almost inevitably linked with legitimisation, some have coined that dilemma 
a legal ‘Gordian-Knot’ as it seems almost impossible to solve without a 
pragmatic approach to detention; Jenks, ‘Detention’ (n 6) 301. This approach 
will also be taken throughout this contribution. 
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this contribution in its outset, will try to set a legal framework on how and 
to what extent OAGs might be bound de lege lata to IHL and human rights 
law within the context of ‘detention’ in order to gain some legal clarity on 
the matter. Before dealing with the issue of detention itself in intenso, it is 
important to note, what is actually not covered by this terminology. 
Although armed groups are engaged in hostage-taking to a large extent, not 
every deprivation of liberty by an OAG also automatically amounts to 
hostage-taking since the latter requires a specific intention for the 
deprivation of liberty.8 The focus of the present contribution will therefore 
be placed on the effect of the conduct of OAGs on treaty and customary 
obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Additional 
Protocols, the 1907 Hague Regulations (as far as they can be related to 
NIACs) and international human rights law outside of the ‘regime of 
hostage-taking’.9 Since States differ in their use of terminology, sometimes 
explicitly avoiding any attribute that may link a non-State conduct to a 
State-like action, the inevitably linked debate of the distinction between 
detention and deprivation of liberty directed at the perceived risk of the 
group’s legitimisation will be touched upon as well. This may constitute a 
relevant factor to ascribing them legal obligations under the regime of 
humanitarian protection.10 It is therefore worth investigating whether the 
existing regime of IHL is still capable of regulating modern conflicts 
____________________ 
8  The deprivation of liberty must be conducted through a threat to the life, integrity 
or liberty of the captured person in order to pursue concessions by a third party, 
as stated in Art. 1 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 
(opened for signature 17 December 1979, entered into force 03 June 1983) 1316 
UNTS 205. The convention currently has 176 States Parties, not including inter 
alia the Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, 
Gambia, Indonesia, Israel, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. See also ICRC, 
‘ICRC position in hostage taking’ (2002) 84 IRRC 467. 
9  See, for example, ECHR, ICCPR, ACHR. For the broader scope of ‘equality’ 
(before the law), ‘freedom’ (right to liberty and security), ‘dignity’ (as the core 
principle) and ‘solidarity’ (collective effort to secure the rights in question) as 
the underlying principles of the human rights regime, see Ilias Bantekas and Lutz 
Oette, International Human Rights, Law and Practice (2nd edn, CUP 2016) 71 
et seq (hereafter Bantekas and Oette, Human Rights Law) in that respect. 
10  This is an argument put forward within the context of human rights law. Some 
differentiate between deprivation of liberty and detention; the latter usually 
entails a formal prolonged internment of the individual under the activation of 
all accompanying procedural guarantees, whereas the former is, by definition, 
short-lived and not necessarily conducted by the State or a State agent. The 
consequence may be a different scope of applicability of human rights. 
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properly and whether a reasonable discussion outside of CA 3 can take 
place. 
When talking about applicable international law, the role of domestic law 
within the debate over the conduct of OAGs in NIACs should not be 
forgotten. The application of existing domestic law in the respective State 
where the conflict occurs (and its possible primacy over international 
obligations) might already represent an adequate tool to bind OAGs to a 
certain legal standard. In other words, do we even need to create legal 
obligations for non-State actors at the international level or is the existing 
domestic law already sufficient to deal with the matter?  
Without prejudice to the nature of the applicable law, the case of a 
possible accountability of non-State actors for violations of IHL and human 
rights needs to be investigated in order to complete the picture. 
B. The Legal Personality of Organised Armed Groups and the Risk of their 
Legitimisation 
To gain a certain degree of legal certainty, the answer to this highly debated 
and (at first glance) contradictory question can only be found in 
international law. Given the prohibitive character of IHL and its function as 
a minimum legal order,11 once all efforts to a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict have failed, the question of legal personality of OAGs under 
international law is central to the complementary protection offered by IHL 
for victims of the conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts and the effective 
human rights protection in areas of limited statehood. 
It may be argued that (a) a certain degree of legal personality and/or 
capacity should be the necessary prerequisite for OAGs to assert their 
possible legal obligations under international treaty and customary law in 
the context of detention, as only subjects of international law may be 
addressed by it, and (b) incorporating those actors into the existing 
____________________ 
11  The prohibitive character of IHL remains the rule rather then the exception. 
Where there is an authorisation to act, the Geneva Conventions and their 
Protocols will mention it explicitly as in Art. 43 (2) AP I. It hereby deviates from 
its prohibitive nature. For a further interpretation of the prohibitive/permissive 
character of IHL, see Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or 
Blooming Flower? Lotus, Permissions and Restrictions within International 
Humanitarian Law’ in this volume 59 (hereafter Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken 
Vessel or Blooming Flower?’). 
 
Part II: Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict 
128 
protection regime might require a renunciation from the current State-
centric public international law.12 Before dealing with possible legal 
obligations of OAGs, it is important to define what can be perceived as an 
OAG in the first place. Its definition plays an important role within the 
debate, especially in terms of a distinct legal personality or even a legal 
capacity in international law, as, by their very nature, these groups are 
characterised by their diversity; the clarification of their definition will 
therefore add effectiveness and validity to the legal regime they might be 
involved in.13 Thus, the variety of non-State actors involved in modern 
(non-international) armed conflicts requires different treatments depending 
on their specific legal character.14 
I. Defining Organised Armed Groups in International Law 
Although defining organised armed groups seems to be straightforward at 
the first glance, adequately defining the term in a legal sense is not without 
difficulties. The term OAG is used by political analysts and sociologists in 
international relations as well as in various other contexts.15 For example, 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs refers to OAGs 
as armed non-State groups and defines them as:  
____________________ 
12  This is a change some expect to take place soon. For further details, see Janne E 
Nijman, ‘Non-State Actors and the International Rule of Law: Revisiting the 
“Realist Theory” of International Legal Personality’ (2009) Amsterdam Center 
for International Law Research Paper Series <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.15
22520> accessed 16 November 2017. 
13  David Tuck, ‘Detention by armed groups: overcoming challenges to 
humanitarian action’ (2011) 93 IRRC 759, 761, also elaborating on the (factual) 
humanitarian challenges regarding the internment by OAGs. 
14  See, for example, Bantekas and Oette, Human Rights Law (n 9) 762, who 
negatively define non-State actors as ‘entities that do not exercise governmental 
functions or whose conduct cannot be described as possessing a public nature’. 
This seems to exclude those entities from the vertical system of human rights 
obligations by definition. 
15  For a detailed discussion on the interdisciplinary approach towards defining an 
OAG and the definition of an OAG, see Vincent Widdig, ‘Perspektiven einer 
möglichen Einbindung bewaffneter organisierter Gruppen als nicht-staatliche 
Akteure in den Normsetzungsprozess des Völkerrechts’ (2016) 29 J. Int’l L. of 
Peace & Armed Conflict 109, 110 et seqq (hereafter Widdig, ‘Perspektiven einer 
möglichen Einbindung’). 
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… hav[ing] the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, 
ideological or economic objectives; … [being] not within the formal military 
structures of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental organizations; and [not 
being] under the control of the State(s) in which they operate.16  
Other authors like Philip Alston have resorted to a negative approach to the 
definition for a long time already by defining non-State actors by what they 
are not, rather than by what they are.17 When interpreting the term itself, 
three basic prerequisites can be identified. The actors in question ought to 
be (1) a group, (2) armed and (3) organised. Although there is no formal 
membership test and it is still disputed whether a ‘certain function’ or a 
‘continuous combat function’ might be required for establishing the 
affiliation to the group,18 it can be considered sufficient that gatherings take 
place on a more than just sporadic basis, bearing in mind that the affiliation 
criterion is ultimately met on a factual basis.19 A certain degree of armament 
is rightly seen as a conditio sine qua non for such groups, since international 
law does not provide for specific technology standards. In general, 
possessing a political wing does not change the characterisation of the group 
as ‘armed’.20 The most interesting and relevant part of the definition is the 
organisation of the group in question. Since CA 3 and Art. 1 (1) AP II differ 
in their scope of requirements, this aspect must be dealt with carefully. In 
that respect, a certain command-and-control structure of the group is 
required.21 This follows the line of the ICTY and its famous Tadić-
Judgment, which was later specified in the Boškoski-jurisprudence in which 
the tribunal laid down five decisive criteria for the part of the definition 
referring to the organisation of a group.22 Firstly, a chain of command, for 
____________________ 
16  Gerard McHugh and Manuel Bessler, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed 
Groups, A Manual for Practitioners (UN 2006) 6. 
17  See Philip Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP 2005) (hereafter 
Alston, Non-State Actors), referring to the ‘not-a-cat syndrome’. 
18  See Dinstein, NIAC (n 3) para 128 et seqq. 
19  Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘Accountability of Organized Armed Groups’ in International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law (ed), Non-State Actors and International 
Humanitarian Law. Organized Armed Groups: A Challenge for the 21st Century 
(FrancoAngeli 2000) 109, 112. 
20  Dinstein, NIAC (n 3) para 129. 
21  Bellal, War Report (n 1) 17; Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj et al (Judgment) 
IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para 60. 
22  Prosecutor v Tadić (n 5); Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-
96-4-T (2 September 1998), para 620 (hereafter Prosecutor v Akayesu) 
following the line of the ICTY; Prosecutor v Boskoski et al (Judgment) IT-04-
82 (10 July 2008) paras 199-203.  
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instance the setting up of headquarters, the emergence of a military 
hierarchy or the issuance of directives to commanders in the field must be 
proved.23 Secondly, organisational capacities to carry out military-style 
operations and coordinate efforts are required – a requirement that has to be 
established on a factual basis.24 Thirdly, a logistical base for food, 
communications, training, etc. should be provided.25 Fourthly, a certain 
discipline to obey IHL must exist. Fifthly, the group must speak with one 
voice, for instance in the form of common statements.26 Although these 
criteria seem ample, they can only remain indicators as they merely touch 
upon some of the problems of defining an OAG27; thus, it might still prove 
difficult to factually establish the aforementioned facts when dealing with 
such a group. Nonetheless, the criteria remain a sufficient roadmap in order 
to better deal with this kind of actors. However, it should not be forgotten 
that these criteria will certainly not cover the majority of smaller groups 
involved in NIACs. Broadening the scope of definition too much would 
only hinder the effective application of the obligations in question. Thus, in 
sum, OAGs can be understood as actors who operate outside of State 
control, mainly pursue political goals which they enforce by resort to armed 
force, and who possess an effective organisational and commando structure 
which enables them to take part in hostilities.28 
____________________ 
23  Prosecutor v Limaj et al (Judgment) IT-03-66 (30 November 2005), paras 46, 
94-103 and 111. 
24  Ibid, paras 108, 129, 158. 
25  Ibid, paras 118-23. 
26  Ibid, paras 113-17 and 125-29. 
27  See Dinstein, NIAC (n 3) para 140, who also addresses the question of whether 
a group remains sufficiently organised when its members frequently violate IHL. 
Dinstein rightly argues that even if violating the laws of war may be a broader 
strategy or policy of an OAG, the group remains organised notwithstanding. It 
is only when members wantonly violate their obligations without any control of 
the group they belong to that they can be seen as ‘unorganised’. See also Andrea 
Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism 
(Hart 2011) 163. 
28  Following a similar approach, see Orla Buckley, ‘Unregulated Armed Conflict: 
Non-State Armed Groups, International Humanitarian Law and Violence in 
Western Sahara’ (2012) 37 North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 793, 797. 
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II. Arguments on International Legal Personality and/or Capacity of 
Organised Armed Groups 
In order to assert the possible legal obligations of OAGs, the pretext of their 
legal personality and capacity has to be investigated and analysed, as only 
subjects of international law may be bound by the latter. That being said, it 
should be noted that the mere exercise of factual legal capacity is usually 
just the consequence of, but not the evidence for the existence of a legal 
personality.29 Another issue that should be addressed in this context is 
whether the debate over the distinction between ‘detention’ and 
‘deprivation of liberty’ directed at the perceived risk of the group’s 
legitimisation and its connection to a State-like behaviour, might be a 
relevant factor to ascribing them legal obligations under the regime of 
humanitarian protection in the first place. 
1. Arguing in favour of an international legal personality and/or capacity of 
Organised Armed Groups 
International law and legal personality in particular have long been solely 
State-centric. However, since the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion concerning 
reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the UN,30 this perception 
has undergone some changes. Following the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, a 
subject of public international law may be every entity, that is (1) able to 
possess international rights and duties, (2) maintain those rights by bringing 
international claims31 and (3) bear responsibility for the breaches of those 
obligations, for example by being subject to an international claim.32 The 
core element that can be taken from this definition is the ability to take part 
____________________ 
29  James Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th 
edn, OUP 2012) 127 (hereafter Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles). 
30  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory 
Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179 (hereafter Reparation for Injuries Suffered). 
31  Ibid. 
32  Ibid; Crawford, Brownlie’s (n 29) 115: ‘an entity possessing international rights 
and obligations and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims and to be responsible for its breaches of obligation by being 
subjected to such claims’; Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2005) 71 et seq (hereafter Cassese, International Law). 
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in international legal relations independently and outside domestic law.33 
The inability to fulfil this last criterion will have important consequences 
for the quality of the legal personality in question; it will not lead to a 
negation of a legal personality as such, but rather results in limiting it to the 
application of rights and duties under existing customary international 
law.34 A conclusion that was also reached by the ICJ in its Advisory 
Opinion. The mere acquisition of a (derived) international legal personality 
does not necessarily enable the entity to enjoy the same rights and duties as 
States. As States are the primary subjects of international law, they alone 
enjoy an unlimited legal personality.35 This traditional approach, however, 
seems rather circular, as, in case of doubt, the decisive criterion of whether 
or not an entity possesses a distinct legal personality is the factual 
determination of its exercise of the capacity to enter into sovereign 
international relations with other subjects; more precisely, its capacity to 
bear rights and duties under international law.36 Therefore, the ability to 
participate in international legal relations as well as the immunity from 
national jurisdiction is the result of a previously established legal 
personality, thereby empowering the entity as a bearer of rights and duties 
under international law as a consequence, and not as a prerequisite. Beyond 
that, the reality of international relations cannot always be reduced to a 
simple formula, which further complicates any attempts at determination.37 
When arguing in favour of OAGs possessing a legal personality in the 
context of armed conflicts, it is well established by now that, once the non-
State party has been recognised as a formal belligerent by the State party to 
the conflict (given that the insurgents exercise effective control over a 
certain part of the State’s territory and their conduct reaches the threshold 
of an armed conflict), these actors enjoy partial legal personality in relation 
to the recognising belligerent State.38 This partially enables them to act on 
____________________ 
33  Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 29) 115. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Reparation for Injuries Suffered (n 30) 180; Volker Epping, ‘Grundlagen’ in 
Knut Ipsen (ed), Völkerrecht (7th edn, Beck 2018) para 7 et seq. 
36  Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 29) 115; Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations (n 4) 64.; Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The 
Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Intersentia 
2001) 24. 
37  Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 29) 116. 
38  Cassese, International Law (n 32) 125; Andrew Clapham, ‘Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 88 IRRC 491, 
492 (hereafter Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations in Conflict Situations’). 
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the international legal plane and to enter into legal relations with other 
subjects of international law.39 Some even argue that this includes the 
ability to conclude international agreements with third Parties.40 However, 
this assertion seems highly doubtful, as third Parties would hereby regularly 
violate the principle of non-intervention. The conclusion of an international 
agreement with an OAG will always be accompanied with its recognition. 
Any legal relations in this case are limited to the belligerents and an 
interference with this constitutes a violation of matters within the sole 
domestic jurisdiction of the belligerent State. This formal recognition, 
however, rarely occurs in practice, as States are eager to avoid conferring 
any legal personality to insurgents in order to limit their own legal 
obligations and responsibilities when combatting insurgency to their own 
domestic sphere.41 
Another approach in this context can be taken from the (limited) principle 
of reciprocity in armed conflict. The answer could lie in the form of a 
limited recognition of the OAG beneath the threshold of the recognition as 
a belligerent: the recognition as an insurgent. This theory relies on practical 
considerations. An insurgency is understood as ‘a more substantial attack 
against the legitimate order of the State with the rebelling faction being 
sufficiently organized to mount a credible threat to the government’42. In 
this case, the limited recognition by the belligerent State is vested in the 
protection of its own interests – for instance a reciprocal standard of 
____________________ 
Some argue that such a recognition of belligerency was set into effect by the 
conduct of the State of Israel within its conflict with the Palestinian Forces. 
Otherwise, the naval Blockade put in effect on the Gaza-shore would remain 
illegal. 
39  Cassese, International Law (n 32) 118; Volker Epping, ‘Sonstige 
Völkerrechtssubjekte’ in Knut Ipsen (ed), Völkerrecht (7th edn, Beck 2018) para 
11 et seq (hereafter Epping, ‘Sonstige Völkerrechtssubjekte’). 
40  Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The general principles of international law considered 
from the standpoint of the rule of law’ (1957) 92 RdC 5, 10; UNYBILC 1958/II 
24,32; UNYBILC 1962/II 161, the original Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties 
used the formulation ‘States and other subjects of international law’ thereby 
including insurgents. 
41  Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law’ 
(2008) Institute for International Law K.U. Leuven Working Paper, 
<https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP146e.pdf> accessed 27 
March 2018 (hereafter Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors’). 
42  Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, (CUP 2007) 4. 
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protection or a ‘humane conduct of hostilities’ – resulting in a de facto, but 
not de jure recognition as a belligerent.43 
This mere factual recognition as insurgents for practical considerations 
can thereby only constitute a partial and particular legal personality of the 
OAG in relation to CA 3.44 An argument that seems very convincing in the 
light of the object and purpose of CA 3, which predominately guarantees a 
minimum standard of protection for vulnerable persons in armed conflicts 
and which does not assert or regulate any international legal status between 
the parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, even in this case, there ultimately 
has to be some explicit recognition of the belligerent group by the State 
itself at some point in time.  
Apart from the creation of a legal personality via recognition, an 
argument for its constitution is also made with the link to the threshold of 
applicability of IHL. The determination of the applicability of IHL 
transforms the previously national situation into an international one. This 
might be done by either the standard of CA 3 or Art. 1 (1) AP II, depending 
on the organisational structure of the group itself. As a consequence, a 
relative legal personality in international law is created for the non-State 
party to the conflict. The question of consent is often the centrepiece of the 
debate over the legal personality of OAGs, since, as a principle of 
international law, its subject may only be bound by consent; moreover, no 
third party shall be affected be an agreement which it has not consented to 
following the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle.45 The rejection 
of the consent requirement would indeed overcome a major obstacle 
towards the direct applicability of international treaty law. Whether or not 
this principle only extends to States or represents a basic principle of public 
international law binding all of its subjects surpasses the scope of the 
____________________ 
43  Ibid, 5; Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2002) 45 GYIL 149 et seq. 
44  Robert Frau, ‘Entwicklungen bei der gewohnheitsrechtlichen Einbindung nicht-
staatlicher Akteure’ in Heike Krieger and Dieter Weingärtner (eds), Streitkräfte 
und nicht-staatliche Akteure (Nomos 2013) 28 et seq; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups through Humanitarian Treaty Law and 
Customary Law’ in Marc Vuijlsteke et al (eds), Relevance of International 
Humanitarian law to non-state Actors (College of Europe/ICRC 2003) 123, 129 
et seq. 
45  See Daragh Murray, ‘How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-
State Armed Groups’ (2015) 20 JCSL 101, who rejects the applicability of the 
pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle on the basis of non-applicability 
to armed opposition groups.  
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present contribution. As OAGs – if at all – merely possess a limited legal 
personality that still is distinguished from that of States, it is convincing to 
solely limit this principle to the conduct of States at the level of international 
treaty relations, even under customary international law.46 
2. Arguing against an international legal personality and/or capacity of 
Organised Armed Groups 
Although recognition might be the easiest way to create some form of legal 
personality for the OAG, its actual implementation is highly unlikely as 
granting OAGs a relative or extensive legal personality always implies 
some form of legitimisation of the group’s conduct – at least from a State-
centric perspective. A position that was also taken by the ILC in its early 
drafts to Art. 10 ASR, which explicitly did not include any prerequisites for 
a legal personality of insurgents in order to avoid the emergence of a formal 
legal personality for the latter.47 However, the stronger and bigger the group 
becomes, the harder it is for the international community to deny its 
existence on the international plane. Even if a legal personality of OAGs 
with the capacity to make treaties could be asserted in theory, there is almost 
no evidence in recent State practice that would prove their full legal capacity 
on the international plane, such as States claiming the group’s international 
responsibility on the grounds of international law.48 The rare exception to 
this rule is the American Alien-Tort Claims Act.49 Under the Alien-Tort 
Claims Act, several cases were filed against the non-State actor as such, 
claiming his responsibility under international customary law.50 Of course, 
____________________ 
46  An Argument that can be supported by the interpretation of the principle itself. 
Since it derives from international treaty law, Art. 34 to 36 VCLT. The treaty 
itself only addresses States by its wording. An exception might has to be made 
of course, when conferring treaty-making capacities to a non-State actor.  
47  UNYBILC 1975/I, 41-6. 
48  James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (OUP 2013) 81 
(hereafter Crawford, State Responsibility). 
49  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). Applicable law in such cases is only customary 
international law. The acceptance thereof may be seen as evidence for an opinio 
iuris. 
50  See eg Mohamad et al v Palestinian Authority et al, 556 US 494 (2012) 
(hereafter Mohamad v Palestinian Authority); Tel-Oren et al v Libyan Arab 
Republic et al, (1984) 726 F.2d 774, 233 U.S.App.D.C. 384 (hereafter Tel-Oren 
v Libyan Arab Republic). 
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the incidents as such cannot suffice to set a precedence for a new rule of 
international law or serve as evidence for sufficient State practice yet. On 
the contrary, in most cases, States implement their international obligations 
into their domestic law in order to avoid any legal interaction with the 
insurgents on the international plane.51 Even in the case of recognition 
through the belligerent State, where a derived and limited subjectivity of 
international law is awarded to the OAG, a full legal capacity comparing to 
that of a primary subject of international law (which would enable the OAG 
to enter and participate in the creation of international treaties and therefore 
create an international common responsibility) must be negated. A capacity 
to make treaties therefore remains unrealistic and sometimes even 
undesirable for OAGs.52 Some even deny any legal personality of an OAG 
as such and argue that this kind of groups ought to be seen as what they are: 
clusters of individuals, who jointly exercise their individual rights and 
duties under IHL; a collective legal personality is not created by this joint 
exercise.53  
C. The Argument of Effectiveness 
Although State practice seems to support this view until now, it might be 
worth asking whether the changing character of warfare and the ever-
growing power of OAGs will inevitably alter the current discourse about 
their position in the international legal system, especially in areas of limited 
statehood. The central element of this discussion is the effective exercise of 
territorial control by OAGs. 
It is often argued that international law must be obeyed in order for it to 
exert its full authority and to be effective. The specific reason for adherence 
to it is often deemed controversial: Sometimes law is obeyed due to the 
perceived (legal and political) threat of force and coercion by others. 
However, for more powerful actors, such as the permanent members of the 
UN SC or other strong nations, this might not be the motivation. Rather, it 
is the levelling of the playing field of the actors, the do ut des of traditional 
consensual public international law, which provides the true reason behind 
adherence to international law. The continued emergence of powerful non-
____________________ 
51  Crawford, State Responsibility (n 48) 81. 
52  Clapham, ‘Focusing on Non-State Actors’ (n 4) 767. 
53  See Dinstein, NIAC (n 3) para 210. 
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State actors seems to disrupt the playing field and shift it to a more three-
dimensional sphere.54  
Without prejudice to the very question of statehood, the argument and 
effect of the ‘failed State’ constellation may be invoked here to make a case 
for human rights protection in situations of limited statehood in order to 
level the playing field once more. The argument can be based on factual 
considerations for a determination of a possible legal personality in 
comparison to the prerequisites of statehood, as found in arguments within 
the ‘failed State’ debate. When adding the principle of effectiveness to the 
debate, it might be a valid point to ascribe some legal obligations to OAGs 
with regard to the protection of human rights in situations of deprived 
liberty within armed conflicts.  
The main question to be asked is whether the exercise of effective control 
might be sufficient to confer legal obligations under the human rights 
regime to OAGs. In the context of prescribing a legal personality to OAGs 
sui generis on the basis of the common principle, it is often argued that 
international law cannot ignore actors with a certain presence on the 
international legal plane, despite their particular anomalous character.55 
This cannot be made dependent on their factual status.56 Taken seriously 
and put in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, a valid argument 
can be made. The effective exercise of permanent control over people and 
territory may very well be a factual criterion for international legal 
subjectivity. When a group is in fact effectively able to exercise control over 
a substantial area of a State’s territory and enforce the rule of law, this 
threshold may be reached, as the group is organised in a State-like 
structure.57 
From this point onwards, the OAG crosses the line towards a subject of 
international law that may even have the capacity to make and enter 
international treaties, as States can no longer ignore its existence.58 Its legal 
____________________ 
54  A sphere in which powerful non-State entities challenge the primacy of the 
States exercise of ultimate and sovereign power over everyone contained within 
their legal space, diluting the clear cut existing horizontal and vertical system. 
55  Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 29) 124. 
56  Ibid. 
57  This will have be determined on a factual level. Although the gain and loss of 
captured territory is subject to change in the ebb and flow of a NIAC, the group 
must effectively control a substantial part of the territory permanently. 
58  With regard to the principle of effectiveness, see Heike Krieger, Das 
Effektivitätsprinzip im Völkerrecht (Duncker & Humblot 2000) 35 et seq 
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personality is therefore created from its effective control: ex facto jus 
oritur.59 A possible consequence might then be the ability to accede to 
international agreements; a convincing argument, considering that the 
effectiveness of an entity is a prominent criterion regarding the 
determination of statehood and governance, for instance in terms of 
effective jurisdiction to enforce and adjudicate.60 Evidence for the 
effectiveness of an OAG can be deduced from its ability to be held 
responsible for its conduct at an international level. This, of course, depends 
to a certain extent on the definition of international responsibility. When 
taking the general approach, which defines international responsibility as 
‘legal relations which arise under international law by reason of an 
internationally wrongful act’61, the ability of OAGs to fall under that system 
is not entirely farfetched. A conclusion that was already reached by special 
rapporteur Ago to the ILC when discussing the issue of State responsibility 
at the end of the 1960s; already then, he argued that ‘an insurrectional 
movement which establishes its authority over a State’s territory becomes a 
“separate subject of international law”’. This entailed the ability to have 
rights and obligations under international law and be held liable to claims.62 
Even though his argument did not make it into the final draft, his point is 
still relevant today, especially in relation to the principle of effectiveness. 
Typical examples of an effective jurisdiction are the establishment of a 
‘domestic’ court system or the setting up of a healthcare or taxation 
system.63 Yet, this international legal subjectivity sui generis must be 
____________________ 
(hereafter Krieger, Effektivitätsprinzip). For its basis in customary international 
law see 49 et seq. 
59  See Robert Frau, ‘Überlegungen zur Bindung nichtstaatlicher Gewaltakteure an 
internationale Menschenrechte’ (2013) 26 J. Int’l L. of Peace & Armed Conflict 
13. 
60  Krieger, Effektivitätsprinzip (n 58) 82, relating to Art. 1 (d) ‘capacity to enter 
into relations with other states’ of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States (opened for signature 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 
December 1934) 165 LNTS 19. 
61  Commentary on Art. 1 of the ILC Draft ASR, UNYBILC 2001/II 31. 
62  UNYBILC 1972/II 129; see also earlier UNYBILC 1966/II 134.  
63  A group that is worth noting here is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), which maintained an own ‘judicial’ system for the detention of persons 
captured under its authority and within the territory it controlled. This system 
reportedly amounted up to 17 courts with a hierarchical structure; see Kristian 
Stokke, ‘Building the Tamil Eelam state: emerging institutions and forms of 
governance in LTTE-controlled Sri Lanka’ (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 
1027 (hereafter Stokke, ‘Building the Tamil Eelam state’). See also Sandesh 
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formally created in the first place, either by treaty or customary 
international law. The mere existence as an entity sui generis itself does not 
per se create an international legal personality in practice.64 
However, if we compare an OAG which acts as a de facto authority by 
exercising effective control and jurisdiction to the concept of a ‘failed 
State’, the recognition of the existence of the former can only be declaratory 
in nature. As long as effective control in terms of government-like power is 
exercised, as in cases of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC) in Colombia 
or the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Sudan, an 
international legal personality exceeding that created by CA 3 will be 
constituted as a consequence of the principle of effectiveness. Whether this 
extends to the applicability of human rights is highly debated. 
Once an OAG, by its factual size and effective control over a relevant 
piece of territory, grows to be a State-like entity and therefore can be 
classified as a de facto authority,65 it is not farfetched to attribute a distinct 
(partial) legal personality to it – at least with respect to IHL and basic human 
rights law.66 
D. Provisional Summary 
Concluding the arguments made above, OAGs can be seen as groups that 
exercise effective authority and have a certain standard of organisation and 
stability. Thus, they can be awarded a de facto limited legal personality in 
international law, which will bind them to existing international customary 
international law in NIACs. As a consequence, members of OAGs lose their 
status and protection as civilians following the wording and logic of both 
____________________ 
Sivakumaran, ‘Courts of armed opposition groups: fair trials or summary 
Justice?’ (2009) 7 JICJ 489 (hereafter Sivakumaran, ‘Courts of armed opposition 
groups’). 
64  Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 29) 124. To this day, the only traditionally 
recognised subjects of international law are the Order of Malta, the ICRC and 
the Holy See. 
65  Epping, ‘Sonstige Völkerrechtssubjekte’ (n 39) paras 11 et seq. This will hold 
true especially once OAGs possess a military capacity equal to that of a State. 
66  Ibid; Bantekas and Oette, Human Rights Law (n 9) 763 rightly arguing, that 
although some application of human rights can be conferred if the non-state 
entities do act state-like, it is not expected, that to provide the whole range of 
economic and social rights, since it would dilute the difference to the actual 
primary subject of international law, the state, too much. 
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CA 3 and AP II as well as the reasoning of the principle of distinction. The 
most effective argument in this case may be made when an OAG exercises 
substantial and effective control over a territory of a State Party to the GC, 
therefore becoming a de facto authority, or if its legal personality can be 
derived from the recognition by a belligerent State. However, State practice 
does not show any support for a creation of an international legal personality 
outside this narrow constellation. This may only cover a small group of 
entities, but everything else would be excessive and counter-productive to 
the validity of the legal argument, keeping in mind that States and their 
interactions on the international plane still build the normative foundation 
of modern international law. It is still unclear, however, to what extent such 
a legal commitment can actually be asserted. Since newly created subjects 
of international law are bound by a pre-existing foundation of (customary) 
rules of international law, this must be the vague minimum standard by 
which they have to live at the very least. 
E. The International Normative Basis 
When dealing with the framework of international legal personality and its 
effect on international obligations for OAGs, the international normative 
base, which may be applicable in situations of armed conflict, is the focal 
point of current debates as well as the legal authority for the act of detention 
under IHL itself. Since the deprivation of liberty by OAGs in NIACs is 
neither an irregular occurrence nor a small-scale issue, this debate should 
not be taken lightly.67 Evidently, this should lead to the conclusion that, 
whenever there is an armed conflict, international law must also regulate 
the treatment and protection of those detained by OAGs. Although CA 3 
and the AP II differ in their scope of application, the minimum requirement 
for an armed conflict would be, ‘a resort to … protracted armed violence 
between governmental armed authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State’68. 
Setting aside internal disturbances since they are solely governed by 
domestic law, it is important to factually distinguish between the two legal 
____________________ 
67  Groups worth mentioning in this context are the Communist Party of Nepal-
Maoist (CPN-M) in Nepal, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Forces Nouvelles de Côte 
d'Ivoire (FAFN) in Ivory Coast, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the SPLAM in 
Sudan, the FARC and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, 
the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine and ISIS in Syria and Iraq, among others.  
68  Prosecutor v Tadić (n 5) at para 70.  
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bodies of CA 3 and AP II for the determination of the specific conflict status 
of a NIAC. From the beginning, the two regimes displayed a very different 
approach. This becomes clear when looking at the drafting of AP II and the 
question of rules on the conduct of hostilities implemented in the protocol. 
In this context, the final draft of AP II contained almost the same set of rules 
and obligations for all parties to the conflict as AP I. Nevertheless, these 
provisions were ultimately deleted from the treaty before its final 
conclusion.69 Notwithstanding the deletion of many of the provisions, AP 
II still contains a variety of precise regulations with respect to detention 
which may become applicable once its threshold of application is reached. 
CA 3 in its wording is vague and only determines very basic obligations; it 
therefore contains a very different set of rules for the respective parties to 
the conflict. This, however, does not change the overarching object and 
purpose of both frameworks, which is to create an ‘equality of belligerents’ 
in a sense. This entails a binding effect on all parties falling within its 
applicability, regulating their conduct and protecting those affected by the 
conduct of hostilities regardless of the characterisation as State or non-State 
entities. 
As a consequence, members of OAGs will lose their status as civilians 
and become ‘fighters’ or so-called ‘unprivileged combatants’; they are 
hence rendered lawful targets. Apart from their own specific status under 
IHL, members of OAGs are also often engaged in the detention of enemy 
‘combatants’ outside the sphere of national law.70 This implied lack of 
status and privilege, for example the lack of combatant-immunity, may be 
easily connected to obligations under IHL, resulting in a factual imbalance 
in rights and duties. This conclusion is, however, not quite convincing, as 
the Geneva Conventions and the AP II specifically address all entities 
involved in armed conflicts equally. The original distinction between OAGs 
and State entities is mainly rooted in the regulation of the conduct of 
____________________ 
69  Nils Melzer, International Humanitarian Law: A comprehensive Introduction 
(ICRC 2016) 125 (hereafter Melzer, IHL). The reasoning behind this shift was 
ultimately seen in the desire of States to avoid any possible legitimisation or 
privilege of non-State parties to a conflict, be they insurgents or non-State 
belligerents. This hesitation is particularly interesting because CA 3 (2) itself 
states that ‘[t]he application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal 
status of the Parties to the conflict.’ Ultimately, this legal containment of the 
non-State entity aside its political implications may be a finding that is 
reasonable in theory, but almost impossible to uphold in practice.  
70  Ibid, 126. 
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hostilities itself, without prejudice to status and, therefore, rights and duties 
under internment. 
I. Applicability of International Humanitarian Law with Respect to the 
Deprivation of Liberty 
The major sources of applicable international law in the specific context of 
the deprivation of liberty and OAGs may be found first and foremost in 
treaty law and customary international law. Although OAGs never became 
parties to the Geneva Conventions and will not be able to do so in the future 
due to their limited legal personality, the direct applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions seems to be excluded for them at the first glance, thereby 
limiting the range of applicable law to customary international law. 
Customary international law seems to be the appropriate legal tool set at 
first, since it is able qua its legal nature to apply to OAGs with a limited 
legal personality.71 A direct treaty-based application of at least CA 3 
however, can be derived from interpreting CA 3 itself. Once the threshold 
of applicability of CA 3 is reached and the OAG in question is qualified as 
a party to the conflict, the convention, by its wording, addresses the OAG 
directly under international treaty law. Whether or not the obligation may 
stem directly from an international treaty or only from customary law is 
irrelevant at this point, as the binding nature of customary law to OAGs is 
undisputed.72 
Although the Geneva Conventions offer some protection under CA 3 by 
demanding a ‘humane treatment’ of detainees and safeguarding the 
fundamental guarantees offered by Art. 4 and 5 of AP II, there is no specific 
detention regime in NIACs that regulates further procedural guarantees of 
the deprivation of liberty. Something that is usually found in human rights 
treaties.73 
____________________ 
71  With respect to applicable international customary law, see Murray, Human 
Rights obligations (n 2) 82 et seq. 
72  Ibid, 89 et seq. 
73  To cope with this difference in regulation, a distinction between detention and 
the deprivation of liberty is often invoked. Whereas detention is perceived as a 
specific conduct by a state entity, the deprivation of liberty re is referred to the 
either procedural part regulated by human rights (for example the internment of 
a suspected pirate on board a ship at the High Seas (deprivation of liberty) until 
a port is reached to present him before a judge (detention)) or a vague term to 
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The protection by the conventions is not necessarily linked to the status 
of the detaining power. They follow a rather conduct-based approach by not 
prohibiting the internment by any party to the conflict per se without 
referencing to a victim and perpetrator narrative, but rather regulating the 
situation of internment once it occurred.74 This reasoning hereby follows 
the same logic as for the authority for the participation to a conflict itself. 
The reference by the Geneva Conventions to civilians, combatants, fighters, 
etc. is solely made with respect to the level of protection and regulation of 
the conduct of hostilities and not with respect to any authority to 
participate.75  
Indeed, a legal authority to detain cannot be found in the framework of 
IHL.76 A conclusion, that was also reached by the High Court of England 
and Wales in its famous Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence decision 
where it held that neither the relevant portions of the Geneva Conventions 
nor AP II contain:  
… any express statement that it is lawful to deprive persons of their liberty in an 
armed conflict to which these provisions apply. All they do is to set out certain 
minimum standards of treatment which must be afforded to persons who are 
detained during such an armed conflict.77 
Hereby following this argument and applying the old Lotus principle, if 
international law does not prohibit a particular conduct, that conduct is 
permitted.78 Even then, the consent-based reasoning of the Lotus case is still 
valid.79 Critics argue that the Lotus principle may only be applied in inter-
State relations, since it was developed in an inter-State dispute at a time 
where no debate over other possible subjects of international law existed. It 
then would only be applicable to State parties to AP II and the Geneva 
____________________ 
differentiate from a state-conduct when talking about non-state actors. This 
however is mere semantics and driven by political reasoning and can have no 
effect on the legal regulation of the conduct itself. 
74  Melzer, IHL (n 69) 208. 
75  Ibid; although prohibited under national law, the direct participation in hostilities 
is not prohibited per se by international law. The only consequence is the loss of 
the protected status as a civilian. 
76  See also Brunner, ‘Security Detention’ (n 4). 
77  Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) 239. 
78  For a critical reading of the Lotus-case and its current interpretation, i.e. the 
Lotus-principle, see Pia Hesse, ‘Comment: neither Sunken Vessel nor Blooming 
Flower! The Lotus-Principle and International Humanitarian Law’ in this 
volume 80. For the role of the Lotus-principle concerning IHL, see Schöberl and 
Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower?’ (n 11). 
79  The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” [France v Turkey] [1927] PCIJ Series A No 1. 
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Conventions. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the principle, i.e. that a 
subject of international law may only be bound by it through consent, is 
easily transferable to the current debate. A strict reliance on the Lotus 
principle itself is therefore not necessary. Moreover, the intent of the 
Geneva Conventions was clearly not to deal with any matters of 
authorisation in this respect, as they follow a conduct-based approach aimed 
to provide protection to those vulnerable, but not to legitimise a party to the 
conflict. However, the authority to detain and its penal regulation may still 
be found in domestic law. 
1. Application of CA 3 
Although the Geneva Conventions do not provide a definition of what a 
conflict not of an international character might be, they in essence require 
as a minimum, that the OAG is organised, has control over some territory 
and is able to obey the rules of war.80 
Although humane treatment remains a vague concept, it does include, as 
a minimum, the prohibition of any violence to life or threats thereof, insults 
and public curiosity including the physical and mental well-being of the 
internees; moreover, it specifically prohibits murder, torture, corporal 
punishment, mutilation, outrages against human dignity, collective 
punishment and hostage-taking as well as the prohibition of any physical 
and psychological coercion.81 Although CA 3 (1) (d) explicitly mentions 
the prohibition of passing out sentences or carrying out executions without 
due process, it does not authorise the establishment of specific courts for 
OAGs in which these cases could be dealt with, again following the 
____________________ 
80  Emily Crawford and Alison Pert, International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2015) 
63 (hereafter Crawford and Pert, IHL); Lindsay Moir ‘The Concept of Non-
International Armed Conflict’ in Andrew Clapham et al (eds), The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions: A Commentary (OUP 2016) para 2 et seq. 
81  Melzer, IHL (n 69) 195. The extent to which medical care and adequate food has 
to be provided to detainees found some clarification in the Aleksovski Judgment 
by the ICTY, where the tribunal defined certain minimum standards. Judging, 
that a standard that would fail to meet the requirement of peace times would still 
be sufficient in times of war; Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-T 
(25 June 1999). 
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conduct-based approach of the Conventions.82 Although CA 3 itself does 
not offer procedural guarantees, it does contain the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention as a minimum standard. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty, for 
instance detention without any due process of law, may already inherently 
constitute a violation of human dignity contained in the meaning of cruel 
treatment under CA 3.83 Whether or not this constitutes a war crime, the 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty constitutes a basic element of 
protection guaranteed by CA 3. 
2. Application of Art. 4 and 5 Additional Protocol II 
As mentioned before, AP II differs in its scope of application. According to 
Art. 1 (1), AP II applies to all conflicts not regulated by AP I and further 
requires the conflict to:  
… take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces, 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
A discussion on the binding effect of AP II is therefore only reasonable once 
the OAG reaches this specific threshold. In relation to the deprivation of 
liberty, the most comprehensive obligations are contained in Art. 4 AP II, 
including the obligation to respect the fundamental guarantees of persons 
who are not directly taking part, or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities as well as the obligation to protect persons deprived of their 
liberty. Apart from their binding effect on all States parties, these 
obligations represent customary international law.84 
This limitation of the scope of application of AP II actually serves the 
interests of the Protocol (and the Conventions) itself, as, only when OAGs 
can effectively exercise their duties under it, an effective protection of those 
interned by such groups can be guaranteed. Broadening the scope of 
application would merely serve to water the obligations down, ultimately 
leaving no satisfactory result. 
____________________ 
82  See Melzer, IHL (n 69) 215; Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflict (OUP 2016) 77 (hereafter Hill-Cawthorne, 
Detention).  
83  Prosecutor v Limaj et al (Prosecution’s final Brief [Confidential]) ICTY-03-66 
(20 July 2005) para 391-2. This position was later overthrown by the trial 
chamber. 
84  Crawford and Pert, IHL (n 80) 257. 
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3. The Hague Regulations 
Another international norm which mentions the internment of parties to a 
conflict is Art. 3 Hague Regulations which provides that ‘the armed forces 
of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In 
case of capture by the enemy, both have the right to be treated as prisoners 
of war’.  
This regulation was later taken up by Art. 4 (4) and (5) GC III. However, 
it remains doubtful whether one can actually draw from the Hague 
Regulations here, as they (as well as Art. 4 GC III) are only applicable to 
IACs. The question is, therefore, whether or not OAGs can be qualified as 
combatants and whether the argument of Art. 3 Hague Regulations can be 
extended to NIACs in order to further root their legal obligations in 
international law. One could argue that Art. 3 not only contains legal 
obligations under the Hague Regulations, but is also a basic rule of IHL 
itself. A rule that ought to be applicable irrespective the character of the 
conflict, as this distinction may be one of the basic principles of IHL; there 
is no reason why it should not to be applied to modern asymmetric armed 
conflicts. After all, the drafters of the Hague Regulations certainly did not 
have NIACs in mind at the time. 
Both CA 3 and AP II do not explicitly refer to the parties as combatants. 
The concepts of the mentioned ‘armed forces’ as well as ‘dissident armed 
forces’ and ‘other organised armed groups’ are unfortunately not further 
defined in the practice pertaining to such NIACs. However, those taking 
direct part in hostilities in NIACs are sometimes referred to as 
‘combatants’.85 This wording is often only used as a generic term with the 
main purpose of distinguishing between the persons in question and 
protected civilians, without implying a formal combatant status or prisoner-
of-war status, which would be the consequence in IACs.86 Additionally, the 
____________________ 
85  See UN GA Res 2676 (9 December 1970) UN Doc A/RES/2676 referring to 
‘combatants in all armed conflicts’ in the context of human rights or the Cairo 
Declaration and Cairo Plan of Action, UN Doc TD /B/EX(24)/2 (5 May 2000) 
at 68–69 and 82 resp. of 3–4 April 2000 adopted at the Organization of African 
Unity and the European Union Africa-Europe Summit. 
86  The term ‘combatant’ is often used synonymously when translated into different 
languages, which adds to the confusion. Although its original meaning would 
have been ‘fighter’ instead of a formal ‘combatant’; a mere interpretation of the 
wording alone cannot be wholly satisfactory. See also Michael N. Schmitt et al 
(eds), ‘The Manual of Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: with 
Commentary’ (2006) 36 IYHR 71, Rule 1.1.2 - Fighters. 
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assertion that the term ‘combatant’ might be extended to NIACs would need 
some proof in form of opinio iuris and a uniform State practice. As evidence 
for this is scarce, its direct application must be negated. However, the basic 
principle contained in Art. 3 Hague Regulations can, of course, be 
considered when interpreting possible legal obligations for OAGs under 
customary international law, as modern-day norms are a further 
development of that principle – even in NIACs. 
II. Application of Human Rights Law in Cases of Deprivation of Liberty 
No field of international law is more controversial than the application of 
human rights to non-State actors and to OAGs in particular. Bearing in mind 
the exception of the effectiveness argument made above, the special nature 
of human rights per se seems to bar non-State entities from its direct 
application. In current State-centric international law, only States may be 
the bearers of human rights obligations. Any violation of human rights 
should be seen as a violation of the domestic transformations of those 
obligations and, therefore, as a domestic criminal offense which the State 
must prosecute.87 The failure to do so is seen as a due diligence violation of 
the respective State.88 Setting aside the domestic argument for a second, we 
shall firstly examine whether human rights obligations may be invoked by 
international law directly. 
1. General considerations concerning how and when human rights may 
become directly applicable 
Much has been written and said about the direct application of human rights 
in the context of non-State actors and armed conflicts.89 Unlike IHL, which 
____________________ 
87  One might hesitate to incorporate non-State entities into the human rights realm, 
as that may require a reconsideration of the basic human rights architecture and 
rationale, since it is founded on the premise that only States may hold absolute 
and ultimate power over its people; on this, see Bantekas and Oette, Human 
Rights Law (n 10) 716. It remains to be seen whether this can be upheld in areas 
of limited statehood, where no or only a limited State authority is present.  
88  Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (OUP 
2011) 118 et seqq. 
89  See Alston, Non-State Actors (n 17); Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 4). 
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addresses OAGs directly as a party to the conflict and hereby imposes direct 
obligations on them, human rights almost always address States.90 That 
being said, both the UN SC and the UN GA address non-State actors with 
respect to their human rights obligations in NIACs.91 Even if one would 
apply certain customary IHRL to non-State actors, a number of difficulties 
would arise when applying such rules to them.92 Neither the UN SC nor 
other bodies have yet clearly referenced the legal source of the proclaimed 
human rights obligations for OAGs, leaving it unclear why these actors 
should be bound in the first place.93 As far as human rights obligations are 
already contained within the basic protection offered by CA 3, they only 
serve as a complementary protection regime under IHL. This may be 
relevant in cases of torture or degrading treatment in situations of 
internment. The minimum requirement for the applicability of human rights 
law is that the violation occurs on the territory of a State Party to the 
respective convention and that the respective entity exercises effective 
control over the territory in question. This approach seems to be adopted by 
other UN bodies as well.94 An argument that has been put forward here is 
that the OAG in question would thereby be bound by human rights 
obligations of the State whose territory it controls, thus implementing a rule 
of succession.95 This, however, is not very convincing in light of Art. 10 
____________________ 
90  See Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations in Conflict Situations’ (n 38). An 
accession to the relevant treaties for non-State actors is still impossible. If any 
binding law exists, it will have to be customary in nature.  
91  UN GA Res 67/262 (4 June 2012) UN Doc A/Res/67/262 with respect to the 
conflict in Syria or UN SC Res 1834 (24 September 2008) UN Doc S/Res/1834 
and UN SC Res 1814 (15 May 2008) UN Doc S/Res/1814 with respect to Chad 
and Somalia. 
92  Hill-Cawthorne, Detention (n 82) 217; Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed), International 
Law and the Classification of Conflicts (OUP 2012) 90-1. 
93  Hill-Cawthorne, Detention (n 82), 218. Apart from the factual addressing by the 
UN SC, the legal nature of its resolutions in the context of non-State actors is 
very much unclear, since resolutions can neither be classified as a classic treaty 
nor as customary international law, however they may have gained a separate 
legal status in international law in that respect altogether. See Serdar Mohammed 
v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para 23; Brunner, ‘Security Detention’ 
(n 4). 
94  For extensive examples, see Hill-Cawthorne, Detention (n 82) 218.  
95  UN HRC, ‘General Comment No. 26: Continuity of Obligations’ (8 December 
1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1; Anthony Cullen and Steven 
Wheatly, ‘The Human Rights of Individuals in de facto Regimes under the 
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ASR, which only retroactively converts acts of an OAG into an act of the 
State once the insurrection is completely successful. A direct application of 
human rights obligations to OAGs is therefore not convincing. 
2. Applying the ‘minimum standard’ to Organised Armed Groups 
Although the consideration of the application of a minimum human rights 
standard is an argument which is often put forward, it is not quite clear what 
this standard actually entails. A hint to what this standard may comprise can 
be found in the 1990s Turku Declaration:96 Art. 3 restates the existing 
obligations under CA 3. Art. 4 specifically relates to the situation of 
____________________ 
European Convention on human Rights’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 
691, 717-23. 
96  Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (2 December 1990). The declaration was adopted by a 
meeting of experts and organised by the Human Rights Institute of Åbo Akademi 
in Turku/Åbo (Finland) in cooperation with inter alia the ICRC, which 
participated in the drafting. It was designed as a draft treaty, but its international 
legal reception was controversial. Despite its positive reception within the UN, 
the declaration was never included in a formal treaty due to the lack of States 
willing to take on these broad obligations in internal conflicts. Nevertheless, it 
remained an important document for the development of human rights protection 
in NIACs, see Knut Ipsen, ‘Die Entwicklung von Kriegsrecht zum Recht des 
bewaffneten Konflifts’ in Knut Ipsen (ed), Völkerrecht (6th edn, Beck 2014) 
1195, and paved the way for the complementary protection approach to human 
rights in armed conflict, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Theorien zum Verhältnis 
von Menschenrechten und humanitärem Völkerrecht’ (2011) 24 J. Int’l L. of 
Peace & Armed Conflict 4. It was also recognised by the ICTY in its Tadić-
jurisprudence, which referenced the declaration when debating the core 
principles of customary humanitarian law, Prosecutor v Tadić (n 5) para 119. 
The ICRC had initially criticised the declaration in the drafting process for its 
progressive stance on human rights and humanitarian law, but later revised its 
opinion and contributed to its spreading, see Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvian 
Vité, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ (1993) 75 IRRC 
99; Djamchid Momtaz, ‘The minimum humanitarian rules applicable in periods 
of internal tension and strife’ (1998) 80 IRRC 487. It is noteworthy in that 
context that even this progressive draft expressly addressed armed groups 
without conferring any legal status to them, see Art. 2 of the declaration: ‘These 
standards shall be respected by, and applied to all persons, groups and 
authorities, irrespective of their legal status and without any adverse 
discrimination’, herby echoing Art CA 3. 
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detention referring to the obligations under Art. 5 AP II but exceeding it in 
its scope, declaring that 
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be held in recognized places of 
detention. Accurate in-formation on their detention and whereabouts, including 
transfers, shall be made promptly available to their family members and counsel or 
other persons having a legitimate interest in the information. 
2. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be allowed to communicate with the 
outside world including counsel in accordance with reasonable regulations 
promulgated by the competent authority. 
3. The right to an effective remedy, including habeas corpus, shall be guaranteed as 
a mean to deter-mine the whereabouts or the state of health of persons deprived of 
their liberty and for identifying the authority ordering or carrying out the deprivation 
of liberty. Everyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention shall 
be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of the detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court and his or her release ordered if the detention is not 
lawful. 
4. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated humanely, provided with 
adequate food and drinking water, decent accommodation and clothing, and be 
afforded safeguards as regards health, hygiene, and working and social conditions. 
When thinking about customary international human rights obligations, 
applicable to OAGs exercising effective control over a territory, it is often 
referred to the core of human rights that may not be derogated from. 
Although arguments concerning effective control and jurisdiction may be 
made for OAGs such as Al-Shabab or the Kurdish militias in northern Iraq, 
the question remains whether or not OAGs fall within the scope of the 
conventions in the first place. Whereas CA 3 refers to ‘the case of armed 
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply’,97 thereby differentiating between the territorial applicability and the 
applicability rationae personae, the basic human rights covenants expressly 
refer to States only with respect to their applicability.98 
From a human rights perspective, the legal definition of the perpetrator 
in cases of internment may be almost irrelevant. For the victim it does not 
make a difference whether a violation of his or her rights occurs through a 
State or an OAG. As long as there is a manifest exercise of effective control 
or authority over a certain territory or area, the application of human rights 
____________________ 
97  Emphasis added. 
98  Eg Art. 1 ECHR: ‘High Contracting Parties’; Art. 2 ICCPR: ‘Each State Party’. 
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obligations following the argument of the Al-Skeini jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR with its ‘divided and tailored’ approach seems to be favourable.99 It 
may well be argued here that the division and tailoring may not only be 
done by the applicable obligations, but also by the obligated actor himself. 
However, this specific jurisprudence was solely designed for the application 
in an inter-State realm and may not be easily transferred out of the vertical 
level of human rights protection. Indeed, neither State practice nor any 
judgment by an original human rights body would support the claim that 
this system is on the verge of changing. Whether those actors are able to 
actually fulfil their possible obligations in the first place remains highly 
questionable. After all, the ability to enforce and provide human rights and 
their protection remains the essence of sovereignty and statehood. 
Humanitarian legal obligations for OAGs exceeding the minimum 
standards under IHL therefore remain highly doubtful. 
F. The Domestic Argument 
Picking up the debate opened above, the question to be dealt with now is 
the application of domestic law in the State where the conflict occurs. As 
mentioned, this might already constitute an adequate tool to legally bind 
organised armed groups to a certain legal standard regarding the deprivation 
of liberty. Within this debate, the question of the primacy of existing 
domestic law over possible international obligations will also be dealt with. 
In other words, do we even need to create international legal obligations for 
non-State actors or is the existing domestic law sufficient to deal with the 
matter? Problems arise especially when international and national 
obligations contradict each other. Is the applicable international law only a 
complementary protection alongside national law as the primary source of 
law in NIACs? 
I. Domestic Relations of International Law 
The case that is often put forward here is the argument of legislative 
jurisdiction. Not only in terms of applicable domestic, but also international 
____________________ 
99  Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, App no 55721/07, 7 July 2011, 134; 
confirmed in Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom, App no 27021/08, 7 July 2011. 
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law. It is argued that, since the belligerent State in question has already 
ratified the international treaty and may even have implemented it into its 
domestic law, the obligation is therefore automatically binding for non-
State actors operating on its territory and within its jurisdiction.100 The 
advantage of this theory is that OAGs operating in the State’s territory may 
be bound without their explicit consent, as the State exercises the will of the 
people it represents. However, this argument is not convincing on two 
grounds. Firstly, it ignores the sometimes divergent inner structure of States 
that either follow a dualistic or monistic system and, secondly, especially in 
areas of limited statehood, the further the insurgents progress, the less 
authority and factual existence of State there is. Thus, there would be no 
one liable to the violations of IHL and human rights law for the duration of 
the conflict. For example, notwithstanding the principle of continuity and 
the assumed continuous sovereignty over Somalia, it is highly doubtful that 
the Somali government may be held accountable for human rights 
violations perpetrated by Al-Shabab within the vast territory it effectively 
controls. 
II. Primacy of Existing Domestic Law over International Obligations 
Apart from the argument of legislative jurisdiction, the actual relation 
between national and international law with respect to non-State actors 
offers a further obstacle which would have to be overcome first. Existing 
national law often already deals with the deprivation of liberty on the penal 
und public law level. If an authority for OAGs to detain existed in 
international law, it would consequently entail an immunity from 
penalisation for the act of detention under national law and maybe even for 
taking part in the conduct of hostilities in the first place, analogous to the 
combatant immunity in IAC. This, however, might not be a concept the 
drafting States of AP II and especially the Geneva Conventions had in mind 
when regulating the treatment of OAGs in NIACs. National law must 
remain applicable alongside international law during conflicts. 
Furthermore, in most cases, the existing national law regulating the 
deprivation of liberty is the implementation of existing human rights 
obligations, for example the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
____________________ 
100  Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 
369, 381; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva 
Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (1981) 30 ICLQ 416, 429. 
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as well as regulations concerning the procedural requirements regarding the 
establishment of an independent judicial body and a fair trial. What it does 
not regulate is an authorisation of such acts – neither for State Parties nor 
for other actors involved. The authority to detain under international human 
rights law may only be found in national law itself or by particular acts of 
the UN SC.101 Additionally, States will most likely avoid any authorisation 
for OAGs to detain under international law for reasons of enforcing their 
own domestic penal law.  
In areas of limited statehood, the validity of this argument can be 
questioned. It may well be argued here that, in such cases, the effective 
protection of human rights should to be prioritised. If neither the State nor 
the OAG can be held accountable for their actions, at least for the prolonged 
duration of the conflict, a gap of protection arises.102 This is especially the 
case when rights and duties in that respect are only provided by domestic 
law and the interests of the individual in the international sphere are 
assumed by the respective State through the voluntary system of diplomatic 
protection.103 Additionally, from the perspective of a victim, the factual 
violation of an individual’s right and the legal character of the perpetrator 
do not make a substantial difference anyway. 
III. Conclusion 
Ultimately, the answer of applicable domestic law to OAGs and their 
obligations for situations of internment will have to be found in the actual 
effectiveness of the OAG as an entity exercising territorial control and 
therefore in the effectiveness argument made earlier and or the absence of 
the State. A point that validity may be made comparing this case to the 
argument made in situations of failed States and their legal obligations 
under international law regarding the principle of effectiveness. 
____________________ 
101  Cf Brunner, ‘Security Detention’ (n 4). 
102  Although individual criminal responsibility deriving from international law 
directly will hold some individuals accountable, for instance in cases of war 
crimes, this might not suffice in all cases, for example regarding crimes against 
humanity, Bantekas and Oette, Human Rights Law (n 9) 764. 
103  Ibid, 762. 
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G. Integrating Organised Armed Groups into the Process of ‘Law-Making’ 
When accrediting OGAs with a distinct legal personality, thereby setting 
aside the primacy of domestic law and creating a legal framework for their 
involvement in the deprivation of liberty, the subsequent topic to be dealt 
with is the discussion of the relationship between OAGs and positive 
international norms, may they be treaty- or customary-law based. While 
certain groups do not seem to recognise any substantial standards of 
internment, some OAGs expressly recognise entitlements of their detainees 
under IHL and IHRL and regulate the conduct of its members according to 
those presumed obligations.104 Therefore, the focus should be placed on the 
conduct of such groups and their conducts effect on treaty and customary 
obligations under the Geneva Conventions and international human rights. 
This also relates to the basic question of whether or not those actors remain 
‘law-takers’ as opposed to ‘law-makers’ and how they affect the 
international (State) practice of those norms.105 In the end, it must be asked 
to what extent OAGs should be incorporated into the process of the creation 
of rules of international law in the first place. Taking OAGs seriously in 
that respect might help to enhance compliance with international norms by 
these actors but might also just be a political argument.106 
____________________ 
104  See the example of the FAFN in Ivory Coast, which secured and maintained 
territorial control over a substantial part of northern Ivory Coast between 2002 
and 2007. The Group established routine detention operations utilising the 
captured facilities of the State and even segregated conflict-related detainees 
from regular persons detained under their control. The behaviour of the FAFN 
can largely be recognised as ‘State-like’, see David Tuck, ‘Detention by armed 
groups: overcoming challenges to humanitarian action’ (2011) 93 IRRC 759, 
761. As mentioned above, the LTTE maintained an own ‘judicial’ system for the 
detention of persons captured under their authority and within their controlled 
territory, see Stokke, ‘Building the Tamil Eelam state’ (n 63), 1027. For the 
usage of detention to implement an OAG’s own ‘rule of law’ within its 
controlled territory to ensure its continuous exercise of power over the area, see 
Sivakumaran, ‘Courts of armed opposition groups’ (n 63) 489. 
105  For further details, see Widdig, ‘Perspektiven einer möglichen Einbindung’ (n 
15) 109 et seqq. 
106  For the compliance argument, see Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, 
‘Enhancing Compliance with International Law by Armed Non-State Actors’ 
(2011) 3 GOJIL 175. 
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I. The Integration of Organised Armed Groups into the Creation of 
International Treaty and Customary Law 
The question of the relationship between OAGs and international treaties 
remains highly controversial. The basic argument in this debate is, in fact, 
not a legal one, but rather one of compliance. If we accept that some conduct 
of OAGs (for instance detention), even though banned under national law, 
is not illegal or at least tolerated under international law, there should be an 
incentive for them to respect the laws of war. Taking the process of 
detention out of the illegality from the States perspective, might be an 
incentive for the respective group to detain those captured and respect their 
dignity and due process rights, rather than simply kill them.107 This is 
something that might be achieved by the incorporation of OAGs into the 
‘law-making’ process. However, the question remains of whether this is 
possible at all. 
Art. 2 in accordance with Art. 1 VCLT defines international treaties as 
agreements between States. Today, most States accept and recognise this 
definition of an international treaty, thereby rendering it customary 
international law.108 By this standard, the incorporation of OAGs into the 
process seems to be impossible. However, Art. 3 VCLT stipulates the fact 
that the Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded 
between States and other subjects of international law or between such other 
subjects of international law, shall not affect their legal force, nor the 
applicability of certain rules of the convention, as far as these rules 
constitute customary international law.  
Consequently, agreements that qualify under Art. 3 VCLT can be seen as 
an international treaty, although not concluded between two primary 
subjects of international law.109 The inclusion of OAGs in international 
agreements therefore seems not to be completely out of the question.110 The 
formal requirements for such an inclusion would be the competence and 
____________________ 
107  Andrew Clapham, ‘Detention by Armed Groups under International Law’ 
(2017) 93 ILS 1, 2-3. 
108  For its basis in customary international law, see Duncan Hollis, ‘Defining 
Treaties’ in Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 12 
et seq. 
109  Ibid, 13. 
110  Ibid, 23; Yves Le Bouthillier and Jean-Francois Bonin, ‘Article 3’ in Olivier 
Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary, vol. I (OUP 2011) 72. 
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jurisdiction of the actor in question and the free will of the other party to 
enter the agreement.111 This might apply to a stabilised de facto regime or 
an effective de facto authority. Ultimately, there is no positive obligation or 
rule neither within the VCLT nor in international law in general which 
prescribes what OAGs may or may not regulate with States through an 
international agreement. 112 Even if convincing in theory, this argument 
simply lacks sufficient State practice to be proven correct.  
Therefore, it remains to be asked whether there are other ways for OAGs 
to be incorporated into the process of international ‘law-making’. 
Art. 38 (1) (b) ICJ-Statute requires ‘international custom as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law’ for the genesis of new customary 
international law. The influence of OAGs on that custom seems to be 
limited at first, but its indirect effect is quite substantial, as the conduct of 
States often is motivated by or is a reaction to the conduct of OAGs and 
their newly consolidated power in modern NIACs.113 The OAG’s influence 
or incorporation therefore is only an indirect one, which may come in the 
form of a (formal) recognition of its conduct and/or statements and 
declarations in the process of the creation of new rules.114 This 
comprehensive approach can actually be beneficial to States, since it 
increases the probability of non-State actors complying with new rules of 
law as they were involved in the process to a certain extent.115  
____________________ 
111  Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 664 et seq. 
112  Thomas Grant, ‘Who Can Make Treaties? Other Subjects of International Law’ 
in Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 145. 
113  Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors’ (n 41) 1, 6: referring to Prosecutor v Tadić (n 5) 
para 70, where the Appeals Chamber is said to also incorporate the practice non-
State actors as proof for the formation of new customary international law at 
paras 107 et seq; Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lessons from the law of armed conflict 
from commitments of armed groups: identification of legitimate targets and 
prisoners of war’ (2011) 93 IRRC 1 (hereafter Sivakumaran, ‘Lessons’). 
114  An approach also recognised by the ICRC study on existing customary IHL, 
which concludes that conduct or practice by OAGs per se may not be qualified 
as State practice and classifies their conduct as ‘other practice’ or gives it an 
auxiliary character in the process. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I: Rules (CUP 
2005) xlii. 
115  See Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate 
Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian 
Law’ (2011) 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 108, 126 et seq (hereafter Roberts and 
Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors’). 
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However, putting too much emphasis on the conduct and practice of non-
State actors may hold the risk of a mere regression of customary 
international law.116 Some OAGs explicitly do not want any attribution to 
human rights or other State-like obligations and duties and, by definition, 
oppose any legislative action that derives from the regime they fight against, 
even on the international plane. Yet, it is not entirely out of the question to 
take into consideration statements made by OAGs in relation to IHL. For 
example, the so-called Deeds of Commitments facilitated by the NGO 
Geneva Call allows OAGs to express their perception of binding 
humanitarian norms.117 The relevance of such actions can be asserted 
following the argument of the ICJ; for proof of international custom as 
evidence of a general practice, emphasis has to be put on the subjects of 
international law that contribute to the practice and whose interests are 
touched by the relevant provision.118 This might be a very progressive and 
dynamic interpretation of the decision as the court might have only had 
States in mind at the time of judgment, but the argument itself still holds 
some validity. Aside this indirect influence on customary international law, 
a further incorporation is not possible. Only if the rebellion of the OAG is 
successful, its conduct and practice will become that of a State and therefore 
gain relevance retroactively.119 
II. The Integration of Organised Armed Groups into Law-Making through 
Unilateral Declarations 
The nature of unilateral declarations made by OAGs is disputed; some see 
them as meaningless, and as a mere political tool for negotiation, whereas 
____________________ 
116  Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors’ (n 41) 6. 
117  Although they are intentionally not called ‘treaties’, the content of such 
agreements essentially resembles that of the respective treaty and de facto 
reflects the practice of existent international obligations. An approach that was 
most likely also taken by the ICTY in Prosecutor v Tadić (n 5) para 108 with 
reference to the abovementioned declarations by the FMLN in El Salvador (para 
107 of the judgment). 
118  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 
73 et seqq; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Völkergewohnheitsrecht’ in Knut 
Ipsen (ed), Völkerrecht (6th edn, Beck 2014) para 11; Maarten Bos, A 
Methodology of International Law (Elsevier 1984) 231 et seq. 
119  Art. 10 ASR. 
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others grant them a certain legal value. However, OAGs regularly make use 
of unilateral declarations to voice their perception of existing binding legal 
obligations. The scope of such declarations ranges from the mere 
restatement of the law to explicit violations of existing international 
standards.120 Therefore, the nature and effect of such declarations on 
customary international law deserves some further investigation. 
In its famous Nuclear Test Cases, the ICJ elaborated on the binding effect 
of unilateral declarations (by States), arguing that, by public unilateral 
declaration of the existence of a positive legal obligation, the declaration 
becomes binding for the declaring actor itself. However, further 
implications and legal effects on third parties may not be established with 
the exception of obligations having an jus cogens character.121 It may be 
argued that now, although this reasoning was construed with only States in 
mind, there is no apparent obstacle in applying it to OAGs as well, 
particularly because States have a genuine interest in binding OAGs to their 
statements. For the respective group its binding character will come from 
its own consent to be bound and or held accountable.122 This legally self-
binding ability seems favourable, at least in cases in which de lege lata the 
group is bound by international law anyway. 
Although it can be effectively argued that unilateral declarations have a 
binding effect on the group that issues them, the question of the legal nature 
of the agreement itself remains. Is it governed by international law or can 
its legal nature only be derived from the sovereign (domestic and political) 
decision of the responding State that engages the actor? Looking at State 
practice, evidence of States reacting to declarations by OAGs is fragmented, 
____________________ 
120  Sivakumaran, ‘Lessons’ (n 113) 3-4. Groups such as the SLM-Unity in Darfur 
or the UNITA in Angola. 
121  Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253; Nuclear 
Tests (New Zeland v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 457; ILC, ‘Guiding 
Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal 
obligations, with commentaries’ (2006) UN Doc A/61/10, Guiding Principle 1.  
122  In some cases, OAGs even go beyond the scope of existing international law. 
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, for example, issued a declaration obliging 
itself to not conduct any operations that may cause collateral damage to civilians; 
see the Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International 
Monitoring Team (20 October 2009) <http://www.opapp.gov.ph/sites/de-
fault/files/Terms_of_Reference_of_the_International_Monitoring_Team.pdf> 
accessed 27 March 2018. As far as a declaration exceeds existing international 
law, its involvement in the international legal process will remain at the political 
level only. 
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but existent. The accession to the 1997 Ottawa Convention123 by the 
Sudanese government, for example, was said to be the result of a declaration 
issued by the SPLMA stating to be bound by it.124 The recent peace 
agreement between the State of Colombia and the FARC or the ongoing 
negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government through an 
intermediary in Doha are further examples of States engaging in a legal 
agreement following declarations by OAGs to adhere to certain standards.  
However, although these agreements did and will involve the 
implementation of obligations under international law, they remain within 
the sovereign decision and will of the negotiating State and, therefore, 
governed within its domestic sphere. Moreover, these agreements were 
deemed a national conciliation effort, but not a formal peace agreement 
which could be governed by international law. Nevertheless, international 
courts and tribunals tend to rely on those declarations as evidence for the 
international legal obligations of OAGs.125 This, however, should only be 
interpreted as the exploration of the group’s political intent to act and not 
as a direct influence on international legal practice. Its effect on 
international legal practice may only be an indirect one, as the conduct of 
the OAG in question certainly influences the State’s conduct when dealing 
with it. Unilateral declarations by OAGs are therefore regulated by 
domestic law or, at most, have a sui generis character. 
H. Accountability 
Lastly, the question of a possible accountability of non-State actors for 
violations of IHL and human rights law should be briefly examined in order 
to complete the picture. International obligations may only come to their 
full effect, once they may also be enforced. The reparation for the damage 
caused may take the form of restitutio in integrum, monetary compensation 
or satisfaction, including a public apology with the acceptance of 
____________________ 
123  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (opened for signature 18 
September 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999) 2056 UNTS 211. 
124  Roberts and Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors’ (n 115)128-29. 
125  See Prosecutor v Akayesu (n 22) para 627; Report of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary Executions, ‘Mission to Sri Lanka’ (27 
March 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 para 30. 
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responsibility or guarantees of non-repetition.126 Considering that the 
attribution of unlawful conduct and the hereby created obligation to 
compensate the damage caused is one of the core principles of international 
law, the inclusion of OAGs in this principle seems to be self-evident. 
However, existing compensation mechanisms mainly address States as the 
primary holders of international obligations for their unlawful conduct, 
most prominently the ASR. If the group succeeds in its insurrection, the 
question of responsibility is answered by Art. 10 ASR; thus, the group’s 
conduct is retroactively treated as the conduct of a State. The question that 
remains is what happens in prolonged conflicts, where neither party can 
make decisive victories nor end the conflict. This especially holds true in 
the case of detention, where serious violations of international law occur. 
Following the definition of OAGs set up above, requiring them to 
exercise effective control over a certain part of territory, and acting as de 
facto authorities, thereby conferring them a certain legal personality, it may 
not be farfetched though, to hold them accountable for their unlawful 
conduct.127 As already argued above, ILC Special Rapporteur Agos’s 
proposition that ‘an insurrectional movement which establishes its authority 
over a State’s territory becomes a ‘separate subject of international law’ at 
the end of the 1960s is still valid in this context.128 Even if we define 
international responsibility as ‘legal relations which arise under 
international law by reason of an internationally wrongful act’129, the 
decisive criterion for conferring those OAGs international legal 
responsibility is their actual capacity to fulfil those responsibilities and to 
____________________ 
126  See UN SG, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies’ (23 August 2004) UN Doc S/2004/616 18-19. 
127  Cf Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors’ (n 41) 4 et seq. For a further account in favour 
of the accountability of armed organised groups for violations under 
international law, see Jann Kleffner, ‘The Collective accountability of organized 
armed groups for system crimes’ in Harmen van der Wilt and Andre 
Nollkaemper (eds), System Criminality in International Law (CUP 2009) 238 
(hereafter Kleffner, ‘Collective accountability’).  
128  UNYBILC 1972/II 129; also earlier UNYBILC 1966/II 134.  
129  Commentary on Art. 1 Draft ASR, UNYBILC 2001/II 31; See also UN GA, 
‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ 
(21 March 2006) UN Doc A/Res/60/147, Basic Principle 15: ‘[i]n cases where 
a person, a legal person, or any other entity is found liable for reparation to a 
victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the 
State, if the State has already provided reparation to the victim’.  
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enforce eventually existing claims against them, such as their ‘jurisdiction 
to enforce’. Additionally, the mere establishment of an international 
responsibility de jure might not lead to a responsibility de facto for most 
OAGs, since the actual enforcement of those claims might prove difficult.  
However, to this day, cases in which States hold OAGs responsible and 
accountable by international law and which could therefore be used as 
evidence for a broader existence of OAGs on the international plane, remain 
rare and selective incidents rather than precedents.130 The only exception to 
this can be found in the US Alien Tort Claims Act131. Within the Alien-
Tort-Claims-Act jurisprudence, cases can be found where the group as such 
is collectively held accountable for its actions.132 Although legal 
proceedings are instigated at a national level, the applicable law within such 
cases remains international customary law; the cases are therefore used as 
supplementary evidence for the emergence or existence of a rule of law 
itself. However, this alone is not sufficient to serve as evidence for 
international custom, as it remains limited to the practice of the USA. The 
response by third parties on the international plane remains divided; States 
rather prefer to implement their international legal obligations into national 
law to avoid any interaction with those actors on the international legal 
plane.133  
Setting aside the practical problems concerning the actual enforcement 
of claims, the international responsibility of OAGs for unlawful conduct 
therefore only remains a distant dream – if States deem it appropriate at 
all.134 After all, the recognition of the existing mechanism of accountability 
____________________ 
130  Crawford, State Responsibility (n 48) 81. For example, see the recommendation 
of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN SC, which noted 
that, apart from States, its agents or de facto organs, rebels and insurgents have 
a similar obligation to compensate for the crimes they committed, UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, ‘Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’ (25 January 2000) 
para 600 <http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf> accessed 27 
March 2018. Although Reports by International Commissions of Inquiry cannot 
be considered direct State practice, the recurrence on them may still be valid, as 
an auxiliary source of international law as in Art. 38 (1) (d) ICJ-Statute. 
131  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). Although the case may be tried before a national court, 
the applicable law in such cases will be customary international law. 
132  Mohamad v Palestinian Authority (n 50); Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic (n 
50). 
133  Crawford, State Responsibility (n 48) 81. 
134  Kleffner, ‘Collective accountability’ (n 127) 250 also notes the practical issue 
of enforcement, but makes the argument for monitoring, compliance and 
sanctions with regard to their obligations.  
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of non-State actors outside the individual criminal responsibility will 
always be accompanied by some form of legitimisation. This, however, is 
something most, if not all, States certainly do not want to see happening. 
I. Conclusion 
For the time being, the deprivation of liberty by OAGs in areas of limited 
statehood remains an uneasy terrain. Although the legal obligations in CA 3 
as well as, to a certain extent, Art. 4 and 5 of AP II (as far as they constitute 
customary international law) provide some protection to those captured in 
NIACs, the protection of human rights, especially those exceeding the 
scope of the ‘minimum standards of humanity’, which itself remains a 
rather murky concept, remains unsatisfactory de lege lata in most cases. 
The most common human rights treaties and the obligations set within their 
non-derogative provisions are not applicable to OAGs in general, as they 
exceed the protection provided by IHL. Although an argument can be made 
with respect to the principle of effectiveness in order to confer human rights 
obligations to these groups, future State practice will show whether 
international courts and State practice accept the idea of OAGs being 
involved in the delicate matter of detention to a more sophisticated level. 
Especially in cases when the principal organs of the State struggle to 
exercise control over the relative territory. Until then, it can only be restated 
that 
International Law is constantly evolving but still is State-centric in the way in which 
it is made and applied: treaties are made by States …, and customary law is formed 
primarily by State practice and State opinio iuris; international law still struggles to 
recognize entities other than States and IOs as legal persons.135 
A resolution to this dilemma might be found at the policy level. Taking 
armed non-State actors seriously and engaging them as a legal actor in terms 
of policy on the international plane might be advantageous to all parties to 
the conflict, as reciprocal obligations offer the most effective contribution 
to the protection of civilians and other vulnerable persons in an armed 
conflict. This pragmatic conduct based on the engagement of OAGs without 
prejudice to status, ensuring their legality under national law and possible 
involvement into the international legal process might provide an effective 
tool to further one of the basic intentions of IHL: a humane conduct of 
hostilities. 
____________________ 
135  Crawford and Pert, IHL (n 80) 261 et seq. 
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Comment: Detention by Armed Groups 
Lars Müller 
In his contribution, Vincent Widdig raised a number of questions concerning 
the role of armed groups in international law. To what extent are they bound 
by IHL or even IHRL? To what extent does this require them to possess a 
certain degree of legal personality and how could it be established? What 
are the further consequences of ascribing armed groups this kind of status? 
Would this legitimise their conduct and their goals on a political level? And 
would this also allow them to become law-makers, instead of mere law-
takers, on a legal level? Finally, should armed groups be held accountable 
for their violations of international law? 
All of the above are pertinent questions and inform us about the 
challenges international law, and especially IHL, faces in areas of limited 
statehood – where not only the exact meaning and scope of certain norms 
is contested, but the significance of international law itself is sometimes 
rejected.1 We can approach these issues with the idea of ascribing armed 
____________________ 
1  Concerning such a rejection by armed groups, see for example: Geneva 
Academy, ‘Reactions to Norms: Armed Groups and the Protection of Civilians’, 
Policy Briefing No. 1, (Geneva 2014) 13, 29 et seq; Olivier Bangerter, ‘Reasons 
why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or not’ 
(2011) 882 IRRC 353, 380 et seq; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels under 
the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (1981) 30 
ICLQ 416, 426; Andrew Clapham, ‘The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed 
Non-State Actors: The Legal Landscape and Issues Surrounding Engagement’ 
(Geneva Academy 2010) 23; Jann K. Kleffner, ‘The applicability of 
international humanitarian law to organized armed groups’ (2011) 93 IRRC 443, 
446 (hereafter Kleffner, ‘The applicability of international humanitarian law’); 
Michelle Mack, Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts (ICRC 2008) 11; Anthea Roberts and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Non-State Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in 
the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37 Yale J. Int’l L 107, 
127.  
However, also governments reject the applicability of international law in their 
conflict zones from time to time: Secretary-General, ‘Minimum humanitarian 
standards: Analytical report of the Secretary-General submitted persuant to 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/21’ UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/87 
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groups a certain legal personality or capacity, thereby explaining that such 
groups are bound by international law obligations, but also prompting the 
conclusion that they could, or at least should, take part in the creation of 
international law.2 This is one of the ideas international law is based on – 
sovereign equality, meaning that one should only be bound by rules one 
consented to. Hence, States either negotiate the law in State conferences or 
through their conduct on the battlefield, or at least they create their own 
obligations by adhering to a certain instrument or by not persistently 
objecting to a certain practice. 
So, can we identify this kind of synchronicity of law-creation and 
corresponding obligations in the law of armed conflict or do we rather see 
non-State actors as being bound without having any influence? The fact that 
armed groups and their members are bound by and have obligations under 
international law – and can even be held accountable for their violations – 
seems to be settled.3 The scope of these obligations is sometimes 
challenged, but that also holds true for States involved in NIACs, as for 
____________________ 
(5 January 1998) 20; Michelle Mack, Increasing Respect for International 
Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts (ICRC 2008) 11; 
Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 AJIL 239, 
260 et seq; Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (CUP 2002) 34, 
67 et seq, 85 et seq (hereafter Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict); 
Antonio Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on 
Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (1981) 30 ICLQ 416, 426; Dawn Steinhoff, 
‘Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engaging Non-State 
Armed Groups’ (2009) 45 Texas International Law Journal 297, 313. 
2  On the concepts and consequences of international legal personality, see 
especially Janne E. Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An 
Inquiry Into the History and Theory of International Law (TMC Asser Press 
2004) and Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (CUP 
2010). 
3  Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) IT-96-4-T (2 September 1998) 617; 
Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) 134; Kleffner, ‘The 
applicability of international humanitarian law’ (n 1) 445; Moir, The Law of 
Internal Armed Conflict (n 1) 53; Daragh Murray, ‘How International 
Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups’ (2015) 20 JCSL 
101, 122; Marco Sassòli, Antoine Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does Law 
Protect in War, vol. I (ICRC 2011) chapter 12, 25 et seq. 
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example the debate on the power of the UK’s armed forces to detain in the 
conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates.4 
What hereby becomes apparent is the complete disregard of States and 
international organisations involved in the debate on the role of armed 
groups in international law, for the idea of international law being made by 
those who are bound by it. When we try to argue against that, we should 
analyse whether international law really accepts actors as being treated as 
mere objects or whether there is something in the law which might trigger 
a change of status from object to subject – at least in a limited area of the 
law. 
Vincent Widdig correctly mentioned the principle of effectiveness in this 
regard. IHL is meant to effectively protect individuals from the 
consequences of war as far as possible. In contrast to most other fields of 
law, IHL refrains from taking into account the status of an actor and simply 
prescribes norms of behaviour to all those engaging in armed conduct. 
Therefore, the rules are formulated to either apply to each ‘party to the 
conflict’,5 or do not mention the actor at all and simply prescribe that ‘the 
wounded and sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances’.6 
In this sense, I would argue that IHL also effectively accepts attempts by 
any actor within an armed conflict to adjust the rules to the specific conflict 
or to expand the protection provided by its rules. Even if we understand 
international law to generally remain a State-centric system – and there are 
many reasons to do so – IHL already accepts other actors. Consider CA 3, 
which provides:  
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of 
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
Likewise, the UNESCO Convention on the protection of cultural property 
in armed conflicts7 by itself includes only a limited protection regime in 
case of NIACs, but again provides in Art. 19 (2) that 
____________________ 
4  Manuel Brunner, ‘Detention for Security Reasons by the Armed Forces of a 
State in Situations of Non-International Armed Conflict: The Quest for a Legal 
Basis’ in this volume 89. 
5  For example, CA 3 (1). 
6  For example, Art. 12 GC I; Art. 7 AP II. 
7  Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict (opened for signature 14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1956) 
UNTS 249. 
 
Part II: Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict 
166 
The parties to the Conflict shall endeavor to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
Other treaties follow this example. In addition to this, all of them include a 
caveat,8 stating:  
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the 
parties to the conflict. 
IHL, thus, already allows armed groups to change from mere objects of the 
law to real subjects, who are able to influence, at least in part, the law as it 
applies to their respective armed conflict. The trigger mechanism seems to 
be that the armed group must effectively be able to, first, engage in an armed 
conflict, and, second, to force their enemy into negotiating an agreement. 
In other words: If an actor is in a position to effectively make the law 
applicable in a specific armed conflict, IHL will not ask for this actor to 
provide some further international status or legitimacy, but it will simply 
attempt to steer that actor’s conduct on the battlefield and his law-making 
activities into certain directions, thus trying to maintain, or even to improve, 
the protection provided by IHL. 
This also brings us back to the contribution by Katja Schöberl and Linus 
Mührel on the permissive and/or restrictive nature of IHL.9 If this law is 
simply trying to steer the behaviour of those engaged in an armed conflict 
reaching a certain threshold, its goal is not to permit or otherwise legitimise 
this action as such. IHL, as the jus in bello, is concerned with how parties 
to a conflict behave, not about whether they should engage in an armed 
conflict at all. In the same way, it does not permit or forbid detention by 
armed groups, but rather provides certain standards to be observed during 
detention. 
Looking at the applicable domestic law, we have to expect a totally 
different picture. States usually prohibit non-State actors from carrying out 
armed attacks as well as from detaining people, especially when this 
concerns the State’s own armed forces. Here again, IHL does neither permit 
____________________ 
8  For an early example, see Art. 152-55 of the Lieber Code (Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis 
Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln, 24. April 
1863); see also African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) (adopted 23 
October 2009, entered into force 6 December 2012). 
9  Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? Lotus, 
Permissions and Restrictions within International Humanitarian Law’ in this 
volume 59. 
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nor forbid States to prohibit non-State actors from doing so. This is 
articulated in Art. 6 (5) AP II, which states that  
… at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict … 
Thus, States are not obliged to accept activities by non-State armed groups, 
but are merely requested to contemplate amnesties at the end of hostilities. 
And not only States are asked to do so, but also ‘the authorities in power’. 
As many post-conflict situations around the world have demonstrated, ‘the 
authorities in power’ are often not simply the government which has 
defeated a domestic armed group, or an armed group that has taken over 
State authority, but it is frequently both of them. Most internal armed 
conflicts are not terminated by the complete defeat of one party to the 
conflict, but by a negotiated settlement between the parties.10 So, here again, 
IHL provides a way for armed groups to have an impact on the law, this 
time at the end of hostilities. 
What all of this tells us is that, when trying to assess the law of detention 
in NIACs or any other aspect of this law, we should not limit ourselves by 
looking only into the universal treaties and customs of IHL, IHRL or even 
domestic law. Instead, we must consider agreements made between the 
parties to the specific conflict and what they provide, for example on 
detention. Looking ahead, the parties to armed conflicts should be 
encouraged to conclude such agreements, as they not only raise awareness 
for IHL in the first place, but also allow to translate the law into the specific 
context and, lastly, provide more legitimacy as both parties mutually agree 
to be bound by them. 
____________________ 
10  Sidney D. Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of 
Armed Conflict 1946-1964, vol. I (Clarendon Press 1982); David M. Morriss, 
‘From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role 





Part III:  






Foreign Investments as Non-Human Targets 
Ira Ryk-Lakhman Aharonovich 
A. Introduction 
On 23 July 1983, the LTTE, a separatist Sri Lankan militant group that was 
fighting for Tamil independence, ambushed and killed 13 Sri-Lankan 
soldiers. Over the next week, Sinhalese Sri Lankans, with the government’s 
support, retaliated with Tamil blood shed across the country. These events 
ignited the 25-year civil war between the government and the LTTE. 
Shortly thereafter, the State created the Special Task Force (STF) to head 
counter-terrorism missions against the LTTE. By 1987, STF units were 
mainly deployed in the Batticaloa district, which quickly turned the area 
into a bloody battlefield.1 
On 28 January 1987, an STF unit broke into a shrimp farm owned by 
Serendib Seafoods Ltd. in Batticaloa, which had been suspected of 
harbouring LTTE separatists.2 Within hours, Serendib’s manager and a 
dozen more employees were shot to death, yet not a single LTTE separatist 
was found on site. Before leaving, the STF destroyed the farm, causing it to 
go out of business. Accordingly, AAPL, a Hong Kong corporation which 
half-owned Serendib, filed an investment claim against Sri Lanka under the 
Sri Lanka – UK BIT,3 claiming compensation for the losses. The AAPL v 
Sri Lanka Tribunal mostly accepted the claim and held that by failing to use 
less-deadly means and methods in its military operation, the State breached 
the BIT obligation to act in due diligence so as to protect the physical 
integrity of the investment. The Tribunal however, paid little attention to 
____________________ 
1  Human Rights Watch, ‘State Responsibility for “Disappearances” and 
Abductions in Sri Lanka’, Section IV <https://www.hrw.org/re-
ports/2008/srilanka0308/4.htm#_ftnref136> accessed 23 November 2017. 
2  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka (Final Award) (1991) ICSID case 
No ARB/87/3 30 ILM 580 (hereafter AAPL v Sri Lanka).  
3  UK-Sri Lanka BIT (1980). Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all investment 
treaties cited herein are available at UNCTAD – international investment 
agreement navigator http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA accessed 23 
November 2017. For purposes of convenience these treaties are cited by their 
abbreviated version.  
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the existence of the protracted war in Sri Lanka, and made no reference to 
the laws that regulate the conduct of hostilities.  
A similar occurrence concerned Kinshasa in the DRC, where Mr Mitchell 
had operated a boutique law firm, Mitchell & Associates. In March 1999, 
under a military court order that cited grounds of alleged illegal 
collaboration between the firm and the rebels, Congolese armed forces burst 
into the firm. They forcefully dragged the employees for detention, 
shuttered the business, sealed the premises, damaged the property, and 
seized several documents. Consequently, Mr Mitchell brought an 
investment claim against the State under the US-Zaire BIT arguing,4 inter 
alia, that his investment was expropriated as a result of the State measures. 
The State’s primary defence was that the law firm did not qualify as an 
‘investment’ and thus did not benefit from the standards of protection under 
the BIT. This objection was rejected by the Mitchell v DRC Tribunal. It held 
that the BIT’s definition of ‘investment’, which covered ‘service contracts’, 
was wide enough to encompass the services of Mitchell & Associates. Since 
the Tribunal determined that the firm was a covered investment, which 
benefited from certain protection, it also held that the firm was expropriated 
as a result of the military operation.5 Pertinently, at the time of the events 
subject-matter of the claim, Kinshasa was a conflict-ridden area, and the 
DRC was in the midst of the Great African War that had commenced in 
August 1998.6 Nevertheless, neither the Tribunal nor the ad hoc annulment 
Committee, which annulled the award on grounds that the firm did not 
constitute an ‘investment’7 engaged in an IHL analysis in the assessment of 
the attack. 
These examples illustrate that in practice investments may be the subject 
of military attacks. Yet in these cases, the lawfulness of the attacks was 
assessed in isolation from IHL; the tribunals focused rather on the 
classification of the object under the BIT’s definition of ‘investment’ and 
on the standards of protection that were conferred upon this investment 
under the treaty. Nevertheless, these instances raise the question whether 
investments, in the forms of tangible economic objects, are in fact protected 
from direct and deliberate attacks or whether they can be lawfully targeted 
____________________ 
4  US-DRC (formally Zaire) BIT (1989). 
5  Mitchell v Democratic Republic of the Congo (Award) (2004) ICSID case No 
ARB/99/7. 
6  Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics (CUP 
2010), see generally 1-10 and chapter 7. 
7  Mitchell v Democratic Republic of the Congo (Decision on the Application for 
Annulment) (2006) ICSID case No ARB/99/7, 25-33. 
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under certain circumstances. The answer to this question, it is argued, turns 
not only on the treatment that investment law prescribes for certain assets, 
but also on the treatment of these objects under IHL and the principles of 
distinction more specifically. 
Distinction is a fundamental and ‘intransgressible’ principle of 
customary international law. It is anchored in Art. 48 of AP I, which 
mandates that attacks may be directed ‘only against military objectives’, 
while ‘civilian objects shall not be the object of attack’.8 The classification 
of investments under this principle may appear deceptively simple, since 
the term ‘investment’ is used in everyday language which forms the 
perception that it is necessarily a civilian economic asset that denotes a 
shared understanding. This classification however is far more complex in 
practice. 
Accordingly, Section 2 establishes that the concept ‘investment’ 
encompasses a wide array of objects. An investment is potentially any 
economic asset in any sector that is owned or controlled by a foreign 
national. Such assets benefit from certain treaty standards of protection that 
remain operational during hostilities.9 At the same time, Section 3 
demonstrates that the scope of permitted targets under the definition of 
‘military objective’ is as wide. Often objects are classified as targets for the 
economic sector in which they operate and for their ability to generate 
profits.  
Building on the foregoing, Section 4 addresses the classification of 
investments into military objectives and civilian objects, and examines 
when, if at all, investments may be classified as lawful targets. Additionally, 
it is argued that the concrete rules that emanate from any such classification 
may result in a norm conflict, whereby what is permitted or required under 
IHL is prohibited under investment law. This norm conflict affects the 
treatment and protection of investments during hostilities and the invocation 
of international responsibility of the host State thereof. 
____________________ 
8  Art. 48, 51 (2) and 52 AP I; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 257; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Legitimate 
Military Objectives Under The Current Jus In Bello’ (2002) 78 ILS 139, 139 
(hereafter Dinstein, ‘Legitimate military objectives’). 
9  Art. 3, 4, 7, and the Annex to Art. 7 ILC Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed 
Conflict on Treaties, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth 
Session, Supp 10, UN Doc A/66/10 <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ 
doc.asp?symbol=a/res/66/99> accessed 9 December 2016. 
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B. The Classification of Assets under Investment Law 
This section focuses on the classification of tangible economic objects 
under investment law and the international obligations that result thereof. 
Overall, this section establishes that ‘investment’ encompasses a very wide 
array of tangible objects in various economic sectors, that benefit from 
certain protections, in peacetime and hostilities. 
International law of foreign investment is a field of public international 
law that is mostly regulated by investment treaties. This legal regime was 
described as the combination of substantive protections for foreign 
investors and investments, with remedial procedures that serve to enforce 
these protections.10 Thus explained, the concepts of ‘investment’ and 
‘investor’ are the foundations of investment law. The term ‘investment’ 
determines economic interests, to which States extend substantive 
protections in investment treaties, while the term ‘investor’ specifies the 
range of legal and natural persons who stand to benefit from any such treaty. 
The centrality of ‘investment’ notwithstanding, the concept has no 
universally accepted definition.  
In economic parlance, a foreign direct investment, as opposed to a 
portfolio investment, entails, inter alia, regular income, long-term 
relationship, and business risk. The parlance of investment treaties 
however, goes beyond the meaning associated with economics. 
‘Investment’ is defined in each instrument independently in a manner that 
arguably reflects the contractual bargain between the particular State parties 
to the treaty.11 In this sense, the treaty definition serves to identify the types 
of investments that capital-importing States wish to attract and to ascertain 
the types of investments capital-exporting countries wish to protect 
overseas. Because treaties are forward-looking and since technology and 
provision of services is ever-evolving, there is some difficulty with defining 
‘investment’ in exhaustive terms. 
____________________ 
10  Julian D Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the 
Domain of International Investment Law’ (2010) 51(1) Harv. Int’l L. J. 257, 
262. 
11  Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (CUP 2009) 161-
65. 
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To this end, two main approaches have developed in treaty practice.12 
The first approach uses an open-ended asset-based definition. In these 
cases, ‘investment’ is defined as ‘every kind of asset’ or ‘any kind of asset’, 
often accompanied by a non-exhaustive list of examples. For instance, the 
Albania-Cyprus BIT defines ‘investment’ as ‘every kind of asset and in 
particular, although not exclusively, the following…’.13 The second 
commonly found approach uses principle-based definitions, which 
elucidate the concept by reference to the economic features of an 
investment, frequently using an illustrative list. For example, the Morocco-
Nigeria BIT defines ‘investment’ as: 
An enterprise within the territory of one State established, acquired, expanded or 
operated, in good faith, by an investor of the other State in accordance with law of 
the Party in whose territory the investment is made taken together with the asset of 
the enterprise which contribute sustainable development of that Party and has the 
characteristics of an investment involving a commitment of capital or other similar 
resources, pending profit, risk-taking and certain duration. An enterprise will 
possess the following assets … For greater certainty, Investment does not include 
…14 
Recent investment instruments have attempted to develop a more nuanced 
definition by way of using a combination of both approaches and a list of 
inclusive and exclusive examples. Art. 8.1 of the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, for instance, reads:  
Investment means every kind of asset … that has the characteristics of an 
investment, which includes certain duration and other characteristics such as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include …15  
The content and scope of these treaty definitions is asserted by way of treaty 
interpretation.16 Thus, no particular debate arises over the classification of 
an object that is enumerated under the treaty.17 Likewise, if the treaty 
provides for an asset-based definition, then ‘the definition is open, general 
____________________ 
12  Rudolf Dolzer and Christopher Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 62 et seq (hereafter Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles 
of Investment Law). 
13  Art. 1 of the Albania-Cyprus BIT (2010). 
14  Art. 1 of the Nigeria-Morocco BIT (2016) (emphasis added). 
15  Emphasis added. 
16  Art. 31 VCLT. 
17 Petrobart Limited v The Kyrgyz Republic (Award) (2005) SCC case No 
126/2003 24. 
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and not restricted’18 and any economic asset could potentially qualify as an 
investment. 
However, the growth of investment treaty disputes illustrated the 
implications of using broad treaty definitions of ‘investment’. Arguably, 
States are often surprised at the type of asset that is considered as an 
investment under the relevant treaty, in that the meaning of ‘investment’ 
had been extended beyond what was envisaged by the host State. This 
results in frequent challenges of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals on the 
ground that the investor’s assets do not constitute an investment. In 
response, arbitral tribunals that were constituted under the ICSID 
Convention, which limits the jurisdiction of the tribunal to legal disputes 
‘arising directly out of an investment’,19 but does not define the term, 
attempted to provide an ‘objective’ elucidation of ‘investment’. Practically 
this means that the investor needs to demonstrate to the ICSID tribunal that 
the asset at bar meets the definition of ‘investment’ under both the 
applicable treaty ‘and’ Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. 
This ‘objective’ definition is commonly known as the ‘Salini criteria’, 
whereby ‘investment’ entails: (a) duration, (b) regularity of profit and 
return, (c) assumption of risk, (d) substantive commitment, and (e) 
contribution to the host State’s development.20 To be sure, these criteria are 
far from widely accepted. For the purposes of the present discussion 
however several debates over the issue are put aside.21 Namely, the relative 
weight of each of these features;22 whether these are cumulative 
prerequisites, facultative characteristics, or an attempt to read into treaty 
____________________ 
18  RREEF v Spain (Decision on Jurisdiction) (2016) ICSID case No ARB/13/30 
156-60 (hereafter RREEF v Spain). 
19  Art. 25 ICSID Convention. 
20  Fedax NV v Venezuela (Award on Jurisdiction) (1997) ICSID case No 
ARB/96/03, 43; Salini Costruttori SpA v Morocco (Decision on Jurisdiction) 
(2001) ICSID Case No ARB/00/4 52; Joy Mining v Egypt (Award) (2004) ICSID 
case No ARB/03/11 53. 
21  See Beijing Urban Construction v Yemen (Decision on Jurisdiction) (2017) 
ICSID case No ARB/14/30 124-38; David Williams and Simone Foote, ‘Recent 
developments in the approach to identifying an “investment” pursuant to Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention’ in Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds), 
Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP 2011) 42. 
22  LESI SpA v Algeria ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 July 
2006, para 72; Bayindir v Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction) (2005) ICSID case 
No ARB/03/29 131. 
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definitions what is simply not there;23 and, whether these parameters apply 
only to disputes conducted under the ICSID Convention, to all investment 
claims, or not at all.24 Nonetheless, at its lowest it may be said that the 
objective Salini criteria for ‘investment’ reflect the features that are mostly 
found in treaty definitions, economics, and investment practice.  
Finally, the determination if a given asset is an ‘investment’ is detached 
from its area of economic activity. The protection of objects under 
investment law is independent from and non-contingent upon economic 
sectors. In practice, tribunals have exercised jurisdiction over a wide array 
of diverse economic activities and States indeed seek to promote and 
facilitate investment inflows in various sectors.25  
The corollary of the classification of an asset as an ‘investment’ is that 
this object benefits from certain standards of protection. One such common 
standard, which was at the heart of the AAPL dispute, is ‘full protection and 
security’ (FPS). This provision requires states to take feasible precautions 
so as to protect investments from violence whether authored by the State or 
by a third party. It has been said to be designed to protect investments 
against violent actions, in particular during hostilities.26 Another notable 
____________________ 
23  MCI v Ecuador (Award) (2007) ICSID Case No ARB/03/6 165; Malaysian 
Historical Salvors v Malaysia (Award on Jurisdiction) (2007) ICSID Case No 
ARB/05/10; Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia (Decision on the 
Application for Annulment) (2009) ICSID Case No ARB/05/10; RREEF v Spain 
(n 18) 156-60.  
24  Romak SA v Uzbekistan (Award) (2009) UNCITRAL, PCA Case 173-243; Alps 
Finance and Trade v Slovakia (Award) (2011) UNCITRAL 240–241. 
25  ICSID, ‘Annual Report 2017’ 33 et seq <https://icsid.world-
bank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20AR%20EN.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2017. 
26  For arbitral jurisprudence, See AAPL v Sri Lanka (n 2) 77; AMT v Zaire (Award) 
(1997) ICSID case No ARB/93/1 6.05; Tecmed v The Mexico(Award) (2003) 
ICSID case No ARB (AF)/00/2 177; Saluka v Czech Republic (Partial Award) 
(2006) UNCITRAL 483 PSEG v Turkey (Award) (2007) ICSID case No 
ARB/02/5 258; Pantechniki v Albania (Award) (2007) ICSID case No 
ARB/07/2171-4; Houben v Burundi (Award) (2016) ICSID case No ARB/13/7 
160-64. For scholarship see Giuditta Cordero-Moss, ‘Full protection and 
security’ in August Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (OUP 
2008) 134-39; Christopher Schreuer, ‘Full Protection and Security’ (2010) 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 354; Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, ‘Full 
protection and Security’ in Stephan Schill (ed), International Investment Law 
and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 183, 201; David Collins, ‘Applying 
Full Protection and Security Standard of International Investment Law to Digital 
Assets’ (2010) 12 Journal of World Investment & Trade 225; Cristopher 
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standard of protection, which was found to have been breached in the matter 
of Mitchell v DRC, concerns the dispossession of property. Almost all 
investment treaties recognise the right of States to expropriate investments 
as long as the taking is for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, 
under due process, and in return for compensation.27 Finally, if a certain 
object constitutes an ‘investment’ that is owned or controlled by an investor, 
then the investor may also benefit from direct recourse to international 
adjudication.28 There, he will be able to invoke the violation of, say, FPS, 
and claim reparations for losses owing to armed conflict.  
In outline, the term investment potentially concerns a very wide scope of 
assets that are owned or controlled by foreign nationals. This definition, due 
to its width, confers certain standards of protection, in peacetime and 
hostilities, upon a varied range of tangible objects. Yet, the above 
referenced cases of AAPL and Mitchell demonstrate that in the reality of 
hostilities the determination that an asset is an ‘investment’ does not 
translate into its inviolability from attacks. In fact, it appears that the 
treatment of such investments during hostilities is predicated on a 
completely separate set of considerations. These considerations arguably 
stem from IHL and are therefore examined at the next step. 
C. The Classification of Commercial Objects under International 
Humanitarian Law 
This section focuses on the classification of tangible economic objects 
under IHL. The discussion below, first, analyses the wording of Art. 52 (2) 
AP I, which prescribes the binding definition of military objectives; and 
second, on two classes of targets that originate therefrom. This section 
demonstrates that the wide definition of ‘military objectives’ potentially 
allows for the deliberate destruction of objects, inter alia, for the economic 
sector in which the object operates and, for the financial contribution and 
profits that the object generates.  
____________________ 
Schreuer, ‘The protection of investments in armed conflicts’ in Freya Baetens 
(ed), Investment Law within International Law: Integrative Perspectives (CUP 
2013) 6.  
27  Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of Investment Law (n 12) chapter VI. 
28  Subject to the provisions of the relevant treaty and issues of jurisdiction and 
admissibility. 
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Whereas ‘investment’ lies at the heart of investment law, the principle of 
distinction is the cornerstone of all IHL instruments. It mandates that attacks 
may be directed ‘only against military objectives’, while ‘civilian objects 
shall not be the object of attack’.29 Notwithstanding the centrality of this 
term, IHL defines ‘civilian objects’ a contrario, thus a civilian object is one 
which is not a ‘military objective’.30 This means that to learn what a 
protected object is, it is first necessary to identify what is a targetable 
objective. Art. 52 (2) AP I, which is widely recognized as customary law,31 
sets out the two-pronged definition of ‘military objectives’, whereby: 
[M]ilitary objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.32 
Under the first prong of Art. 52 (2) AP I, the targetability of an object is 
determined by the examination of its use and function with the armed 
forces.33 In this sense, an object can offer an ‘effective contribution’ to the 
military in four possible ways – nature, location, purpose, or use.34 The 
____________________ 
29  Art. 48, 51 (2), 52, AP I. 
30  Art. 51 (1), AP I. 
31  Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, vol. II: Practice (CUP 2009) practice on Rule 8. The most 
updated version of this authority is fully available online https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home accessed 23 November 2017 
(hereafter ICRC Customary IHL Study). See also Horace B Robertson Jr., ‘The 
Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict’ (1998) ILS 
197, 201-4 (hereafter Robertson, ‘The Principle of the Military Objective’); Julie 
Gaudreau, ‘The reservations to the Protocols additional to the Geneva 
Conventions for the protection of war victims’ (2003) 849 IRRC 143, 159-60; 
Yoram Dinstein, ‘Legitimate Military Objectives’ (n 8) 140; Ian Henderson, The 
Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and 
Precautions in Attach under AP I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 51 
(hereafter Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting); 
Sandesh Sivakumaran The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 
2012) 344 (hereafter Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts); Stefan Oeter, ‘Methods and Means of Combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), 
The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 
170-71. 
32  Art. 52 (2) AP I. 
33  Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (n 31) 55. 
34  Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Attack’ in Susan Breau and 
Agnieszka Jachec-Neale (eds), Testing the Boundaries of International 
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criterion of ‘location’ concerns the geographical features of the object.35 
Civilian buildings, for instance, may become military objectives if they 
‘obstruct the field of fire for an attack on another valid military objective.’36 
An object that is ‘owned or usually controlled’ by the armed forces,37 and 
possesses ‘intrinsic military significance’,38 would qualify as a military 
objective by its ‘nature’.39 Such objects may include headquarters, military 
aircraft, and enemy warships.40 ‘Use’ refers to the object’s actual usage by 
the forces, i.e. whether it is presently used militarily either by the military 
itself or in a manner which benefits the forces.41 Finally, ‘military purpose’ 
is construed from an established intention of the belligerent as regards 
‘future’ use. Note, the purpose of an object refers to the adversary’s known 
intentions, not to ‘those figured out hypothetically in contingency plans’.42 
At the next step, it is necessary to address the required level of ‘effective 
contribution’ that turns an object to a potential target. The original wording 
of the provision, as suggested by the ICRC, was concerned with objects that 
‘contribute effectively and directly to the military effort’. This qualifier 
however was deliberately omitted.43 Beyond the drafting history of the 
provision, State practice indicates that ‘effective contribution’ comprises 
____________________ 
Humanitarian Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
2006) 277, 278-80 (hereafter Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines’). 
35  Ibid, 280. 
36  Robertson, ‘The Principle of the Military Objective’ (n 31) 209. 
37  Yaves Sandoz et al (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) 
2020 (hereafter Sandoz et al, AP I Commentary) 
38  Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines’ (n 34) 280. 
39  Sandoz et al, AP I Commentary (n 37) 2020-2021; Dinstein, ‘Legitimate military 
objectives’ (n 8) 145-47; Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (n 
31) 55-56. 
40  Unless these objects were specifically exempt eg if aircrafts are used for medical 
transport. 
41  Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines’ (n 34) 280; Henderson, The Contemporary Law of 
Targeting (n 31) 59. 
42  Sandoz et al, AP I Commentary (n 37) 2022; Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines in the Law of 
Attack’ (n 34) 280; Dinstein, ‘Legitimate military objectives’ (n 8) 148; 
Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (n 31) 59-60; Sivakumaran, 
The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (n 31) 344. 
43  Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Second 
Session, Geneva, 3 May-3 June 1972), vol. I, 146-47, para 3.141 (emphasis 
added). 
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not only direct, but indirect contributions to the military action.44 Thus, 
‘effective’ does not denote a linear correlation or a direct causation, between 
the object and its military contribution. 
Under the second-prong of Art. 52 (2), it is necessary to determine that 
given the circumstances ‘ruling at the time’, the ‘total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization’ of the objective ‘offers a definite military 
advantage’ to the military ‘action’. The language ‘circumstances ruling at 
the time’ is inherent to IHL and to the notion that a conduct in warfare is to 
be assessed in consideration to all factors and existing possibilities as they 
appeared to the commander at the time.45 A definite military advantage, in 
turn, is a term of limitation that requires a ‘concrete’ and perceptible 
military advantage rather than a ‘hypothetical and speculative one’.46 This 
means that there should be a reasonable connection between the destruction 
of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.47 
As regards the threshold ‘definite’, the drafting history of Art. 52 (2) AP I 
teaches that an ‘extensive discussion took place’ before agreement was 
____________________ 
44  Human Rights Watch, ‘Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties 
during the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War’, part 1, chapter 1 
(1991) <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/CHAP1.htm> accessed 29 
March 2017; Human Rights Watch, ‘Off Target: The Conduct of the War and 
Civilian Casualties in Iraq II’ (11 December 2003) <https://www.hrw.org/re-
port/2003/12/11/target/conduct-war-and-civilian-casualties-iraq> accessed 30 
July 2017. 
45  The United States of America v Wilhelm List, et al (Judgment (Military Tribunal 
V)) (1948) case No 47 in Michael N. Schmitt (ed), Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law – 2010 (Springer 2010) 234; Eric Jensen, ‘Article 58 and 
Precautions against the Effects of Attacks in Urban Areas’ (2016) 98 IRRC 147, 
166. 
46  Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (n 31) 63; Yoram Dinstein, 
The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2nd 
edn, CUP 2010) 106 (hereafter Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities); 
Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (n 31) 346; 
Michael Bothe et al, New rules for victims of armed conflicts: commentary on 
the two 1977 protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (2nd edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 367 (hereafter Bothe et al, New rules for victims of 
armed conflicts). 
47  Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight (adopted 11 December 1868, entered into force 29 
November/11 December 1868) 138 Consol TS 297 (hereafter St. Petersburg 
Declaration) Preamble; Bothe et al, New rules for victims of armed conflicts (n 
46) 367; Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (n 31) 62; 
Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (n 31) 346-47. 
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reached on the word ‘definite’. Among the qualifiers that had been 
considered and rejected at the Diplomatic Conference were: ‘distinct’, 
‘direct’, ‘clear’, ‘immediate’, ‘obvious’, ‘specific’, and ‘substantial’.48 The 
intentional rejection of these adjectives indicates that Art. 52 (2) AP I aims 
at a lower standard. As for its scope, a military advantage is not restricted 
to ‘tactical gains’; the spectrum is necessarily wide, and it extends to the 
security of the attacking force.49 Importantly, Art. 52 (2) AP I clarifies that 
any such ‘definite advantage’ ought to be of a ‘military’ category, character, 
or nature. This ‘military’ modifier excludes economic, civil, political, or 
national advantages from the scope of Art. 52 (2) AP I.50 In sum, the 
definition of military objectives leaves a lot to be desired. In practice, this 
ambiguity resulted in several contentious classes of targets, namely dual-
use and revenue-generating targets that are addressed below.  
For the purpose of the present discussion, suffice it to explain that, in 
warfare particularly, the military also uses civilian infrastructure, 
telecommunications, and logistics. Objects which have both a civilian and 
a military application are commonly known as ‘dual-use objects’. To 
illustrate, power-generating stations are used not only to grant civilians the 
access to clean water, but also to provide power to war industries.51 
It is not plentifully clear that Art. 52 (2) AP I covers these targets. The 
provision focuses on the military contribution of the object, but pays no 
attention to the object’s contribution to civilian life. This arguably indicates 
that the civilian benefits of an object are of little to no significance to its 
____________________ 
48  Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, Geneva (1974–7) vol XV, CDDH/2l5/Rev. l, 277, para 64. 
49  James Burger, ‘International humanitarian law and the Kosovo crisis: Lessons 
learned or to be learned’ (2000) 82 IRRC 129, 132; Dinstein, ‘Legitimate 
military objectives’ (n 8) 144; US General Counsel of Department of State, 
Department of Defence - Law War Manual (June 2015, revised February 2016) 
section 5.7.7.3 (hereafter DoD LOAC Manual); ICRC Customary IHL Study (n 
31) practice relating to Rule 8. 
50  St. Petersburg Declaration (n 47) Preamble, prohibits any forms of economic 
activities; Sandoz et al, AP I Commentary (n 37) 2018 et seq; Henderson, The 
Contemporary Law of Targeting (n 31) 61; Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities 
(n 46) 108; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Targeting Narcoinsurgents in Afghanistan: The 
Limits of International Humanitarian Law’ (2009) 12 YbIHL 30, 314. 
51  Leslie C. Green, ‘The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare’ 
(1991) 29 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 222, 233; Michael N. 
Schmitt, ‘Future War and the Principle of Discrimination’ (1998) 28 IYHR 51, 
68; Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (n 31) 129-42. 
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classification. Additionally, the term ‘use’ in the provision is not modified 
by any adjectives (e.g. ‘primary’). Arguably, this suggests that any degree 
of military use may lead to the classification of an object as a military 
objective. In practice, bridges, factories, industrial plants, ports, mines, 
broadcasting stations, etc., are often treated as dual-use targets.52  
As regards ‘revenue-generating objects’, these are any economic 
infrastructure that generate revenue for an enemy’s armed forces,53 such as 
production, transportation, storage, and distribution facilities of 
petroleum,54 energy resources,55 and generally any form of profit.56 Note, 
the justification for targeting, say, oil assets does not arise from the military 
usage of the infrastructure as in the case of dual-use objects; the reasoning 
rather lies with the potential revenues from the object, which may (or may 
not) be transferred to the armed forces, who may (or may not) use the money 
to sustain their war-fighting.  
Although revenues are not mentioned in Art. 52 (2) AP I, the ambiguity 
over the requirement that the object offers an ‘effective’ – but not ‘direct’ – 
contribution to the military action, arguably allows for this practice.57 In the 
past, this doctrine justified the destruction of cotton storages and opium 
facilities. In today’s warfare, revenue-generating targets mostly comprise 
petroleum infrastructure and bulk cash storage sites.58 This is the most 
contentious, yet fast-growing, class of targets in modern warfare. 
____________________ 
52  Dinstein, ‘Legitimate military objectives’ (n 8) 154-58; Marco Sassòli, 
‘Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law’ (2004) 
HPRC 1, 6-8 <http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/do-
cuments/Session1.pdf> accessed 20 October 2016.  
53  Ryan Goodman ‘The Obama Administration and Targeting “War-Sustaining” 
Objects in Non international Armed Conflict’ (2016) 110 AJIL 663, 664 
(hereafter Goodman, ‘War-sustaining Objects’). 
54  DoD LOAC Manual (n 49) section 5.7.8.5 – ‘Examples of Military Objectives 
– Economic Objects Associated with Military Operations’. 
55  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Maintaining 
Momentum in The Fight against ISIL’ (15 January 2016) 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/15/fact-sheet-
maintaining-momentum-fight-against-isil> accessed 12 May 2017. 
56  The speech of DoD General Counsel, Jennifer O’Connor at NYU Law School, 
published in Just Security, ‘Applying the Law of Targeting to the Modern 
Battlefield’ (Just Security, 28 November 2016) <https://www.just-
security.org/34977/applying-law-targeting-modern-battlefield%E2%80%8E-
full-speech-dod-general-counsel-jennifer-oconnor/> accessed 5 May 2017. 
57  Goodman, ‘War-sustaining Objects’ (n 53) 663 et seq. 
58  Ibid. 
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In sum, the definition of ‘military objective’ is broad and ambiguous 
enough to allow in practice for the classification of varied economic assets 
as military objectives, which may be subject to direct attack.  
D. The Classification of Investments into Protected Civilian Objects and 
Permissible Military Targets 
Building on the foregoing analyses, this section puts forth a twofold 
examination. First, the discussion outlines the instances when an object may 
constitute a covered and protected investment but at the same time be 
classified as a military objective susceptible of targeting. Alongside, the 
section outlines the implications of any such classification on the standards 
of treatment that the host State confers upon investments before and during 
hostilities, and the possible invocation of the international responsibility of 
the host State thereof.  
I. Foreign Investments and the Language of Article 52 (2) AP I 
Like any other civilian object, which may be targetable if it meets the two-
prong test of Art. 52 (2) AP I, foreign investments may too be lawfully 
attacked. Thus, if a plant is used as headquarters or if it obstructs the line of 
fire, its military use or location may justify its targeting. The same is true if 
the plant is a foreign investment. Take the case of AAPL v Sri Lanka. Insofar 
and for so long as the shrimp farm at the heart of the dispute was in fact 
used militarily by the LTTE in a manner that offered an ’effective’ 
contribution to their military action, the total or partial destruction of the 
investment may have been lawful under IHL,59 regardless of the BIT’s 
definition of ‘investment’. 
At the same time, the classification of this object as an ‘investment’ 
generates certain international obligations for the host State. In reality, the 
AAPL v Sri Lanka Tribunal held that by failing to use less-deadly means 
and methods in its military operation, the State failed to take the 
precautionary measures that a well-administered government would have 
taken in these circumstances.60 Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the 
____________________ 
59  Subject to additional conventional and customary constraints and limitations. 
60  AAPL v Sri Lanka (n 2) 85(B). 
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State breached the FPS standard. To be sure, there is no IHL rule obliging 
States not to eliminate a military objective if it can be neutralized in other 
less-lethal means.61 Arguably, here the rules on the treatment of the same 
object in the same situation may yield contradictory results. 
II. Foreign Investments as Dual-Use Targets 
In practice, foreign investments are often made in economic sectors which 
are prone to dual-use classification.62 Investment in the form of, say, 
hydroelectric power plants,63 airport security services,64 
telecommunications,65 and certainly weapons production, are of primarily 
civilian nature, use, and purpose. But, these investments also possess 
secondary military qualities that may serve the armed forces in armed 
conflicts. Under certain circumstances such investments are legitimate 
targets. This classification generates international obligations for the host 
State. Under Art. 58 AP I, States are required, even before the outbreak of 
hostilities, to remove civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of 
military objectives, to avoid locating military objectives within, or near, 
densely populated areas, and to take all other practicable precautions so as 
____________________ 
61  This standard is rather taken from human rights law. See HCJ 769/02 The Public 
Committee against Torture in Israel et al v Israel (2006) 33, 40. Cf Marko 
Milanovic, ‘Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror: 
comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings case’ (2007) 89 IRRC 373, 
389 et seq. 
62  To illustrate, at least 153 disputes were focused on investments in electricity, 
gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; some 36 claims concerned investments 
in water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; 30 
investment disputes concerned agriculture, forestry and fishing; 129 cases 
concerned mining and quarrying; (UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement 
Navigator, Economic sector and subsector <http://investmentpolicyhub.unc-
tad.org/ISDS/FilterByEconomicSector> accessed 14 May 2017). 
63  Eg Amlyn v Croatia (pending) ICSID case No ARB/16/28. The dispute concerns 
investments in the construction of a biomass power plant. 
64  Eg Abed El Jaouni v Lebanon (pending) ICSID case No ARB/15/3. The dispute 
concerns ownership of a company that operates a fleet of private jets for charter 
and lease throughout Europe and the Middle East. 
65  Eg Lauder v Czech Republic (Final Award) (2001) IIC 205, UNCITRAL, and 
CME v Czech Republic (Final Award and Separate Opinion) (2006) 9 ICSID 
Rep 264. These disputes concerned an investment in the field of information and 
communication, and programming and broadcasting activities. 
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to protect the civilian population under its control from the effects of 
attacks.66 
To illustrate, since the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Hezbollah leader 
Hassan Nasrallah repeatedly insisted that in any future armed conflict with 
Israel Hezbollah will target Haifa’s ammonia storage tank, which mainly 
serves the agriculture sector; such an attack is alleged to have an effect 
tantamount to an atomic bomb.67 True, a deliberate attack against a civilian 
industry plant is in breach of the principle of distinction and a war crime.68 
However, aside from its civilian usage, ammonia is also used militarily as 
an alternate fuel, namely for combat jets. Hence, the tank is prone to dual-
use classification. Considering that the tank is located in the Haifa 
metropolitan area, the probability of an attack against it as evidenced in 
repeated threats by Hezbollah, and the magnitude of anticipated civilian 
damage thereof, the closure of the investment is not only permitted, but 
mandated, by Art. 58 AP I. 
The same is true if the object is a foreign investment. In fact, this 12,000-
ton storage container of ammonia is part a longstanding US investment in 
Israel.69 If this foreign investment is a military objective, then Israel is 
obliged under Art. 58 AP I, ‘already during peacetime’,70 to remove and 
avoid locating it within, or near, densely populated areas.71 Indeed, on 28 
May 2017 the Israeli Supreme Court instructed the government to 
discontinue the permit for the operation of the tank and ordered its closure, 
citing grounds of inter alia security concerns.72 At the same time, this 
regulatory interference in the form of a revocation of a license unfavourably 
changed the regulatory environment in which the investment has operated 
for decades. This also caused the investor to lose control of the investment 
and enjoyment of the benefits thereof. In this instance, Israel’s compliance 
____________________ 
66  Art. 58 AP I. This provision is widely recognised as a rule of customary law and 
as such applies to IACs and NIACs. See ICRC Customary IHL Study (n 31) rule 
22; Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (n 31) 351 et 
seq. 
67  Noa Shpigel, ‘Tens of Thousands of Israelis Could Die if Key Security Weak 
Spot Exploited, Experts Warn’ Haaretz (Israel, 30 January 2017). 
68  Art. 8 (2) (B) (I) ICC-Statute. 
69  Haifa Chemicals is owned by the American holding company Trance-Resource 
Inc., which is controlled by the Trump Group, where Jules Trump, a US national, 
serves as chairman of the board. 
70  Sandoz et al, AP I Commentary (n 36) 2244, 2247, and 2251. 
71  Art. 58 (a) and (b) AP I. 
72  PCA 2841/17 Haifa Chemicals v The City of Haifa et al (2017). 
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with what is required under IHL may give rise to an investment treaty 
claim.73 
III. Foreign Investments as Revenue-Generating Targets 
This category may prove the most challenging for investments. In fact, a 
closer examination reveals that the very first use of this doctrine concerned 
the destruction of British foreign investments by Union forces during the 
American Civil War.74 In that case, the UK brought a claim against the US, 
arguing that the destruction of cotton was in breach of the FPS provision in 
the applicable treaties of amity.75 The primary defence of the US was that, 
‘cotton in the insurrectionary States was peculiarly and eminently a 
legitimate subject for such destruction’ because the revenues from cotton 
sustained the war-fighting of the Confederacy against the Union.76 From its 
birth, the notion that the destruction of objects ‘due’ to their revenue-
generating abilities is permissible, conflicted with the concurrent obligation 
to protect these objects ‘for’ their revenue-generating abilities. 
Today, the doctrine of revenue-generation continues to challenge 
investment protection. Recently, this class of targets justified counter-
narcotics operations in poppy-growing areas of Afghanistan. These 
operations aimed at collapsing the Taliban’s financial base, which relied on 
____________________ 
73  Namely, expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. 
74  The 1980 US Air Force Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, 
25 July 1980 (AFP 110-34); US Department of the Navy – JAG, ‘Annotated 
Supplement to the Commanders Handbook on Naval Operations’, NWP 1-14M 
(1989) 8.1.1; Ralph Thomas and James Duncan (eds), Annotated Supplement to 
the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, (1999) 73 ILS 
403; Bothe et al, New rules for victims of armed conflicts (n 46) 2.4.3. 
75  Art. 14 of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His 
Britannick Majesty; and the United States of America, by Their President, with 
the advice and consent of Their Senate, 19 November 1794 (entered into force 
29 February 1796); Article 1, Convention to Regulate the Commerce between 
the Territories of The United States and of His Britannick Majesty (3 July 1815). 
Both provisions contain a FPS obligation whereby, ‘which stipulated that the 
‘merchants and traders of each Nation respectively shall enjoy the most 
complete protection and security for their Commerce’. 
76  US Department of State, Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington: Report 
of the US Agent (Washington 1874) vol. 6, 52–58. 
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the taxation of the production and sale of opium.77 The success of the anti-
drug campaign however forced the Taliban to look elsewhere for revenues. 
Today, foreign investments fill in the gap. 
Illustratively, in November 2016, the Taliban publicly pledged to ‘back 
all national projects’ and to ‘direct its Mujahideen to help in the security of 
projects that are in the higher interest of [Afghanistan]’.78 This pledge also 
enumerated several national and foreign projects, including the investment 
of China Metallurgical Group Corporation’s (MCC) in a copper mine 40 
kilometers south-east of Kabul. To be sure, the Taliban does not volunteer 
its protection; it levies taxes on infrastructure which it ‘guards’ so as to 
sustain itself. Therefore, investors who pay protection-taxes effectively 
support the belligerent’s financial base and risk turning their investment 
into a revenue-generating target. 
As for MCC, its investment was the subject of repeated deadly attacks by 
the Taliban, until in 2014 it withdrew from the project.79 After the Afghan 
President pleaded the insurgents to ‘stop pursuing objectives of outsiders’,80 
the Taliban propounded the protection of its Mujahideen. Put differently, 
the Taliban’s support of foreign investments reflects an offer of taxation in 
____________________ 
77  Judy Dempsey and John Burns, ‘NATO Agrees to Take Aim at Afghan Drug 
Trade’, NY Times (New York, 10 October 2008) <http://www.ny-
times.com/2008/10/11/world/asia/11nato.html> accessed 12 July 2016; Dapo 
Akande, ‘US/NATO Targeting of Afghan Drug Traffickers: An Illegal and 
Dangerous Precedent?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 13 September 2009) <http://www.ejil-
talk.org/usnato-targeting-of-afghan-drug-traffickers-an-illegal-and-dangerous-
precedent/> accessed 10 May 2016; Schmitt, ‘Narcoinsurgents in Afghanistan’ 
(n 50) 301-5; Emily Crawford, Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in 
Armed Conflict (OUP 2015) 198-201; Goodman, ‘War-sustaining Objects’ (n 
53) 672. 
78  Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, ‘Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding 
backing national projects in the country’ (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 29 
November 2016) <https://alemarah-english.com/?p=7766> accessed 
13 December 2016. 
79  Global Witness, ‘Copper Bottomed? Bolstering the Aynak contract: 
Afghanistan’s first major mining deal’ (Global Witness, 20 November 2012) 
<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/afghanistan/copper-
bottomed/?> accessed 13 December 2016. 




25 July 2017. 
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lieu of violence, leaving foreign investments and the State between a rock 
and a hard place.81 
Modern operations against revenue-generating targets pose a particular 
challenge for the law and policy of foreign investment. In recent years the 
US launched a ‘wave of strikes against oil infrastructure, tanker trucks, 
wells and refineries’ in Iraq so as to undermine Daesh’s financial base.82 
President Obama explained that ‘thanks’ to the American campaign, 
‘money is literally going up in smoke’ and oil prices are reduced.83 
The justification for these economically-motivated operations is very 
weak under IHL, but it is even harder to square this conduct with the law 
and policy of foreign investments. While the US Department of Defense 
cites revenue-generation as a justification for targeting oil assets in Iraq, the 
US State Department, simultaneously, encourages oil companies to invest 
in Iraq, stating that investments in petroleum represent a rewarding business 
opportunity for American corporations, as Iraq’s economy depends mainly 
on the revenues from this sector.84 Iraq on its part, with the encouragement 
of the international community,85 goes to great length to promote and 
____________________ 
81  Anders Corr, ‘Sanction China for Its Support of Taliban Terrorists’ Forbes (New 
York, 21 February 2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ander-
scorr/2017/02/21/sanction-china-for-its-support-of-taliban-terror-
ists/2/#1e6ae1b14b31> accessed 10 October 2017. 
82  Remarks by President Barack Obama on Progress Against ISIL, 25 February 
2016 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/remarks-presi-
dent-progress-against-isil> accessed 24 November 2017; Statement by the Pres-
ident on Progress in the Fight Against ISIL, 13 April 2016 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/13/statement-
president-progress-fight-against-isil> accessed 7 May 2017. 
83  Ibid. The current Trump Administration fully adopts this practice, see US DoD, 
‘US, Coalition Continue Strikes against ISIL in Syria, Iraq’ <https://www.de-
fense.gov/News/Article/Article/1056079/us-coalition-continue-strikes-against-
isil-in-syria-iraq/source/GovDelivery/> accessed 16 May 2017. 
84  US State Department, ‘2010 Investment Climate Statement – Iraq’ 
<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138084.htm> accessed 13 May 
2017; US State Department, ‘2011 Investment Climate Statement – Iraq’ 
<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/> accessed 13 May 2017; US 
State Department, ‘2013 Investment Climate Statement – Iraq’ 
<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204661.htm> accessed 12 May 
2017; International Trade Centre, ‘Iraq – Country Brief’ <http://www.intra-
cen.org/country/iraq/> accessed 12 May 2017. 
85  OECD, ‘Bringing Investments to Iraq’ (OECD Insights, 21 September 2015) 
<http://oecdinsights.org/2015/09/21/bringing-investment-to-iraq/> accessed 20 
October 2017.  
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facilitate revenue-generating investments in the energy and petroleum 
sectors. To that end, the State offers concession contracts, bids, and more 
relaxed licensing for foreign investors.86 Indeed, investments in oil account 
for some 90% of Iraq’s revenues; most of these are foreign investments, 
many of which are US-owned. Taken at face-value, this class of targets 
means that the assets of ExxonMobil in the West Qurna I oil field are 
permissible targets that may be lawfully attacked by Daesh under certain 
circumstances. 
Put simply, the implication of conditioning the legality of attacks on 
revenue-generation is that revenue-generating foreign investments may too 
be targeted by the adversary. This class of targets seems to directly conflict 
with the law and policy on the promotion, facilitation, and protection of 
foreign investments. 
IV. Foreign Investments as Civilian Objects 
Finally, the classification of investments as civilian objects and the 
implications thereof should be considered. If the investment is not classified 
as a military objective under Art. 52 (2) AP I, and whenever there is any 
doubt as to its classification,87 the investment is presumed to be is a civilian 
object. As such, an investment cannot be the subject of direct and deliberate 
attacks.88 More so, this civilian classification imposes certain obligations on 
war-torn host States. These obligations require States to take precautionary 
measures to protect investments from attacks (Art. 58 AP I), however they 
do not guarantee inviolability. 
The case of MCC’s above referenced investment in Afghanistan is 
illustrative. Under Art. 58 AP I, Afghanistan, as the ‘attacked’ party, is 
required to take the practicable and practical precautionary measures, given 
the prevailing circumstances, to protect the civilian objects under its control 
(including foreign investments) from the attacks of the Taliban.89 This 
obligation of due diligence is assessed against the particular means and 
____________________ 
86  This fact has been consistently emphasised in the publications of the State 
Department (n 84). 
87  Art. 52 (3) AP I. 
88  Art. 48, 51 and 52 AP I. 
89  Art. 58, AP I; Sandoz et al, AP I Commentary (n 37) 2239; Jean-Francois 
Queguiner, ‘Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities’ 
(2006) 88 IRRC 796, 818-19; Jensen (n 45) 162. 
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circumstances of each State.90 In this case, it may be that Afghanistan 
complied with Art. 58 AP I notwithstanding the damage to the investment.91 
At the same time, it may be that the FPS obligation under investment law 
holds Afghanistan to a higher threshold of diligence, whereby it should have 
taken more or other measures than what is required under IHL.92 In such a 
case, both norms prescribe different standards of vigilance with respect to 
the same situation. 
Furthermore, IHL accepts that in the harsh reality of hostilities civilian 
objects, foreign investments inclusive, may be incidentally hurt during 
attacks against legitimate military targets. This is recognised under the 
customary principle of proportionality, which prohibits launching an attack 
against a lawful target which is ‘expected’ to cause incidental civilian 
damage that would be excessive in relation to the military advantage 
‘anticipated’.93 Therefore, not all losses to investments owing to military 
operations invoke the international responsibility of the attacking party. 
Take the situation of Mitchell v DRC where the investment sustained 
damage as a result of the State’s attack. If the damaged investment was not 
a military objective but, say, a victim of mistaken target identification (in 
good faith), its destruction may have been lawful under IHL. The same is 
true for the damage that was caused to the investment in AAPL v Sri Lanka, 
if it was not excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage from 
the destruction of, assume, a permissible LTTE target. At the same time, it 
may be that these State measures (attacks) breach the standards of 
investment protection under the applicable investment treaty, as indeed the 
Mitchell and AAPL Tribunals found. 
____________________ 
90  Kimberley Trapp, ‘Great Resources Mean Great Responsibility: A Framework 
of Analysis for Assessing Compliance with AP I Obligations in the Information 
Age’ in Dan Saxon (ed), International Humanitarian Law and the Changing 
Technology of War (Brill Nijhoff 2013)163-64; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘War, 
Technology, and the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2006) 82 ILS 137, 163-65.  
91  Afghanistan deployed armed forces to guard the investment, provided the 
workers with armed vehicles, built bunkers and shelters on site, and spread 
checkpoints around the area. Farhad Yavazi, ‘Mes Aynak Archeological 
Project’, Project Management Unit PMU (January 2014) 43 
<http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Mes-Aynak-Complete_January_2014.pdf> 
accessed 21 December 2017. 
92  Ampal-American Israel Corporation v Egypt (Decision on Liability) (2017) 
ICSID case No ARB/12/11 283-91.  
93  Art. 51 and 57 AP I; ICRC customary IHL (n 30) practice on Rule 14. 
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In sum, investments may be, and are, classified as military objectives. 
The concrete obligations that flow from this classification may result in a 
conflict with applicable investment treaty standards. In each of the above 
discussed situations, IHL arguably permits, and even mandates, what 
investment law prohibits or restricts. Since in these situations both IIL and 
IHL norms are valid and applicable and point to incompatible decisions, a 
choice must be made between them.94 For each of the above described 
situations, it is necessary to ascertain which of the two norms, IHL or IIL, 
prevails under the priority rules of international law namely, the lex 
specialis rule.95 Any such determination must be made on a case-by-case 
basis, and therefore exceed this discussion. Nonetheless, for its implications 
of State responsibility, the recognition that a norm conflict may arise in the 
assessment of losses to investments owing to armed conflict has an intrinsic 
significance. In practical terms of State responsibility, under a conflict in 
the applicable law only the special rule that must be applied can be breached 
and, in turn, result in responsibility. 
E. Concluding Remarks  
This chapter was concerned with the status of investments, as tangible 
economic objects, in armed conflicts. In this sense, the discussion examined 
when, if at all, investments may be the subject of a lawful attack, and the 
implications for the treatment of investments and State responsibility 
thereof. 
To that end, a twofold argument was proposed. First, the chapter 
demonstrated that the concept of ‘investment’ is broad enough to confer 
protection upon a very wide scope of economic assets. Further, it was 
established that an array of objects may be classified as permissible targets, 
often for the economic sector in which they operate (dual-use objects) or 
for their ability to generate revenues for the war-torn host State (revenue-
____________________ 
94  Joost Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (CUP 2003) 278-
98 (hereafter Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law); ILC, 
‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) 1.  
95  Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 94) 387-89; Marko 
Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human 
Rights Law’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed) International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 103-15. 
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generating targets). In some instances, this means that an object may be 
attacked as a ‘military objective’ precisely for the reasons for which it is 
protected as an ‘investment’. 
Second, the chapter addressed the rules that emanate from the 
classification of an object as a covered investment on the one hand, and as 
a military objective ‘or’ a civilian object, on the other. It was suggested that 
investment treaty standards often conflict with the treatment that IHL 
permits or mandates with respect to the same economic object. The 
protection of investments in armed conflict therefore may entail a conflict 
in the applicable law. In practical terms, only the rule that prevails in a norm 
conflict may be breached and invoke international responsibility. 
Overall, it is suggested that in practice the protection and regulation of 
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An outbreak of hostilities disrupts day-to-day life in the affected State or 
region, posing a considerable challenge to both legal and contractual 
relations of the involved States. While complex situations of conflict 
generally endanger the rule of law and hamper the allocation of rights and 
duties as well as their practical implementation, it is the disruption and 
takeover of control by another sovereign State that poses an even more 
serious legal obstacle to the maintenance of regular State functions, 
including the protection of investment. The state of occupation requires a 
thorough analysis of the continuity or renunciation of legal relations 
between the occupied State, the occupying State and (foreign) private 
investors.  
During conflict, investments are often the target of hostile action or 
collateral damage, resulting in the destruction, seizure or, broadly phrased, 
loss of value of the investment in question.1 IHL aims at regulating the 
conduct of hostilities and restricts or reduces damages to civilians and 
civilian objects by prohibiting direct attack or destruction. Its regulation of 
the protection of investment in general and the protection of investment 
during occupation, however, is far from undisputed; moreover, situations of 
occupation in recent years have illustrated the need for legal certainty on 
the interpretation and application of IHL. In particular, the powers of the 
occupying State to control or change the economic landscape in the 
____________________ 
1  Ofilio Mayorga, ‘Occupants, Beware of BITs: Applicability of Investment 
Treaties to Occupied Territories’ (2017) 19 Palestine Yearbook of International 
Law 1, 2 (hereafter Mayorga, ‘Occupants, Beware of BITs’). 
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occupied territory must be further examined, as, so far, no coherent practice 
on the economic legislative powers of an occupying State has emerged.2  
IHL governs conduct during occupation; yet, it is investment law, most 
commonly in the form of BITs, which contains more specialised regulations 
for the matter at hand. International investment law has quickly evolved 
over the last decades and provides mechanisms aimed at the protection of 
investment and means of remedy both in times of conflict and violence. 
Therefore, with the help of factual examples, this contribution firstly 
analyses the protection of (foreign) investment in situations of occupation 
under IHL; secondly, it takes a closer look at the specific regime of BITs, 
their applicability during conflict and their interaction with the laws of 
occupation.  
B. The Laws of Belligerent Occupation and the Protection of (Foreign) 
Investment 
The laws of belligerent occupation cover a wide array of specific aspects 
occurring during occupation, of which the protection of (foreign) 
investment is only a minor, yet heavily debated one. Recent occurrences of 
situations of occupation, (un)lawful interventions and potential annexations 
highlight the need for providing legal clarity on both the means of protection 
and means of remedy. Occupation itself is not considered a permanent 
transfer of sovereignty in a territory; however, the recognition of a state of 
occupation is often a highly politicised matter. Therefore, as a first step, this 
paper highlights how the legal regime is applied in situations of occupation. 
I. The Recognition of a State of Occupation and the Application of its 
Specialised Regime 
When examining a state of occupation, one must be aware that, prior to the 
codification of modern IHL, a diametrical understanding of occupation was 
promoted. This entailed that, when the occupant took over powers as a 
____________________ 
2  Robert Tadlock, ‘Occupation Law and Foreign Investment in Iraq: How an 
Outdated Doctrine Has become an Obstacle to Occupied Populations’ (2004) 39 
The University of San Francisco Law Review 227, 245 (hereafter Tadlock, 
‘Occupation Law and Foreign Investment in Iraq’).  
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conqueror, he emerged as the new rightful owner of the territory and, 
therewith, as the new sovereign. Yet, the prominent codification processes 
which took place at the turn of the century changed this perception: ‘As the 
nineteenth century drew to a close, the distinction between conquest and 
military occupation had been firmly established,’3 the latter being regarded 
merely as a phase of temporary change of de facto, but not de jure powers 
within a State territory. In this understanding, State sovereignty basically 
remained untouched despite the occurring transfer of control. Thus, 
occupation is not to be understood as the acquisition of a legal title over an 
occupied territory, but as the military ruling and exercise of administration 
in and over a, or parts of a, foreign State without consent of its sovereign. 
This conflict between two or more sovereign entities – one holding de facto 
powers, one holding de jure powers and none holding both – elucidates its 
integration into the laws of international armed conflict. Art. 1 (4) AP I 
reflects this understanding as it encompasses:  
situations … includ[ing] armed conflicts in which people are fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise 
of their right of self-determination … 
In temporal terms, the point of time in which an occupation began is 
decisive in identifying the application of the corresponding legal regime. 
The main treaties of reference in this matter are the Convention Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 17 October 1907, the Geneva 
Convention relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War 
of 12 August 1949 and AP I.4 In Art. 3, AP I explicitly holds that the 
protocol is applicable: 
____________________ 
3  Romulus A. Picciotti, ‘Legal Problems of Occupied Nations after the 
Termination of Occupation’ (1966) 33 Military Law Review 25, 29. 
4  Beyond the application of treaty law, customary IHL must also be referenced 
and analysed in order to establish differences between the two. The corpus of 
the GC IV has been transformed into customary IHL as broadly, and among 
others, acknowledged in the prominent ICTY’s Tadic Judgment: ‘The extensive 
codification of humanitarian law and the extent of the accession to the resultant 
treaties … have provided the international community with a corpus of treaty 
rules the great majority of which had already become customary …’, Prosecutor 
v Tadic (Judgment) [1997] IT-94-1-T, para 577. See also Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 
[1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 79. ‘Under customary international law, this duty 
begins once a stable regime of occupation has been established, but under the 
Geneva Conventions, the duty attaches as soon as the occupying force has any 
relation with the civilians of that territory, that is, at the soonest possible 
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… (a) from the beginning of any situation referred to in the aforementioned Article 
1 and (b) shall cease, in the territory of parties to the conflict, on the general close 
of military operation and, in the case of occupied territories, on the termination of 
the occupation except, in either circumstances, for those persons whose final 
release, repatriation or re-establishment takes place thereafter … 
The change of control over the respective territory is the key question by 
virtue of Art. 42 Hague Regulations, which states that the ‘territory is 
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised’. 
It is this takeover of factual control, irrespective of the lawfulness of the 
original deployment of armed forces or motives behind the engagement in 
hostilities, which triggers the application of the laws of belligerent 
occupation.5 
The ICRC asserts that  
[t]here is no intermediate period between what might be termed the invasion phase 
and the inauguration of a stable regime of occupation. Even a patrol which 
penetrates into enemy territory without any intention of staying there must respect 
the Conventions in its dealings with the civilians it meets.6 
While the focus on the factual change of control over territory aims at 
ensuring the application of the pertinent laws irrespective of the official 
position of actors involved, the fluid and highly politicised nature of 
situations of occupation per se nonetheless hampers the smooth transition 
to the occupation regime. For this reason, it is essential that IHL underlines 
the general and broad renunciation of official declarations in favour of the 
factual situation.7 Positions brought forward by the State Parties, including 
any denial of a situation of occupation, are irrelevant for the legal finding 
____________________ 
moment, a principle that finds reflection in U.S. military policy.’; Human Rights 
Watch, ‘International Humanitarian Law Issues In A Potential War In Iraq’ 
(Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 20 February 2003) 
<http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm> accessed 08 Octo-
ber 2017. 
5  Frederic Kirgis ‘Security Council Resolution 1483 on the Rebuilding of Iraq’ 
(ASIL Insight, 2003) <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/13/security-
council-resolution-1483-rebuilding-iraq> accessed 11 March 2004. 
6  Jean S. Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, 
vol. IV (Geneva 1958) 60 (hereafter Pictet, Commentary). 
7  Art. 2 AP I: ‘... the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.’ 
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and, thus, do not relinquish any arising obligations – at least in theory. The 
dispute over Ukraine in recent years and, more specifically, the status of 
Crimea between annexation, occupation and secession has illustrated the 
difficulties in both, ascertaining a certain legal status and demanding a 
subsequent application of law.8 
Art. 1 (4) AP I furthermore emphasises that the occupation itself need 
not be armed; however, it is triggered when resistance against the 
occupation arises which could lead to active hostilities. Moreover, Art. 2 
(2) GC IV applies ‘to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory 
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no 
armed resistance’. This clarification allows it to encompass various 
situations, whether the control over territory stems from foreign military 
superiority or from foreign control through a puppet regime.9 This broad 
scope of application is required to trigger the resulting obligations for the 
occupant while exerting its de facto control over the foreign territory. 
II. The Protection of Private Property during Occupation 
The international law of belligerent occupation contains general obligations 
concerning the security and basic necessities – such as food, medical 
supplies, or the provision of electricity – of the civilian population in the 
occupied territory. As such, it also aims at reconciling the disputed interests 
of the occupant, the occupied State and the population residing in the 
territory in question.10 Art. 47 GC IV lays down the general obligation that  
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case 
or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions 
or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the 
authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any 
annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory. 
____________________ 
8  Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Völkerrecht und Sezession – Ist die Annexion der Krim 
eine zulässige Wiedergutmachung sowjetischen Unrechts?’ (2014) 27 J. Int’l L. 
of Peace & Armed Conflict 129. 
9  Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 4 
(hereafter Benvenisti, Law of Occupation). 
10  Christopher Greenwood, ‘Book Review and Note: The International Law of 
Occupation by Eyal Benvenisti’ (1996) 90 AJIL 712. 
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The 1907 Hague Regulations, while not directly referring to investment, 
codifies the general respect for private property and the prohibition of 
confiscation in Art. 46: ‘Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and 
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be 
respected. Private property cannot be confiscated’. Furthermore, Art. 47 
Hague Regulations generally prohibits pillage, and Art. 33 (2) GC IV11 
states that, ‘Pillage is prohibited. (3) Reprisals against protected persons and 
their property are prohibited’. 
Examples of the protection of private property during occupation can 
already be found in early investment disputes, such as the Lighthouse 
Concession Arbitration of 1956. The case concerned a lighthouse operated 
by a French company for which it held concessions granted by the Ottoman 
Empire in 1860. The lighthouse was located on territory that was later 
occupied by Greece. The tribunal set up decided that the occupying power, 
Greece, had to respect existing commercial rights in light of Art. 46 Hague 
Regulations, which were established by the concession contract of the 
occupied State prior to the occupation. Therewith, Greece was obliged to 
pay dues for its ships to the French company.12 
The fundamental prohibition of IHL to directly attack civilians and 
civilian objects, in conjunction with the prohibition of disproportionality in 
targeting operations, offers a general protection mechanism for 
investments, both national and foreign, covering factories, offices, vehicles 
and any other form of assets.13 One can generally presume that staff is 
____________________ 
11  Generally, the GC IV in this regard operates with a limited scope of application 
to individuals, linking its provisions to protected persons as defined by Art. 4: 
‘those, who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, 
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.’ The commentary elaborates 
on this provision as referring to the whole population of the territory, which also 
includes foreign investors. See, Mayorga, ‘Occupants, Beware of BITs’ (n 1) 44 
et seq. Arai argues that, if the home State of the investor maintains regular 
relations with the occupying power, then these cannot be considered ‘protected 
persons’, Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and 
Change of International Humanitarian Law, and its Interaction with 
International Human Rights Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 306 
(hereafter Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation). 
12  Administration of Lighthouses Arbitration (France v Greece) (Award) [1956] 
RIAA 155, para 201 et seq. 
13  Art. 48 AP I, Art. 13 AP II, Art. 51 (4) and (5) AP I, Art. 51 (5) (b) and Art. 57 
(2) (a) (iii) AP I. 
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considered civilian and is therefore protected; moreover, factories, offices 
and equipment such as vehicles are classified as civilian objectives unless 
they change their nature during hostilities.14 This change in classification 
has more than often resulted in arbitration and compensation claims 
following an attack.15 The GC IV in Art. 53 ascertains that 
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public 
authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.  
Moreover, Art. 52 Hague Regulations equally holds that no interference 
should be made unless it is of use for military purposes of the occupying 
military, as stated in the following:  
Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or 
inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in 
proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the 
inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own 
country. 
The limitation of the protection granted is the test of military necessity.16 
This rationale stems from the attempt to separate the sphere of hostilities 
between the conflict Parties from the daily life and its procedures in the 
affected territory.17 In the 1921 Cessation of Vessels and Tugs for 
Navigation on the Danube case, Arbitrator Hines proclaimed that ‘[t]he 
purpose of the immunity of private property from confiscation is to avoid 
throwing the burdens of war upon private individuals, and is, instead, to 
place those burdens upon the States which are the belligerents.’18 
The protection of single or individual property, both national and foreign, 
is only one aspect of the broader issue of the protection of investment during 
occupation; there have been numerous incidents and disputes over 
economic intervention during occupation in past years. These illustrate not 
____________________ 
14  Horace Robertson, The Principle of Military Objective in the Law of Armed 
Conflict (1997) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 35. 
15  Ofilio Mayorga, Arbitrating War: Military necessity as a defense to the breach 
of investment treaty obligations (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research, Harvard University 2013). 
16  For the debate on the interpretation of military necessity, see Katja Schöberl and 
Linus Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? Lotus, Permissions and 
Restrictions within International Humanitarian Law’ in this volume 59, 73 et 
seqq (hereafter Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower?’). 
17  Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation (n 11) 238. 
18  Cessation of Vessels and Tugs for Navigation on the Danube River (Award) 
[1921] 1 RIAA 97, para 107 et seq. 
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only the importance of the protection of property as such, but rather the 
importance of more generally clarifying the status of law during occupation 
and the status of existing contractual relations. 
III. Occupation, Law and Foreign Investment 
The focus of this contribution does not solely lie on the protection of 
investment, but is concerned more specifically with foreign investments in 
occupied territory. Therefore, the status of existing laws in occupied 
territory as well as the power of the occupant to engage in substantive 
legislative changes is addressed in the following.  
1. The status of law and the legislative powers of the occupant 
Early during the negotiation and drafting processes at the Hague Peace 
Conference, the newly envisaged role of the occupant for modern IHL was 
debated. The later codified position of the de facto powers in occupied 
territories originated from a small group of States that strongly elaborated 
on their interests at the 1899 Conference – a group of States fearing 
potential future occupation.19 Their goal was to introduce obligatory 
language to the developing occupation regime rather than to acknowledge 
or even strengthen any rights of occupying States.20 The travaux 
préparatoires emphasised that 
… it has been formally said that none of the articles of the draft can be considered 
as entailing on the part of the adhering States the recognition of any right whatever 
in derogation of the sovereign tights of each of them, and that adhesion to the 
regulations will simply imply for each State the acceptance of a set of legal rules 
restricting the exercise of power that it may through the fortune of war wield over 
foreign territory or subjects.21 
____________________ 
19  See the delegates debating at the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Meeting, James 
Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: Translations 
of the Official Texts: The Conference of 1899 (OUP 1920) 503 (hereafter Scott, 
The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences). 
20  See also Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? (n 16) 71 
et seq. 
21  Report annexed to the minutes of the Fourth Meeting, 5 July 1899 in Scott, The 
Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences (n 19) 418. 
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Art. 43 Hague Regulations is the main result of this successful attempt and 
contains the regulation on the distribution of power and entailing rights 
during occupation: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country.22 
Generally, the obligation is considered as one of means rather than of result 
due to the special situation of occupation as well as the limited resources 
and powers of the occupying State.23 The Article reflects the basic 
understanding that the state of occupation should disrupt the regular life in 
the occupied territory as little as possible. It represents a call for continuity 
– one that was already recognised as customary in nature at the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremburg.24 
While the more prominent way to ensure public order and safety is 
through criminal prosecution25 and law enforcement operations, for the 
matter at hand, the occupying power’s rights and obligations concerning 
‘the law in force’ in the economic context is of greater relevance. As such, 
Art. 43 Hague Regulations acts as a means to restrain the occupying 
power.26 The term ‘laws in force in the country’ is commonly perceived as 
a broad term, which does not solely cover legislation but, with minor 
exceptions, also the whole legal system.27 This understanding is reflected in 
the longstanding (academic) debate over the scope of the Articles in 
question. 
____________________ 
22  See Benvenisti, Law of Occupation (n 9) 8. 
23  Marco Sassòli, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Peace Operations in the 
Twenty-First Century (Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level 
Expert Meeting on Current Challenges to International Humanitarian Law, 
Cambridge, 25-27 June 2004) 4 (hereafter Sassòli, Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations). 
24  ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals, International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg’ reprinted in (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 248 et seq.  
25  The limiting factors for the power of the occupying party were subsequently 
codified in GC IV, most prominently in Articles 66-74 on Penal Legislation and 
Procedure. 
26  Sassòli, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (n 23) 4 et seq. 
27  Ibid, 6, with reference to Benvenisti, Law of Occupation (n 9) 16. See further 
Ernst Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1942) (hereafter Feilchenfeld, 
International Economic Law). 
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The GC IV addresses this approach in Art. 64: 
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception 
that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where 
they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present 
Convention … 
In contrast to the Hague Regulations, the GC, however, explicitly refers to 
‘penal laws’ rather than relating to the laws generally in force in the 
territory. For this reason, a dispute over its legal scope has arisen. In contrast 
to the above proclaimed rationale to restrict the (legislative) powers of the 
occupant, the terminology of Art. 64 GC IV can be interpreted as less 
restrictive, even as ‘extensive and complex’28. While some stick to the exact 
wording and therewith support the strict reference to ‘penal law’, others opt 
for a broader and more encompassing interpretation, one that includes 
administrative and civil laws in force in the occupied territory. Art. 64 (2) 
GC IV backs up this argument as it solely refers to ‘provisions’ rather than 
to repeat the penal law wording of the previous paragraph.29 Benvenisti 
promotes this idea of a conscious omission of reference and emphasises the 
broad reading of both paragraphs as referring to all types of laws.30 
Similarly, Dinstein argues that ‘logic dictates that Art. 64 should be 
construed as applicable, if only by analogy, to every type of law (including 
civil or administrative legislation)’31. Moreover, the Pictet Commentary on 
Art. 64 underlines that 
[t]he idea of the continuity of the legal system applies to the whole of the law (civil 
and penal law) in the occupied territory. The reason for the Diplomatic Conference 
making express reference only to respect for penal law was that it had not been 
sufficiently observed during past conflicts; there is no reason to infer a contrario 
that the occupation authorities are not also bound to respect the civil law of the 
country, or even its constitution.32 
____________________ 
28  Pictet, Commentary (n 6) 335. 
29  Sassòli, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (n 23) 6. 
30  Benvenisti, Law of Occupation (n 9) 102 et seq, with reference to the Final 
Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 (1950), iii, at 139 et 
seq. For a very strong counter argumentation based on the travaux 
préparatoires, the Commentaries to the Convention and subsequent ICJ 
Advisory Opinions, see Jose Alejandro Carballo Leyda, ‘The Laws of 
Occupation and Commercial Law Reform in Occupied Territories: Clarifying A 
Widespread Misunderstanding’ (2012) 23 EJIL 179 (hereafter Leyda, ‘Laws of 
Occupation’). 
31  Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (CUP 2009) 
111.  
32  Pictet, Commentary (n 6) 335. 
Part III: International Humanitarian Law and International Investment Law 
204 
The Article generally enshrines the obligation to respect and uphold 
existing legislation and contractual obligations of the occupied State. This 
not only acts in favour of the affected population, but it could equally 
provide security for foreign investors and their contractual relations in the 
territory. The major downside to the debate over the laws is the following: 
while the above referenced attempts to expand the scope of ‘the laws in 
force’ are an endeavour to expand protection from the occupant and limit 
his powers, they can also act as a door-opener to empower the occupant, not 
only to change the ‘penal laws’ but also to make changes to ‘every type of 
law’.  
The Article entitles the occupant to make alterations to the law. However, 
this power is limited, as it allows the occupant to introduce legislation in 
order to maintain or even enhance civil welfare. The maintenance of an 
orderly government is the explicit goal incorporated in paragraph two; the 
longer a situation of occupation exists, the more pressing additional legal 
changes might become in order to avoid a failing and disruption of 
governance in the territory.33  
While it is generally considered that small interventions in the inherent 
nature of an economy can be initiated by the occupant, the definition and 
identification of the ‘absolutely necessary’ remains highly disputed and 
gives leeway for arbitrariness.34 
2. The occupant’s powers and the welfare of the population in the occupied 
territory 
The abrogation of existing laws as well as the introduction of new laws can 
be instruments of drastic economic and political transformation in occupied 
territories – changes that depend on the occupant’s general understanding 
of economic development, or specific positions towards protectionism, 
market liberalisation or global economic interaction.  
The occupant is ‘allowed to evaluate the modality and extent of 
investments in occupied territories, while bearing in mind the duty to ensure 
the welfare of inhabitants in that territory’.35 The regulations both in the 
Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations encompass a balancing act 
____________________ 
33  Sassòli, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (n 23) 15. For example, see tax 
regulations as addressed under Art. 48 Hague Regulation. 
34  Leyda, ‘Laws of Occupation’ (n 30) 188. 
35  Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation (n 11). 
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between the powers of the occupant as a permissive element and the welfare 
of the affected population as a restrictive element. Establishing when a 
balanced situation is achieved and defining what constitutes the welfare of 
the population, however, leaves a wide margin of discretion as well as 
options for unilateral change and intrusion.  
In principle, Art. 55 Hague Regulations seems to contradict a too 
permissive reading by depicting the occupant ‘only as administrator and 
usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates 
belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country’36. 
Nonetheless, Art. 43 Hague Regulations may provide an exception to such 
a ‘conservationist premise’37 as it entitles the occupying power to introduce 
changes for a specific purpose, for instance the improved welfare of the 
population. In particular, introducing new laws that affect the territory’s 
economy – for instance through the negotiation of new foreign 
investments – may follow such a purpose. The pertinent regulations remain 
silent on the explicit issuing of new investments. Already in 1957, von 
Glahn considered that granting investments is not per se a breach of the law 
of occupation as long as it does not exceed the time of the occupation.38  
Examples of this balancing act and the role of the occupying power in 
investment matters can already be found in early case law. For instance, 
arbitrary tribunals in Belgium decided on the economic and legislative 
powers of the occupant, Germany, after the First World War. In 1920, the 
Brussels Court of Appeal upheld a decree on the regulation of excessive 
pricing of produce introduced by Germany, stating that the latter had ‘acted 
in the place of the legitimate authority which for the time being had been 
ousted, and in conformity with the provisions of Art. 43’39. In 1925, it 
argued that ‘the circumstances of war-times, and particularly the increase 
of cost in raw materials and the necessity for providing the needs of the 
population, in fact justified the measures taken by the occupying 
authority’40. Rulings from the post-Second-World-War era addressed 
____________________ 
36  For a detailed discussion on the scope of Art. 55, see Separate Opinion of M. 
Séfériadés in Lighthouses Case between France and Greece (France v Greece) 
[1934] PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 62, para 205 et seq. 
37  Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation (n 11) 169. 
38  Gerhard Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory – A Commentary on 
the Law of Belligerent Occupation (University of Minnesota Press 1957) 209. 
39  Bochart v Committee of Supplies of Corneux (1920) No. 327, AD 1919-1922, 
quoted by Feilchenfeld, International Economic Law (n 27) 148. 
40  City of Malines v Societe Centrale pour L’Exploitation du Gaz (1925) No. 362, 
AD 1925-26, quoted by Feilchenfeld, International Economic Law (n 27) 148.  
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similar issues. For example, the Singapore Oil Stocks case concerned oil 
concessions in Sumatra granted to Dutch companies by the Netherlands 
East Indies Government. Following the invasion by Japanese troops in 
February 1942, oil was exported to Singapore to further strengthen the 
Japanese war effort. The UK later seized parts of the oil in question when 
taking control over Singapore in 1945. Based on the Defence Compensation 
Regulation of 1940, owners were entitled to claim compensation by the UK. 
The legal dispute arose over the question of who held this entitlement: the 
Dutch companies, or the occupying power, Japan. In a first decision, the 
claim of the Dutch companies was rejected. Then, however, the Court of 
Appeal of Singapore reversed the decision.41 The leading argumentation 
was related to Art. 53 Hague Regulations, which did not cover the 
exploitation of the oil by the Japanese troops as it was conducted without 
consideration of the local economy.42 
Thus, the considerations on the rights of the occupant do not solely affect 
the abrogation or introduction of a single new piece of legislation, but are 
even more sensitive when affecting the economy of the occupied territory 
or the State as such. 
3. Balancing in practice: the example of occupied Iraq 
The situation of occupied Iraq following the conflict in 2003 is a major 
example when discussing the legality of alterations made by the occupant 
or, in the pertinent case, the occupying coalition.43 The questionable aspect 
at stake in this context was the introduction of rather neoliberal ideas by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, which aimed at opening the 
State to foreign investment.44 The scope and necessity of changes to the 
Iraqi economic system and the resulting evaluation of the laws of 
occupation and potential changes to the domestic legal regime have 
____________________ 
41  Martins Paparinskis, ‘Singapore Oil Stocks Case’ in MPEPIL (online edn, OUP 
April 2010). 
42  N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and Others v The War Damage 
Commission (1956) 23 ILR 810 para 833 (Singapore Court of Appeal). 
43  See Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation (n 11) 171. 
44  See the preamble of CPA Order 39: ‘Noting that facilitating foreign investment 
will help to develop infrastructure, foster the growth of Iraqi business, create 
jobs, raise capital, result in the introduction of new technology into Iraq and 
promote the transfer of knowledge and skills to Iraqis’. 
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triggered debates on the role of an occupying power.45 In contrast to prior 
situations of factual occupation such as in the Palestinian territories, in 
Northern Cyprus, or the Falkland Islands, the belligerent occupying armed 
forces acknowledged their own status as an occupying power and the 
Security Council also determined the occupation as such. In May 2003, the 
UN SC under Art. 41 UN-Charter explicitly recognised ‘the specific 
authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international 
law of these States as occupying powers’ and their obligation to fully 
comply with ‘the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Regulations 
of 1907’ in particular.46 The SC’s Resolution 1483 reaffirmed that no 
transfer of sovereignty would take place and emphasised the ‘right of the 
Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their 
own natural resources.’ The application of the legal regime of occupation 
was consequently undisputed, but the scope of the occupant’s rights and 
obligations became a matter of discussion. 
Were the changes introduced necessary or did they go beyond Art. 43 
Hague Regulations, therefore violating it? Prior to the occupation, the Iraqi 
economy was characterised by limitations on foreign investment, for 
instance with respect to immovable property for non-Arabic foreign 
corporations, the investments of such more generally as well as their 
ownership of Iraqi companies specifically.47 The CPA, however, introduced 
laws that led to inherent changes in the nature of the Iraqi economy. CPA 
Order 39 of 2003 is the primary example of such a transformed new 
legislation.48 By replacing ‘all existing foreign investment’, the CPA 
attempted to comprehensively dismantle all barriers to foreign investment.49 
Foreign investors were provided with protection ‘no less favourable than 
those applicable to an Iraqi investor’50 and no longer experienced 
____________________ 
45  For a very critical view of occupation practices that are limiting the occupied 
territories’ development for instance in the case of Iraq, see Tadlock, 
‘Occupation Law and Foreign Investment in Iraq’ (n 2). 
46  UN SC Res 1483 (22 May 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1483. 
47  US Department of Commerce, Overview of Commercial Law in Pre-War Iraq 
(12 September 2003) 1, 6 et seq <http://www.aschq.army.mil/supporting-
docs/Iraqi_Comm_Law.pdf> accessed 08 October 2017. 
48  In particular, the Companies Law 21 of 1997, available under International 
Labour Organization, Iraq, General provision <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/nat-
lex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=83220&p_classification=01> accessed 14 
October 2017. 
49  CPA Order 39 (3) (1). 
50  CPA Order 39 (4) (1). 
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restrictions regarding the percentage rate of full or partial ownership of Iraqi 
companies.51 
With a transformation of this scope, the changes made are none that were 
restricted to the time of occupation, but rather shaped the economic system 
of the country far beyond the time of occupation. As such, they were 
criticised for ‘completely overhaul(ing) Iraqi commercial law, in particular, 
its foreign investment law’52. Interestingly, the changes to the economic 
structure of Iraq constituted only one aspect of the attempt to induce an 
overall change in regime.53 This undertaking, however, is exactly what IHL 
prohibits within its laws of occupation.54 
C. The Role of Investment Law during Belligerent Occupation 
IHL is not the only field of law that governs in times of conflict. While the 
law of occupation codifies regulations concerning the powers of the 
occupying State to enact or change existing (economic) laws, the field of 
investment law provides another angle on the status of foreign investment 
and its protection in occupied territories. The traditional instruments 
governing the protection of investment are BITs, the use of which has 
increased since the 1990s. BITs are agreements between two States 
regulating the terms and conditions of private investment of the respective 
State’s nationals or companies in the other State’s territory. Typically, these 
agreements contain treatment guarantees, protection regulations as well as 
recourse to an investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. During times 
____________________ 
51  CPA Order 39 (4) (2). Only minor limitations remained or were put in place, 
among other restrictions on foreign investments into the sectors of natural 
resources, banking and insurances, CPA Order 39 (6) (1). 
52  Tadlock, ‘Occupation Law and Foreign Investment in Iraq’ (n 2) 242. 
53  For a more detailed analysis, see Sir Adam Roberts, ‘The End of Occupation in 
Iraq’ (IHLRI, 2004) Section D on the transformative purpose of the occupation 
of Iraq <http://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/feature.php?a=51> accessed 02 March 
2017 
54  Knut Dörmann and Laurent Colassis, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the 
Iraq Conflict’ (2004) 47 GYIL 293, 306 (hereafter Dörmann, ‘International 
Humanitarian Law’). For a partially different argumentation concerning regime 
change and human rights violations, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘The Attack of 
September 11, 2001, the War Against the Taliban and Iraq: Is There a Need to 
Reconsider International Law on the Recourse to Force and the Rules in Armed 
Conflict?’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, 56. 
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of occupation, one can question whether and to what extent BITs are and 
remain applicable. 
I. Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Application during Times of 
Conflict and Occupation 
The general rule of public international law, res inter alios acta, emphasises 
that States are only bound by treaties that they have consented to.55 This 
rule is codified in Art. 34 VCLT: ‘[a] Treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’. In a situation of 
occupation, the occupying power itself is not a State Party to pre-existing 
BITs between the occupied State and third States. From the res inter alios 
acto rule, one could infer that the occupying power, since it had never 
consented to the treaty, is not bound by it. Does that mean that no 
obligations arise out of the BIT as such and is it only the occupied State, the 
original BIT host State – a party without effective control over the territory 
in which the investment is located – that must adhere to its obligations? Or 
does the law of occupation that renders the occupant the new administrator 
of the territory transfer these obligations to the occupant – without his direct 
consent? 
The classical international law presumption concerning treaties during 
times of occupation stems from the traditional and clear-cut separation of 
the regime of law of peace and the regime of law of armed conflict.56 
Generally, one assumed a discontinuity of all existing treaties and State 
relations as IHL replaced all laws belonging to the law of peace.57 This 
understanding of the relation of law of peace to the law of armed conflict 
has since changed. The Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflict on 
____________________ 
55  See Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower?’ (n 16). 
56  Arnold Pronto, ‘The Effect of War on Law – What happens to their treaties when 
states go to war?’ (2003) 2 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 227, 230. 
57  Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘On the Relationship between Human Rights Law 
Protection and International Humanitarian Law’ (2004) 86 IRRC 789, 790. The 
1958 commentary of the Geneva Convention mirrors such an understanding by 
stating that the occupant ‘is not bound by the treaties concerning the legal status 
of aliens which may exist’, see Pictet, Commentary (n 6) 49. 
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Treaties58 are illustrative of this development as they do not support the ipso 
facto termination support in Art. 3 treaty continuity. The general 
assumption of the continuity of treaties explicitly includes a situation of 
occupation, which they subsume under situations of armed conflict through 
Art. 2.59  
In addition to this general assumption of continuity, the Draft Articles 
furthermore directly address treaties on finance as one type of treaty that 
continues to apply in the absence of any explicit and contradictory treaty 
clauses. This link to treaties of commerce is encompassed in the indicative 
list annexed to the Draft Articles and also includes contemporary BITs.60 
As a third argument on the continuity of BITs, these often contain so called 
‘war-clauses’ to regulate protection guarantees and resulting compensation 
claims in situations of armed conflict. Thus, their drafters envisaged their 
application during armed conflict. Art. 4 Draft Articles supports this 
argument. 
General treaty law as well as the BITs themselves anticipate their 
application during conflict and occupation. One can further subsume those 
BITs under the bulk of ‘laws in force’ in the country as regulated by IHL 
under Art. 43 Hague Regulations and 64 GC IV as referred to above. 
Several peace treaties signed between the defeated States and the US in the 
aftermath of the Second World War act as examples of State practice on 
continuity: The Agreement on Reparation from Germany of 1946 and the 
Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1951 exemplify such an approach.61 
Returning to the aforementioned primary IHL guidance on laws in force in 
the country, Art. 43 Hague Regulations ensures respect for the laws of the 
occupied State territory, including its laws on contracts, which ‘prohibits 
the occupying power to nullify or suspend any legitimate State contracts … 
____________________ 
58  ILC, ‘Draft articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties, with 
commentaries’ (2011) UN Doc A/66/10 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instru-
ments/english/commentaries/1_10_2011.pdf> accessed 14 October 2017 (Draft 
Articles). 
59  Ibid, Art. 2, para 4-9. 
60  Ibid, Art. 3.  
61  Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-
Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold (opened for 
signature 14 January 1946, entered into force 24 January 1946) 55 UNTS 69 and 
Treaty of Peace with Japan (opened for signature 8 September 1951, entered into 
force 28 April 1952) 136 UNTS 45.  
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by amending … laws or by issuing a legislative declaration to that effect’62. 
Art. 64 GC IV also works with the presumption of continuity by stating that  
[t]he penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception 
that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where 
they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present 
Convention.63  
Moreover, the commentary reiterates that ‘[t]he idea of continuity of the 
legal system applies to the whole of the law (civil and penal law) in the 
occupied territory’64.  
Following this assumption, the occupant must uphold the interests of the 
ousted government, which include, as Benvenisti states, obligations towards 
foreign nationals including their investments.65 Meron equally argues that 
the occupant is bound by the treaties that were in force prior to the 
occupation, albeit he emphasises that this concerns treaties addressing the 
maintenance of public order and civil life.66 By analogy, Burke asserts that 
the same applies to multilateral treaties: ‘A multilateral treaty that has been 
ratified by the occupied State is certainly a “law in force in the country”’,67 
or ‘there is no a priori reason why multilateral conventions on other matter 
should not be applicable to occupied territory’.68 Mayorga phrases this new 
link between the occupant and the pre-existing treaty as one of indirect or 
derivative consent, which transfers obligations to the occupying power both 
regarding substantive obligations and procedures of dispute settlement.69 
____________________ 
62  Pieter Bekker, ‘The Legal Status of Foreign Economic Interests in Occupied 
Iraq’ (Asil Insights, 18 July 2003) <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/is-
sue/20/legal-status-foreign-economic-interests-occupied-iraq> accessed 10 Oc-
tober 2017. 
63  Naomi Burke ‘A Change in Perspective: Looking at Occupation through the 
Lens of the Law of Treaties’ (2008) 41 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 103, 115 (hereafter Burke, ‘Change in 
Perspective’). 
64  Pictet, Commentary (n 6) 335 on Art. 64. 
65  Benvenisti, Law of Occupation (n 9) 18. 
66  Theodor Meron, ‘Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied 
Territories’ (1978) 72 AJIL 542, 550. 
67  For a debate on the suspension of treaties, see Burke, ‘Change in Perspective’ (n 
63) 115. 
68  Adam Roberts, ‘Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of 
War and Human Rights’ (2006) 100 AJIL 580, 589. 
69  Mayorga, ‘Occupants, Beware of BITs: Applicability of Investment Treaties to 
Occupied Territories’ (n 1) 33. 
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The matter of dispute settlement and compensation claims is the second 
matter which suffers from legal uncertainty, both regarding IHL and the 
application of BITs during occupation. As BITs are applicable during times 
of occupation, their exact scope influences the arising protection obligations 
and potentially resulting compensation claims. If BITs contain full 
protection and security clauses as well as guarantees of national treatment 
or most-favoured-nation treatment, this changes the standard of due 
diligence which the host State of the BIT must provide – a standard that 
must take into account the restrictions of the host State. The widest 
limitation on the protection of investment surely arises during the 
occupation and takeover of factual control over the territory in question. To 
successfully bring forward a compensation claim, the violation of an 
obligation must firstly be established. Secondly, circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness must be excluded. The specific situation of occupation, 
however, might easily offer such recourse when damages have been caused 
by third actors or were conducted out of military necessity.70 Thus, one must 
analyse these steps in a case-by-case examination and under the respective 
BIT in question. 
II. The Case of Ukraine as an Illustration of the Uncertain Co-Application 
of Laws  
The territorial dispute over parts of Ukraine, most prominently the Crimean 
Peninsula and eastern Ukraine, as well as the protection of investment 
between Ukraine, Russia and private investors serves as an illustrative 
example of the continued dispute over the application of treaties and the 
interaction of different fields of law.71 Since early 2014, the Russian grasp 
of parts of Ukrainian territory, including the takeover of military and 
political control over Crimea, as well as the partly open, partly covert 
incursion of Russian forces and equipment in Eastern Ukraine, have given 
rise to a political and legal outcry of the international community. Yet, 
discordant reactions by States and diverging argumentation by international 
lawyers have left private investors in Ukraine struggling. Ukraine possesses 
____________________ 
70  Eric de Brabandere, ‘Host State’s Due Diligence Obligations in International 
Investment Law’ (2015) 42 Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce 320. 
71  Territorial disputes following an unlawful transfer of territory, for example in 
Western Sahara, the Palestinian territories or the current tensions surrounding 
the South China Sea, provide further examples of such disputes. 
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several different investment treaties with other countries, including Russia, 
the UK, the US or Germany, obliging the State to protect foreign investment 
on its territory – some of them include provisions addressing the outbreak 
of hostilities or insurrections and some incorporate provisions on essential 
security interests of Ukraine, releasing the State of certain protective duties 
when pursuing its own legitimate military objectives. 
Since 2014, Russia has started imposing Russian laws and legislated new 
regulation for Crimea in various sectors, such as the financial sector, army 
services or pension payments.72 These alterations need to be analysed in 
detail for their validity under the laws of occupation – a matter which is 
highly problematic, given that Russia does not acknowledge its status as an 
occupying force and therefore denies the applicability of the laws of 
occupation.  
A similar question arises with regard to the BITs in force. Which BITs 
should be applied to settle arising disputes: those between Ukraine and the 
foreign investors’ country or those between Russia and the foreign 
investors’ country? The Ukrainian case is one in which these matters have 
been or are currently being brought to international attention with regard to 
compensation claims in investor State arbitrations. Moreover, these 
ongoing developments pose a conflict between the different legal regimes.  
Since mid-2016, numerous investment arbitration claims have been 
raised against Russia under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to 
the Russia-Ukraine BIT. These disputes surround the alleged Russian 
expropriation of investments of Ukrainian investors in Crimea.73 Different 
legal issues concerning the interpretation of certain terms, most notably 
‘investment’ and ‘territory’, have arisen. While ‘investment’ covers a broad 
array of subjects, the investments in question were made prior to the 
Russian takeover in 2014 and therewith were Ukrainian investments in de 
jure Ukrainian territory rather than Ukrainian investments in factually 
____________________ 
72  Laura Brank, Danial Gal, Timothy Lindsay et al, ‘The Imposition of Russian 
Law in Crimea: What Does this Mean for Foreign Banks and Companies?’ 
(2014) 19 Westlaw Journal 1.  
73  Among others, Stabil LLC and Others v the Russian Federation (International 
Investment Agreement) [2015] PCA Case No 2015-35; LLC Lugzor and Others 
v the Russian Federation (Investment Arbitration) [2015] PCA Case No 2015-
29; Privatbank and Finance Company Finilion LLC v The Russian Federation 
(Investment Arbitration) [2015] PCA Case No 2015-21; Aeroport Belbek LLC 
and Mr. Kolomoisky v the Russian Federation (Investment Arbitration) [2015] 
PCA Case No 2015-07. 
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Russian-controlled territory. Thus, the tribunals must elaborate on the 
notion of foreign investment. Secondly, Art. 1 of the BIT interprets 
‘territory’ to be the territory of Russia and Ukraine respectively, as defined 
in conformity with international law. The takeover of Crimea by Russian 
forces, however, is broadly considered an unlawful annexation.74 The latter 
provides an additional obstacle to the recognition of any arbitral award 
delivered in this regard, as it might be considered a recognition of the 
alteration of the status of Crimea.75 If unchallenged, it further reinforces the 
factual consolidation of Russia’s control over the peninsula. Initial 
decisions delivered in February 2017 shrank back from actually discussing 
the lawfulness of the Russian control over Crimea and stated that Russia’s 
obligation under the Russia-Ukraine BIT was triggered following 21 March 
2014: the signing date for the decree on the inclusion of Crimea into the 
Russian Federation signed by President Vladimir Putin.76 These decisions 
represent a conflict between the general ex iniuria jus non oritur rule and 
the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition of unlawful territorial changes.77 
To not further consolidate the annexation of Ukrainian territory, 
compensation claims against the regular host State, Ukraine, would 
comprise the correct, albeit potentially ineffective channel.  
____________________ 
74  Sergeis Dilevka, ‘Arbitration Claims by Ukrainian Investors under the Russia-
Ukraine BIT: Between Crimea and a Hard Place?’ (CIS Arbitration Forum, 17 
February 2016) <http://www.cisarbitration.com/2016/02/17/arbitration-claims-
by-ukrainian-investors-under-the-russia-ukraine-bit-between-crimea-and-a-
hard-place/> accessed 10 October 2017; UN GA Res 68/262 (27 March 2014) 
UN Doc S/A/68/262, ‘The General Assembly, … [c]alls upon all States, 
international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any 
alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum’. 
75  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award 
(opened for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) 330 UNTS 
38, Art. V (1) (c) on the recognition and enforcement of awards. 
76  ‘Russia is Obliged to Protect the Ukrainian Investors in Crimea after the 
annexation – IA Reporter’ (Ukrainian Hot News, 10 March 2010) 
<https://ukrhotnews.com/2017/03/10/russia-is-obliged-to-protect-the-ukraini-
an-investors-in-crimea-after-the-annexation-ia-reporter/> accessed 10 October 
2017. 
77  Benvenisti, Law of Occupation (n 9) 142. 
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D. Concluding Remarks 
The contemporary regime of a belligerent occupation establishes the 
occupant as the temporary administrator of a foreign State’s territory. Under 
this premise, the occupant has to safeguard both public order and the 
welfare of the affected population. The primary rules concerning the 
protection of (foreign) property under IHL offer a first fundamental 
protection, while the regulations concerning the introduction or alteration 
of the laws in force in the occupied territory prevent the occupant from 
transforming the territory, including its economy:  
The idea of the law of occupation was to prevent the occupying power from 
modelling the governmental structure of that territory according to its own needs 
disregarding the cultural, religious or ethnic background of the society of the 
occupied territory.78 
The example of occupied Iraq, however, has shown how discretionary 
arguments concerning the welfare of the population and resulting necessary 
changes can be. In particular, the reaction of the international community 
and its States are of utmost importance to control the occupant’s rule in the 
territory. For the occupant to solely act as an administrator and not as 
conqueror of new territory, States must hold the State in question 
accountable to the law of occupation and refuse to acknowledge measures 
going beyond its scope. 
Traditionally, damages resulting from armed conflict were integrated 
into negotiations for a peace treaty, which left the compensation for losses 
dependent on the discretion of the negotiating parties, primarily the former 
occupying power and the victim’s home State. The evolution of 
international law has produced other channels to pursue compensation, such 
as by means of diplomatic protection via the investor’s home State or 
potentially through regional human rights courts.79 Investment law, 
however, offers a much more promising and direct way to claim 
compensation by the affected investor against the State. Yet, it equally 
triggers new debates over the interaction of IHL and investment law. The 
ongoing investment arbitration in Ukraine illustrates the arising dilemma: 
On the one hand, the arbitrations against Russia, the occupant, but not the 
original BIT host State, acknowledge and therewith strengthen the 
occupant’s claim over the territory, as they are based on the idea of the 
____________________ 
78  Dörmann, ‘International Humanitarian Law’ (n 54) 308. 
79  Robert Kolb, Advanced Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (Elgar 
Publishing 2014) 195. 
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transfer of treaty obligations to the occupying State. As such, they are an 
instrument of recognition of transfer of territory and might impede the 
notion of occupation as a temporary, but not inherent change of power. On 
the other hand, they could be considered as a means to hold the occupant 
accountable for violations and therewith also enforce adherence to primary 
obligations. The recent cases again highlight the importance of the 
interaction between the different fields of international law. A narrow 
analysis of each single field of law without recognising its broader effects 




Concluding Observations: how International 
Humanitarian Law is Shaped to Meet the Challenges 
Arising from Areas of Limited Statehood – Theoretical 
Problems in Practice 
Björnstjern Baade, Linus Mührel and Anton O. Petrov 
A. Introduction 
The vast majority of armed conflicts since World War II have been non-
international in character.1 In addition to the traditional civil war between a 
territorial State and a rebel faction, many of these recent conflicts have been 
and are being fought between a State and various actors, or indeed between 
non-State actors themselves.2 Often, outside involvement internationalises 
and therefore further complicates the situation. These conflicts take place 
in, contribute to, and indeed create areas of limited statehood in which the 
territorial State can no longer ensure the implementation of its own law. 
____________________ 
1  Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to 
Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000 (2nd edn, McFarlan & Co. 2002) 593-
94; see also the contribution by Vincent Widdig, ‘Detention by Organised 
Armed Groups in Non-International Armed Conflicts – The Role of Non-State 
Actors in a State-Centred International Legal System’ in this volume 124 
(hereafter Widdig, ‘Detention by Organised Armed Groups’). For an 
explanation of the decline in inter-State warfare, see recently: Oona A. 
Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to 
Outlaw War Remade the World (Simon & Schuster 2017). 
2  In fact, most conflicts in recent years were fought between non-State actors, and 
the number of fatalities in these conflicts was only slightly lower than in 
conflicts with State-involvement according to the available statistical data: 
Marie Allanson, Erik Melander and Lotta Themnér, ‘Organized violence, 1989–
2016’ (2017) 54 JPR 574, 575-79, for all data of the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program see <http://ucdp.uu.se/> accessed 20 November 2017; see also: Heike 
Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, Non-State Actors Rise? Inducing Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law in Areas of Limited Statehood’ in Heike 
Krieger (ed), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: 
Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region (CUP 2014) 504 (hereafter 




As exemplified by the contributions to this volume, the challenges posed 
to IHL and its subsequent implementation by such conflicts are manifold. 
The increase in armed activities by non-State actors is widely, and rightly 
so, regarded as a dangerous phenomenon, which might require adaptations 
to IHL.3 This volume endeavoured to examine if and how such a 
development in the law has taken or could take place. Can the rules and 
principles of IHL be adapted to the challenges of modern armed conflict in 
a legitimate manner, or are they too rigid, frozen in a state that seems 
unreasonable under contemporary conditions? 
B. The Research so far 
This volume sought to expand upon the insights that the research of 
Collaborative Research Centre 700 ‘Governance in areas of limited 
statehood’ (Sonderforschungsbereich – SFB) generated, in particular the 
groundwork laid by Project C8 on ‘Security Governance’ and ‘Legitimacy 
and Law-Making’ in IHL.4  
Ensuring compliance with IHL has always been challenging. The need 
for international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Court, and 
potentially a regional African court,5 which prosecute at least the main 
perpetrators of grave international crimes, is testament to this. In areas in 
which a State’s actual power to enforce its law and provide security for the 
population is fragile or even non-existent, ensuring compliance with IHL 
by all actors involved becomes even more of a challenge.6 
____________________ 
3  See eg Antonio Cassese, ‘States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of 
the International Community’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2014) 49, 69. 
4  This research took place in the first funding period from 2010 to 2013 on 
‘Security Governance and International Law: Humanitarian Governance in 
Areas of Limited Statehood’ and in the second period from 2014 to 2017 on 
‘Legitimacy and Law-Making in International Humanitarian Law’. 
5  See Balingene Kahombo, Africa within the Justice System of the International 
Criminal Court: the Need for a Reform (KFG Working Paper Series No. 2, 
2016). 
6  Cf also Robert Kolb, Ius in Bello: Le droit international des conflits armés, (2nd 
edn, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2009) 494-96 (hereafter Kolb, Ius in Bello). 
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Traditionally, States considered armed non-State actors within their 
borders an entirely domestic affair, i.e. rebels to be dealt with as traitors.7 
While States’ internal law still regards them as such, their number, 
persistence and influence has risen starkly,8 which indicates that responses 
beyond repressive (military) action by States and beyond (international) 
criminal prosecution for breaches of IHL9 may be necessary from an IHL 
point of view.10 Project C8 focused in particular on the Great Lakes Region 
of Africa, which in part exhibits the traits of an area of limited statehood, in 
order to explore whether IHL is effective in such areas and how its 
implementation could be enhanced.11 A central result of this project and the 
SFB’s research more generally was that a rule’s prospects for compliance 
improve significantly if the rule is regarded as legitimate.12 Even non-State 
actors who seemingly engage in casual violence against civilians can 
usually be understood as rational actors.13 To remain legitimate, and thus 
effective, the law might therefore have to develop to meet new challenges.14 
____________________ 
7  Lassa F. L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. II: War and 
Neutrality (3rd edn, Longmans, Green and co. 1921) 76, para 59; for the caution 
exercised by States when drafting CA 3 and AP II see Raphael Schäfer, ‘A 
History of Division(s): A Critical Assessment of the Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict’ in this volume 43. 
8  Cf Sven Chojnacki and Zeljko Branovic, ‘New Modes of Security: The Violent 
Making and Unmaking of Governance in War-Torn Areas of Limited Statehood’ 
in Thomas Risse (ed), Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in 
Areas of Limited Statehood (Columbia University Press 2011) 89. 
9  Reed M. Wood, ‘Understanding strategic motives for violence against civilians 
during civil conflict’ in Heike Krieger (ed), Inducing Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region 
(CUP 2014) 13, 41 (hereafter Wood, ‘Understanding strategic motives for 
violence’); Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, Non-State Actors Rise?’ (n 2) 535-40. 
10  This is not to say that the threat of repressive action, such as criminal 
prosecution, serves no purpose. It may be one of the reasons that induces a party 
to an armed conflict to comply: Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, Non-State Actors 
Rise?’ (n 2) 550-51: non-coercive instruments may work best under a ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’. 
11  Heike Krieger, ‘Introduction’ in Heike Krieger (ed), Inducing Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region 
(CUP 2014) 1. 
12  Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, Non-State Actors Rise?’ (n 2) 504. 
13  Ibid, 518-20; Wood, ‘Understanding strategic motives for violence’ (n 9) 43. 
14  Concerning the challenges posed by asymmetrical warfare, cf: Heike Krieger, 
‘Deutschland im asymmetrischen Konflikt: Grenzen der Anwendung 




C. The Development of Law in Theory and Practice 
In order to scrutinise the need for and the possibilities of a development of 
IHL with regard to areas of limited statehood, in particular two topical 
subjects were discussed in this volume. First, it was debated whether IHL 
provides for a legal basis for detention in NIACs,15 and, secondly, it was 
discussed how IIL reacts to risks to investments emanating from armed 
conflicts. The contributions strove to shed light on these practical legal 
issues in a manner that is also historically and theoretically informed. 
I. Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
IHL does not provide for an express authorisation for detention in NIACs. 
Seemingly unimpressed by this state of affairs, in practice, detention in 
NIACs is commonplace.16 How IHL deals with that phenomenon is 
therefore of considerable importance and was the subject of various 
contributions. Must and can existing rules and principles be legitimately 
developed through interpretation? Do new rules have to be created de lege 
ferenda or is the law as it stands adequate? Does international law authorise 
detention or do States have to enact domestic legislation for that purpose in 
order to comply with the requirement for a legal basis imposed by IHRL? 
Do non-State actors enjoy the authority to detain? 
What is to be done if a legal rule seems normatively necessary, but, at 
first glance at least, no relevant legal material can be located, is a general 
question of legal theory that is of particular importance for IHL. Often, such 
a situation is framed as the existence of a normative gap and it is suggested 
____________________ 
Weingärtner (ed), Die Bundeswehr als Armee im Einsatz: Entwicklungen im 
nationalen und internationalen Recht (Nomos 2010) 39, 59. 
15  For an overview of the issue, see: Marco Sassòli, ‘Internment’ in Frauke 
Lachenmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), The Law of Armed Conflict and the 
Use of Force (OUP 2017) 568, 574-75, paras 25-30. 
16  Geneva Academy (ed), Reactions to Norms: Armed Groups and the Protection 
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that there is a need to fill it.17 In addition to explicit analogies,18 highly 
indeterminate treaty provisions like the Martens Clause in Art. 1 (2) AP I,19 
and general concepts or principles such as military necessity20 may play a 
role in addressing such situations.21  
Constructing a legal basis for detention in NIACs through existing treaty 
law, customary law or general principles appears to be far from easy. The 
existence of such a legal basis has been debated intensively in recent times. 
____________________ 
17  Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Gaps, the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the 
Structure of International Legal Argument between Theory and Practice, (2009) 
80 BYIL 333, 354 et seq; Ulrich Fastenrath, Lücken im Völkerrecht (Duncker 
Humblot 1991) 15 et seq. 
18  See Kevin J. Heller, ‘The Use and Abuse of Analogy in IHL’ in Jens D. Ohlin, 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 232 
(hereafter Heller, ‘Use and Abuse of Analogy’). 
19  See Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower? 
Lotus, Permission and Restrictions within International Humanitarian Law’ in 
this volume 59 (hereafter Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming 
Flowe?’). 
20  Arguing in favour of the principle as an independent constraint on military 
activities: ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 2009), 78-82 
(hereafter ICRC, Direct Participation); Etienne Henry, Le Principe de nécessité 
militaire: Histoire et actualité d’une norme fondamentale du droit international 
humanitaire (Pedone 2016), 623-80 (hereafter Henry, Nécessité militaire); for 
critique, see: W. Hays Parks, ‘Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect’ (2010) 42 
JILP 769, 829 (hereafter Parks, ‘No Mandate’); in turn, for a defence see: Nils 
Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A 
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion 
of Direct Participation in Hostilities’, (2010) 42 JILP 831, 892 et seq (hereinafter 
Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance’). 
21  See Schöberl and Mührel, ‘Sunken Vessel or Blooming Flower’ (n 19), who find 
insufficient support for military necessity as an independent principle, but 
consider the Martens Clause to provide that something which is not explicitly 




In contrast to some scholars,22 but also States23 and the ICRC,24 Manuel 
Brunner, Vincent Widdig, and Matthias Lippold25 – whose contribution 
unfortunately is not a part of this volume –26, found that the most persuasive 
arguments speak in favour of the conclusion that IHL currently does not 
authorise detention in NIACs.27 Katja Schöberl and Linus Mührel found 
this to be the currently prevailing view in international legal discourse. 
For States and international organisations that are bound to human rights 
requiring a legal basis, this finding (only) leads to the need for them to 
create a legal basis. This basis can either be found in their domestic law, or 
– as Matthias Lippold considered,28 in accordance with the UK Supreme 
____________________ 
22  See most recently: Daragh Murray, ‘Non-State Armed Groups, Detention 
Authority in Non-International Armed Conflict, and the Coherence of 
International Law: Searching for a Way Forward’ (2017) 30 LJIL 435, 446-49 
(hereafter Murray, ‘Detention in NIAC’). 
23  For the Obama Administration’s position, which derives authority to detain, 
inter alia, from CA 3, see: Naz K. Modirzadeh, ‘Folk International Law: 9/11 
Lawyering and the Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human 
Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance’ in Jens D. Ohlin (ed), 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 193, 
217, fn 53 (hereafter Modirzadeh, ‘Folk International Law’); but cf Lawrence 
Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict (OUP 2016) 72 
considering US practice to be ambiguous (hereafter Hill-Cawthorne, Detention 
in NIAC). 
24  ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges (Opinion 
Paper 2014) 7-8 <https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/3223/security-deten-
tion-position-paper-icrc-11-2014.pdf> accessed 20 November 2017 (hereafter 
ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict). 
25  LLM (NYU), Doctoral Researcher at the Institute for Public International and 
European Law of the Georg-August-University Göttingen. 
26  See Matthias Lippold, ‘Between Humanization and Humanitarization? 
Detention in Armed Conflicts and the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(2016) 76 ZaöRV 53, 92-93 (hereafter Lippold, ‘Between Humanization and 
Humanitarization?’). 
27  See in the same vein: Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in NIAC (n 23) 71 et seq, while 
taking into account the UK Government’s recent expression of opinio juris in 
the case of Serdar Mohammed. 
28  See on this: Lippold, ‘Between Humanization and Humanitarization?’ (n 26) 80, 
91 et seq. 
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Court’s judgment in Serdar Mohammed29 and the ICRC30 – in Security 
Council resolutions explicitly or implicitly authorising detention. Further 
specifications concerning the conditions and limits of detention might then 
be supplied by applicable IHRL.31 Non-State actors, who are not bound by 
human rights enshrined in treaties, are thereby either left unbound, or, if 
considered bound to a customary rule prohibiting arbitrary detention,32 
unable to comply with that rule’s requirement to detain only when there is 
a legal basis.33 But binding non-State actors in some manner would seem 
desirable to further IHL’s aim of protecting the individual.34 
II. The Protection of Investment in Times of Armed Conflict 
Dorota Banaszewska – whose contribution unfortunately is not a part of this 
volume –35 drew attention to the fact that not only the relationship between 
IHL and IHRL can pose a challenge, but also the one between IHL and IIL, 
which may seem strained by the need to apply in situations of armed 
conflict. Due diligence obligations, for example under a ‘full protection and 
security’ standard, may require a State to do everything feasible to protect 
investments. A pivotal question in that regard is which role IHL should play 
in determining the protection and security owed to the investor. IHL might 
seem better suited for supplying standards appropriate to the situation of 
armed conflict, but it should not allow States to discard their IIL obligations 
at will. 
Ira Ryk-Lakhman Aharonovich complemented this analysis by shedding 
light on the categorisation of tangible investments as military objectives. 
____________________ 
29  Abd Ali Hameed Al-Waheed (Appellant) v Ministry of Defence (Respondent) and 
Serdar Mohammed (Respondent) v Ministry of Defence (Appellant) [2017] 
UKSC 2, Lord Sumption (with whom Lady Hale agrees), paras 18-30 (hereafter 
Serdar Mohammed). 
30  ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict (n 24) 8. 
31  Cf Serdar Mohammed (n 29), paras 90 et seq. 
32  On this controversy, see: Andrew Clapham, ‘Focusing on Armed Non-State 
Actors’ in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014) 766, 786 et seq (hereafter 
Clapham, ‘Focusing on Armed NSAs’); as well as the contribution by Widdig, 
‘Detention by Organised Armed Groups’ (n 1). 
33  Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in NIAC (n 23) 217-22. 
34  For a proposal, see: Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in NIAC (n 23) 225 et seq; see 
also Widdig, ‘Detention by Organised Armed Groups’ (n 1). 
35  Legal advisor working for the Council of Europe in Paris. 
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Dual-use and revenue-generating targets proved to be the most contentious. 
The due diligence duty imposed by IIL may at times be at odds with the 
requirements of IHL in this regard. Any norm conflict would have to be 
resolved by the lex specialis rule on a case-by-case basis. 
Charlotte Lülf analysed the protection provided by IHL in situations of 
occupation, in particular with regard to the occupations of parts of Ukraine 
in 2014 and of Iraq in 2003. Art. 43 Hague Regulations and Art. 64 GC IV 
generally require the occupying power to respect the laws of the occupied 
territory, and BITs of the occupied State may be interpreted to constitute 
such laws. Under certain conditions, the occupying power may, however, 
make necessary changes to these laws, mainly in order to safeguard its own 
security and the well-being of the population in the occupied territory. 
While the impetus of IHL can insofar be understood to be ‘conservationist’ 
– protecting the status quo as far as possible –, the exception clauses have, 
in the past, been interpreted in a manner that may qualify as very liberal, for 
example when the US initiated major changes to Iraq’s economy. 
D. The ‘Nature’ of International Humanitarian Law 
In the discussion of these practical issues, the more theoretical question 
concerning the permissive or restrictive ‘nature’ of IHL proved to be of 
considerable significance. The question whether the effect, or purpose, of 
IHL is to restrict States’ options, or to permit them to make use of additional 
ones, is frequently termed as pertaining to the ‘nature’ of IHL. It is often 
understood to have an influence on how gaps may or may not be filled. Pia 
Hesse observed that the Lotus case – the classical starting point for a 
discussion of the ‘nature’ of international law in general – might be ill-
suited for answering this question, since it rather coordinates States’ 
exercise of jurisdiction, and has no direct impact on a characterisation or 
interpretation of IHL. Like Anton O. Petrov, Katja Schöberl and Linus 
Mührel found IHL to be generally restrictive, serving to restrict States’ 
freedom in times of armed conflict. 
The terms ‘restrictive’ and ‘permissive’ themselves are relative in nature. 
The categorisation of IHL may accordingly depend on the perspective 
taken, and might therefore offer more than one answer. IHL may in fact 
both enable and restrict States’ conduct.36  
____________________ 
36  Cf Jens D. Ohlin, ‘Introduction: The Inescapble Collision’ in Jens D. Ohlin (ed), 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 1, 1. 
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IHL and the institutional practice surrounding it can be understood as 
governance. According to the definition developed in the SFB, governance 
denotes ‘institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and 
implement collectively binding rules, and/or to provide collective goods’.37 
The contributions of this volume have shown that IHL’s governance 
function, the social coordination that IHL is meant to make possible and the 
collective good modern IHL is meant to provide, serves two purposes.  
On the one hand, by producing and implementing binding rules, IHL 
seeks to provide security to individuals, combatants and civilians alike – but 
of course to different degrees. It aims to protect them from the consequences 
of armed conflict that are not militarily necessary.38 This is the humanitarian 
aspect of IHL, which is clearly reflected in its historical origins.39 
On the other hand, bearing in mind that IHL allows for encroaching on 
individuals’ interests in ways otherwise inconceivable under IHRL,40 its 
function can also be understood as enabling States’ armed forces to conduct 
warfare in an effective manner.41 The legal prohibition of Art. 2 (4) UN-
Charter embodies the aspiration that inter-State war should not break out. 
____________________ 
37  Tanja Börzel et al, ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Conceptual 
Clarifications and Major Contributions of the Handbook’ in Tanja Börzel et al 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood (OUP 2018) 
6.  
38  For the shift of the purpose of the laws of war from honour and chivalry to 
humanitarian concerns, see: Robert Kolb, ‘The Protection of the Individual in 
Times of War and Peace’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2014) 317 at 321 et 
seq (hereafter Kolb, ‘Protection of the Individual’); compare Silja Vöneky, 
‘Francis Lieber (1798 – 1872)’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2014) 1137, 1139-
40, who would already ascribe it to Lieber; for an even later date (after AP I and 
in the 1990s), see Amanda Alexander, ‘A Short History of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2015) 26 EJIL 109 (hereafter Alexander, ‘Short History of 
IHL’). 
39  See eg Frits Karlshoven, ‘History of international humanitarian law treaty-
making’ in Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack (eds), Routledge Handbook of the 
Law of Armed Conflict (Routledge 2016) 33, 34 et seq. 
40  For example, collateral damage under Art. 57 (5) (b) AP I. 
41  Cf Raphael Schäfer’s contribution for the war-legitimising effect of IHL; also 
concerning the disciplinary effect of IHL: Eyal Benvenisti and Amichai Cohen, 
‘War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of the Laws of War From a Principal-




Likewise, the domestic law of States prohibits internal strife.42 IHL 
embodies the realisation that peace may collapse despite our best efforts at 
preserving it. 
The jus in bello thus cannot become a jus contra bellum by rendering the 
conduct of hostilities impossible. Once an armed conflict exists, IHL allows 
States to fight it effectively to a degree that would not be possible under 
IHRL, but that is limited nonetheless. To speak in Lotus terms, restrictions 
on States’ sovereign independence, which is in itself a principle of 
international law,43 are not presumed, but based on the positive provisions 
of IHRL.44 IHL in turn offers States greater freedom to wage war. Non-
State actors have so far not been understood as beneficiaries of that 
function. 
E. How to Approach Non-State Actors 
Since the involvement of non-State actors forms a significant part of 
modern armed conflict, particularly in areas of limited statehood, IHL needs 
to respond and maybe adapt to this situation.45 To this end, two aspects 
should be taken into account when considering (the need for) a development 
of IHL: military necessity and capacity from non-State actors’ point of view 
(1.) as well as their self-interest in complying with IHL. The latter can be 
engaged by creating incentives for compliance by non-State actors as 
groups (2.) and by individual fighters (3.). 
____________________ 
42  A jus contra bellum internum does not exist (yet) as a distinct rule of 
international law: Claus Kreß, ‘Review Essay on Emily Crawford, The 
Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed 
Conflict/Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law/Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force 
against Non-State Actors/Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict’ (2012) 83 BYIL 145, 159. 
43  Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL, vol. IX 
(OUP 2012) 366, 378 et seq, paras 85-89, 114-17. 
44  Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in NIAC (n 23) 66-67; Heller, ‘Use and Abuse of 
Analogy’ (n 18) 285. 
45  Murray, ‘Detention in NIAC’ (n 22) 456. 
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I. Take into Account their Situation, in Particular their Military Necessities 
As with States’ armed forces, rules that seek to attract compliance by non-
State actors must also take into account the non-State actors’ situation; in 
particular, their capacity to comply with certain rules.46 This may mean 
taking into account the resources available to a specific non-State actor,47 
but also military necessity seen from the non-State actor’s point of view. 
An example from the law of IAC may illustrate this: interpreting a rule like 
Article 4 A (2) GC III so as to require an irregular fighter (belonging to an 
IAC party) to be exceedingly easy to spot from afar will certainly not attract 
compliance, as it does not sufficiently take into account the operational 
pressures exerted on this specific aspect of warfare.48 This was recognised 
in Art. 44 AP I, which, ‘owing to the nature of the hostilities’, adjusts the 
obligation and requires only to openly carry one’s arms.49 IHL likewise 
does not require non-State actors to wear a uniform.50 
Similarly, as noted by Vincent Widdig, the lack of a basis for non-State 
actors to detain might have adverse consequences for individuals, 
combatants and civilians alike, who might not be captured, but killed or 
treated inhumanely.51 By giving non-State actors no practical choice but to 
violate the law, IHL loses relevance to them.52 This is mirrored by the 
emphasis IIL puts on due diligence obligations for States in armed conflict, 
which acknowledges that even the capacity of States to ensure certain 
results can be limited.  
____________________ 
46  Anton Petrov, ‘Non-State Actors and Law of Armed Conflict Revisited: 
Enforcing International Law through Domestic Engagement’ (2014) 19 JCSL 
279, 281, 293-94 (hereafter Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’). 
47  Cf Art. 5 AP II: ‘within the limits of their capabilities’; Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (OUP 2012) 295-96 (hereafter 
Sivakumaran, Law of NIAC). 
48  For such an interpretation in the British Military Manual of 1958, see: Emily 
Crawford, ‘From Inter-state and Symmetric to Intra-state and Asymmetric: 
Changing Methods of Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict in the 100 Years 
Since World War One’ (2014) 17 YbIHL 95, 104-6 (hereafter Crawford, ‘LOAC 
since WWI’). 
49  Ibid. 
50  Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 290, 292-93. 
51  Cf Murray, ‘Detention in NIAC’ (n 22) 450-451; Anthea Roberts and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the 
Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 38 Yale J. Int’l L. 107. 




Finally, in terms of capacity, it should not be forgotten that knowledge 
of the law is a precondition for compliance.53 Providing training in IHL for 
non-State actors, as done by the ICRC and Geneva Call,54 is therefore of 
considerable importance. 
Taking into account such considerations, of course, does not mean that 
they will prevail in determining what the law provides for or ought to 
provide for.55 Taking into account the military necessities of parties to the 
conflict must not lead to an unreflected race to the point where ‘anything 
goes’. A case in point is the temptation to compensate military inferiority 
by actions violating IHL that exploit the other side’s adherence to this body 
of law, which may at times be observed in some non-State actors.56 Taking 
operational needs into account cannot mean a return to the doctrine of 
Kriegsraison, which allows for any and all action required by military 
necessity. 
As many rules of modern IHL show, military necessity is and will remain 
an important aspect of the law of armed conflict, but so will humanitarian 
concerns. Being too ‘responsive’ to the needs of non-State actors in 
particular might dilute established standards without actually improving 
compliance,57 and might thus also damage IHL’s legitimacy. For example, 
a group’s capacity to control the actions of its fighters might often be 
problematic in practice.58 But this cannot absolve the group and its leaders 
from responsibility for crimes committed, or lower legal standards. After 
all, asymmetry has always been a hallmark of NIAC.59 
Likewise, when considering taking into account non-State actor views 
and practices, it should not be forgotten that, especially in areas of limited 
statehood, non-State actors may thrive which endanger human rights. They 
____________________ 
53  Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 281. 
54  For the ICRC see: Steven R. Ratner, ‘Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The 
Red Cross, Persuasion, and the Laws of War’ (2011) 22 EJIL 459. 
55  Cf Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘How to Improve upon the Faulty Legal Regime of 
Internal Armed Conflict’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The Future 
of International Law (OUP 2012) 525, 534. 
56  Crawford, ‘LOAC since WWI’ (n 48) 108-9; Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 
289-90; Robin Geiß, ‘Asymmetric conflict structures’ (2006) 88 IRRC 757, 758. 
57  Cf James T. Johnson, ‘The Ethics of Insurgency’ (2017) 31 Ethics & 
International Affairs 367, 381-82 (hereafter Johnson, ‘The Ethics of 
Insurgency’); Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 303. 
58  Johnson, ‘The Ethics of Insurgency’ (n 57) 372; Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, 
Non-State Actors Rise?’ (n 2) 509. 
59  Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 290. 
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may fill a governance gap left by the territorial State and disregard well-
established human rights standards or turn against other States and their 
populations – effective governance by actors willing and able is a vital 
precondition for human rights protection after all.60 
II. Create Incentives for the Non-State Actor as a Group 
Historically and in addition to general humanitarian motives, a principal 
reason for the development of and compliance with IHL has been self-
interest.61 Reciprocity, the mutual abstention from violations which benefits 
both sides’ protected persons, has long been recognised as one of the driving 
forces behind compliance.62 Not alienating the enemy more than necessary 
to ensure a more sustainable peace, better operational effectiveness, or 
simply an interest in not destroying more than necessary the spoils of war, 
have proven to be other factors of self-interest of warring parties which lead 
to better protection for the individual.63 In addition to such self-interest, 
which still serves as a meaningful rationale to justify IHL,64 IHL may by 
____________________ 
60  Cf John C. Dehn, ‘Whither International Martial Law? Human Rights as Sword 
and Shield in Ineffectively Governed Territory’ in Jens D. Ohlin (ed), 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 315, 
315, 340-42, 347. 
61  However, it should be noted that self-interest can only be one factor in 
explaining States’ and other entities’ decision-making processes, cf: Andrea 
Bianchi, ‘Law, Time, and Change: The Self-Regulatory Function of Subsequent 
Practice’ in Georg Nolte (ed), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (OUP 2013) 
133, 137; Thomas Forster, ‘International humanitarian law’s old questions and 
new perspectives: On what law has got to do with armed conflict’ (2017) 98 
IRRC 995 (hereafter: Forster, ‘IHL’s old questions and new perspectives’). 
62  For this, as well as the separate legal question of belligerent reprisals, see: Shane 
Darcy, ‘Reciprocity and reprisals’ in Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict (Routledge 2016) 492, 492 
et seq; Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 285-86, 304-5; see generally: Bruno 
Simma, ‘Reciprocity’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL, vol. XIII (OUP 2012) 
651. 
63  Kolb, ‘Protection of the Individual’ (n 38) 322. 
64  Morten Bergsmo and Tianying Song, ‘Ensuring Accountability for Core 
International Crimes in Armed Forces: Obligations and Self-Interest’ in Morten 
Bergsmo and Tianying Song (eds), Military Self-Interest in Accountability for 
Core International Crimes (Torkel Opsahl 2015) 1, 14 et seq, enumerating in a 




now be so entrenched in States’ militaries as to be effective qua 
internalisation.65 For many non-State actors, compliance cannot be 
expected in that manner. 
As Lars Müller and Vincent Widdig emphasised, improving IHL’s input 
legitimacy for non-State actors by involving them in the law-making 
process in some form could be a method to encourage compliance.66 This 
has been actively pursued by the NGO Geneva Call, which has successfully 
been engaging with non-State actors, encouraging them to sign ‘Deeds of 
Commitment’ to IHL, providing support to comply with them, and 
monitoring compliance.67 Here, just like with States, self-interest can 
further compliance with IHL.68 Recently, the Brussels Court of Appeal took 
note of the Deed of Commitment signed by the PKK and their intent to 
abide by IHL; this happened in the context of determining whether the 
group had the necessary degree of organisation to be a party to a NIAC in 
the sense of the Tadic test, and, thus, not count as ‘terrorists’ under Belgian 
domestic law.69 Shared self-interest might also be used to conclude ‘special 
agreements’ in the sense of CA 3 between States and non-State actors that 
clarify and reinforce the applicable legal framework.70 
By committing to the observance of IHL in one form or another, non-
State actors may seek to benefit from others’ reciprocal commitments – for 
example, if connected to a certain population that is in its interest to 
protect – or, just like States, they might seek political legitimacy and 
____________________ 
counter-insurgency and peace-building, internal morale, order and discipline, 
i.e. operational effectiveness. See the other contributions in that volume, too. 
65  Cf eg Harold H. Koh, ‘Internalization Through Socialization’ (2004-2005) 54 
Duke Law Journal 975; Forster, ‘IHL’s old questions and new perspectives’ (n 
61). 
66  Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, Non-State Actors Rise?’ (n 2) 531-34; Crawford, 
‘LOAC since WWI’ (n 48) 114; Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 298 et seq; 
cf Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors and the Formation of International 
Customary Law: Unlearning Some Common Tropes’ in Iain Scobbie and Sufyan 
Droubi (eds), Non-State Actors and the Formation of Customary International 
Law (Manchester University Press 2018, forthcoming) (hereafter d’Aspremont, 
‘Non-State Actors and the Formation of International Customary Law’). 
67  Clapham, ‘Focusing on Armed NSAs’ (n 32) 802-5; Sivakumaran, Law of NIAC 
(n 47) 107 et seq (on their legal nature) and 538-41 (on Geneva Call in 
particular); see also the contribution by Vincent Widdig in this volume 124. 
68  Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, Non-State Actors Rise?’ (n 2) 520-31. 
69  Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, Arrêt à charge de X et al, No. 2017/2911 
(14 September 2017). 
70  Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 298, 312. 
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operational effectiveness by complying with IHL.71 In this context, 
symbolic validation is an important feature. Deeds of Commitment, signed 
in Geneva City Hall’s Alabama Hall (where the First GC was signed in 
1864), and with the Government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva 
acting as custodian of the Deeds, might do more to improve a group’s 
compliance with IHL than a direct change in the law-making process, which 
States are bound to vigorously oppose in any case.72  
Nonetheless, exploring the practice of non-State actors in armed conflict, 
to a certain extent mirroring the ICRC customary law study, might be a 
worthwhile endeavour.73 Besides the already mentioned risk of hereby 
diluting IHL standards,74 it remains to be seen if one non-State actor would 
feel bound to the practice of another.75 
III. Create Incentives for Individual Fighters 
Another important idea to improve compliance by non-State actors is to 
grant their fighters some form of immunity for their participation in the 
hostilities equivalent to combatant immunity.76 However, the gains in 
compliance that may be achieved from this might be more than offset by 
____________________ 
71  Krieger, ‘Where States Fail, Non-State Actors Rise?’ (n 2); Clapham, ‘Focusing 
on Armed NSAs’ (n 32) 803-4; see also: David Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and warfare’ 
in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion 
to International Law (CUP 2012) 158, 162-64, 179-80. 
72  See for this process established by Geneva Call: Geneva Call, Engaging Armed 
Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: The Geneva Call Progress Report (2000-
2007) (Geneva Call 2007) <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/100311/gc-progress-
report-07.pdf> accessed 20 November 2017.  
73  Annyssa Bellal, From Words to Deeds: Exploring the Practice of Armed Non-
State Actors and its Impact on the Implementation of International Law, Geneva 
Academy Project in partnership with Geneva Call, <https://www.geneva-acad-
emy.ch/our-projects/our-projects/detail/55-from-words-to-deeds-exploring-the-
practice-of-armed-non-state-actors-and-its-impact-on-the-implementation-of-
international-law> accessed 20 November 2017. 
74  Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 305-6. 
75  Ibid, 303, 308. In favour of customary law created by and for non-State actors, 
see d’Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors and the Formation of International 
Customary Law’ (n 66). 
76  Cf Sivakumaran, Law of NIAC (n 47) 514-20; Emily Crawford, The Treatment 
of Combatants and Insurgents Under the Law of Armed Conflict (OUP 2010) 




the loss in incentive not to take up arms in the first place.77 In any case, a 
customary rule granting combatant immunity to fighters of well-organised 
armed groups complying with IHL certainly does not exist yet.78 When 
considering granting non-State actors’ fighters such immunity to improve 
compliance with IHL, it may be a separate issue whether this immunity 
should be extended to the leadership. Similar to a prosecution for the crime 
of aggression for a serious violation of the prohibition of using inter-State 
force,79 it could – depending on the particular circumstances – be advisable 
to retain the possibility to sanction the persons primarily responsible for 
breaking the internal peace of a State.80 Under the law as it stands, amnesties 
are a policy choice that States can and should consider.81 Art. 6 (5) AP II 
encourages States to grant amnesties, as should the toll the civilian 
population is likely to bear if the conflict continues, because there is no 
incentive for non-State actors to stop it82. Considering compliance with IHL 
as a mitigating factor in treason charges might be another option.83 
The peace process in Columbia, which at the time of writing is still 
ongoing, is an example of amnesties being part of a settlement.84 But, it also 
highlights that many details need to be worked out for such amnesties to be 
____________________ 
77  Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 310 et seq; Claus Kress, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg und 
das Völkerrecht: Zwei Entwicklungslinien und eine Zukunftsfrage‘ (2014) 69 
JZ 365, 370 (hereafter Kress, ‘Bürgerkrieg und Völkerrecht’). 
78  Considering it to be in statu nascendi: Antonio Cassese, ‘Should Rebels be 
Treated as Criminals? Some Modest Proposals for Rendering Internal Armed 
Conflicts Less Inhumane’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The 
Future of International Law (OUP 2012) 519, 523-24 (hereafter Cassese, 
‘Rebels as Criminals?’). 
79  Art. 8 bis ICC-Statute. 
80  For the discussion of a very restricted right to resistance in the case of the worst 
human rights violations, see: Kress, ‘Bürgerkrieg und Völkerrecht’ (n 77) 371. 
81  See in detail, including doubts regarding the effectiveness of amnesties as an 
incentive for compliance with IHL, Petrov, ‘NSAs and LOAC’ (n 46) 305; 
Frédéric Mégret, ‘Should Rebels Be Amnestied?’ in Carsten Stahn et al (eds), 
Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (OUP 2014) 519, 539-
40. 
82  See Wood, ‘Understanding strategic motives for violence’ (n 9) 41-43. 
83  Kolb, Ius in Bello (n 6) 495. 
84  ‘Columbia: President Santos grants Farc members amnesty’ BBC (11 July 2017) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40564577> accessed 30 
November 2017. 
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perceived as legitimate.85 Grave breaches of IHL certainly constitute a legal 
red line. 
F. States, Courts, Scholars and the Development of International 
Humanitarian Law 
Both, detention and the protection of investment in armed conflicts, are far 
from being abstract academic subjects. Dorota Banaszewska’s, Charlotte 
Lülf’s and Ira Ryk-Lakhman Aharonovitch’s contributions showed this 
concerning the topic of investment protection. Hannah Dönges’86 
contribution, which unfortunately could not become a part of this volume, 
exemplified this most clearly for the subject of detention: even 
peacekeeping operations detain persons who can be directly affected by the 
legal constraints, or a lack thereof. The reality on the ground tends to spawn 
challenges that had not been conceived of when the rules were initially 
devised. The attempt to establish a detention regime that conforms to rule-
of-law standards can meet severe difficulties in practice. However, such 
challenges may also exert pressure on the law and relevant actors to step up 
to the occasion and develop a framework which allows for reasonable 
solutions to the practical problems that arise. 
As Raphael Schäfer found in his contribution, legal development, in 
particular changes in the laws of armed conflict, has generally been gradual 
and evolutionary in the past, not abrupt and revolutionary. While in some 
instances, States have proactively regulated warfare – the treaty 
prohibitions of asphyxiating or deleterious gases87 and the prohibition of 
laser weapons88 seem to be the only examples so far –, most changes in IHL 
____________________ 
85  Alexandra V. Huneeus and Rene Uruena, ‘Introduction to Symposium on the 
Columbian Peace Talks and International Law (November 3, 2016)’ (2016) 110 
AJIL Unbound 161. 
86  Doctoral Researcher at the Centre on Conflict, Development & Peacebuilding 
(Graduate Institute Geneva) and a PhD Candidate in International 
Relations/Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies. 
87  Declaration concerning the prohibition of the use of projectiles with the sole 
object to spread asphyxiating poisonous gases 1899 and Art. 23 lit. a HR, which 
of course were woefully ineffective in WWI and also fraught with some 
interpretative uncertainty: Thilo Marauhn, ‘The Prohibition to Use Chemical 
Weapons’ (2014) 17 YbIHL 25, 28 et seq. 




have been reactive, attempting to adapt the law to ‘the new realities of 
warfare’.89 
Since 9/11, many proposed adaptations to the restrictions imposed on 
States by IHL as well as IHRL, have aimed at granting States greater 
freedom to meet new challenges.90 As noted above, legitimate 
interpretations need to take into account all legally relevant reasons, 
including the will and practice of States. Overemphasising deference to 
States, though, may in certain situations lead to the creation of mere ‘folk 
international humanitarian law’, i.e. ‘a set of concepts spoken and 
interpreted by a broad range of actors to provide a loose moral restraint on 
the organized use of lethal force’.91 The approach of US administrations to 
IHL since 9/11 at least in part seems to resemble such a categorisation. As 
Charlotte Lülf notes in her contribution, in addition to international courts 
and tribunals, as far as they have jurisdiction, the responsibility to 
effectively hold States to reasonable interpretations of their competences 
and obligations under IHL falls first and foremost to other States in the 
international community, which should choose not to recognise excessive 
claims. The work of scholars may likewise play a role in this discourse.  
If the discourse on how to interpret and apply IHL were left solely to 
military institutions, the demands of military necessity would likely be 
given too much weight at times.92 While auto-interpretation by States is sure 
to remain a decisive part of IHL in the near future, the contestation of their 
____________________ 
89  Crawford, ‘LOAC since WWI’ (n 48) 106; Robin Geiß and Andreas 
Zimmermann, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross: A Unique Actor 
in the Field of International Humanitarian Law Creation and Progressive 
Development’ in Robin Geiß et al (eds), Humanizing the Laws of War: The Red 
Cross and the Development of International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2017) 
215, 226-27 (hereafter Geiß and Zimmermann, ‘The ICRC: A Unique Actor’). 
90  Modirzadeh, ‘Folk International Law’ (n 23) 196 et seq. 
91  Ibid, 224. 
92  Cf Robert Cryer, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross’ “Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities”: See a Little Light’ 
in Robin Geiß et al (eds), Humanizing the Laws of War: The Red Cross and the 
Development of International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2017) 113, 135-36 
(hereafter Cryer, ‘ICRC and Direct Participation’); Chris af Jochnick and Roger 
Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of 
War’ (1994) 35 Harv. Int’l L. J. 49, 74; Raphael Schäfer, ‘Anwendung 
humanitärvölkerrechtlicher Normen in asymmetrischen Konflikten: Extensive 
Auslegung oder “Lawfare”-Methode?’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 23 December 2015) 
<http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/anwendung-humanitarvolkerrechtlicher-normen-
in-asymmetrischen-konflikten/> accessed 20 November 2017. 
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interpretations by other States and scholars is likewise an important feature 
of international law as a decentralised legal order.93 Indeed, interpretations 
advanced by scholars can contribute to adapting established IHL rules to 
specific situations;94 the issuance of expert manuals that seek to restate the 
lex lata for the contingencies of naval, air, cyber, and soon, space warfare,95 
or the ICRC’s customary law study,96 speak to the relevance attached to 
such an enterprise. 
The exact requirements of the law will, of course, remain subject to 
controversial debate in many cases. But it is certainly advisable to adhere 
to the methodological standards established in international law; even 
though, their nature and requirements may in themselves be subject to 
controversy. One should avoid the urge to fill perceived lacunae in the law 
using a methodology that could be wielded too freely, since in different 
hands it might produce vastly diverging results.97 For example, the use of 
analogy, a methodological device well-known to many domestic legal 
orders, is rarely advanced or accepted in international law as an argument. 
Most recently, its post-9/11 use to seek an expansion of the legal options of 
____________________ 
93  Alexander, ‘Short History of IHL’ (n 38) 130 et seq, and in particular 136-37; cf 
Anton Petrov, ‘Lawfare? We need the states to interpret international 
humanitarian law’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 28 December 2015) <http://voelker-
rechtsblog.org/lawfare-we-need-the-states-to-interpret-international-
humanitarian-law/> accessed 20 November 2017. 
94  Crawford, ‘LOAC since WWI’ (n 48) 113. 
95  Louise Doswald-Beck (ed), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable 
to Armed Conflict at Sea (CUP 1994); Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research (HPCR), Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile 
Warfare (CUP 2013); Michael N. Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013); Michael N. Schmitt 
(ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (CUP 2017); the forthcoming Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS), for further 
information see: <https://www.mcgill.ca/milamos/> accessed 20 November 
2017. 
96  For its impact, and the function of custom to adapt to new challenges, see: Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Customary International Law’ in Robin Geiß et al (eds), Humanizing the Laws 
of War: The Red Cross and the Development of International Humanitarian Law 
(CUP 2017) 83, 92, 96 et seq (Henckaerts, ‘ICRC and Custom’). 




the US in its ‘War on Terror’, also as regards detention in NIACs, showed 
clearly the potential implications of such a development.98  
Since questions of methodology are always questions of competence, 
anyone interpreting and applying IHL must take into account his or her 
position in the law-making process. An interpretation too detached from the 
interpretative constraints of State will and practice might be rejected in 
practice. The resistance to the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law advanced 
by the ICRC in 200999 and even its customary law study100 is a case in point. 
Regarding the latter, the theoretical question of what counts as State 
practice and opinio juris, and how such material should be evaluated formed 
a decisive part of the critique by States and scholars.101  
It has also been noted that interpreters should be wary of too uncritically 
equating an expansion of the law with progress.102 Scholarly attempts at 
____________________ 
98  Heller, ‘Use and Abuse of Analogy’ (n 18) 234, 275 et seq, rejecting such 
analogies as unlawful under international law. 
99  ICRC, Direct Participation (n 20); Kenneth Watkin, ‘Opportunity Lost: 
Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
Interpretive Guidance’ (2010) 42 JILP 641, 693-94: ‘… certainly not a re-
statement of existing law … does not reflect either the nature of warfare or the 
historical and contemporary scope of armed conflict … bias against State armed 
forces …’; Parks, ‘No Mandate (n 20). For a defence, see: Melzer, ‘Keeping the 
Balance’ (n 20). 
100  Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, vol. I: Rules (CUP 2005). 
101  See ‘Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept of State, and 
William J. Haynes, General Counsel, U.S. Depart. of Defense, to Dr. Jacob 
Kellenberger, President, International Committee of the Red Cross, Regarding 
Customary International Law Study, November 3, 2006’ reprinted in (2007) 46 
ILM 514, 515-16, calling for a ‘more rigorous’ approach to the ascertainment of 
State practice and opinio juris; confirmed in Department of Defense, Law of War 
Manual (2015) 1075; likewise Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Methodological 
framework of the Study’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(CUP 2007) 3, 4 et seq; Iain Scobbie, ‘The approach to customary international 
law in the Study’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), Perspectives 
on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2007) 
15, 27: ‘less stringent [than the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case]’. 
102  See, maybe somewhat too critical in his appraisal of International Criminal Law: 
Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Two Cultures of International Criminal Law’ in Kevin 
J. Heller et al (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law (OUP 
2018, forthcoming), Working Paper available <https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2910295> accessed 20 November 2017. 
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‘pushing’ for certain rules to rapidly become accepted as custom despite 
clear resistance by States103 seem unlikely to be successful. However, 
clinging to a very restrictive interpretation of States’ will in spite of a 
glaring need to interpret the law in a manner that allows for resolving issues 
that arise in practice might similarly delegitimise the law. Legitimate 
interpretations that provide reasonable solutions to legal problems require 
taking into account all interpretative aspects provided for in the VCLT, such 
as a rule’s object and purpose, its effectiveness and systematic 
considerations. However, legal practice shows that certain marks of 
authority may compensate for a lack of adherence to the rules of 
interpretation reflected in the VCLT. For example, the Pictet Commentaries 
to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, written a decade prior to the adoption 
of the VCLT, emphasized subjective aspects of interpretation rather than 
objective ones, i.e. they relied heavily on the travaux préparatoires and the 
circumstances of the treaties’ conclusion (the ‘spirit of the time’). 
Nevertheless, the commentaries were widely taken into account in legal 
practice by reference to their authority104 and established a basis for many 
concepts which are widely accepted today in IHL as well as in international 
criminal law.105  
When reflecting on their profession, and in particular when attempting to 
apply indeterminate legal concepts to the challenges of contemporary times, 
lawyers should bear in mind not only their own role in the law-making 
process, but also the purpose and limits of the law they interpret. The 
increased input-legitimacy of being mandated to study State practice or 
____________________ 
103  Explicitly so, envisioning to recruit the ICRC and the UN GA as ‘midwives’, 
Cassese, ‘Rebels as Criminals?’ (n 78) 524. 
104  See eg Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al (Judgment Volume 4 of 4) IT-05-87-T (26 
February 2009) Annex B; Prosecutor v Stanisic and Zupljanin (Judgment 
Volume 3 of 3) IT-08-91-T (27 March 2013) Annex III; Prosecutor v 
Hadzihasanovic et al (Decision on interlocutory appeal challenging jurisdiction 
in relation to command responsibility) IT-01-47-AR72 (16 July 2003) para 15; 
Prosecutor v Tadic (Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 93; Joint Separate 
Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, 
63, para 31. 
105  For further reading, see Linus Mührel, ‘Die Kommentare des Internationalen 
Komitees vom Roten Kreuz, ihre Autorität und ihr Einfluss auf die Entwicklung 
des humanitären Völkerrechts im Wandel der Zeit’ in Sebastian Wuschka et al 




interpret the law – enjoyed to some degree by the ICRC –106 increases the 
significance that a contribution might have in legal discourse, but is 
certainly not determinative of it.107 States may yet reject its 
interpretations.108 While certainly not free to devise new solutions from 
scratch – unless labelled de lege ferenda –, interpreters cannot be restricted 
to only that which has already been thought. If that were the case, no 
development save by treaty amendment or compellingly clear State practice 
would be possible. It is also legal scholars’ task to devise possible solutions 
to new challenges by employing legal methodology.109 Maybe it is one of 
the enduring lessons of Lotus that, in doing so, the burden of argumentation 
rests on them. Yet, the existence of abstract terms and general clauses in 
IHL treaties, in particular the Martens Clause,110 and the existence of 
diverse aspects relevant for interpretation in the VCLT, show that the law 
is meant to regulate even situations unthought-of before, as well as respond 
to new challenges.  
Interpretive proposals de lege lata as well as proposals de lege ferenda 
which aim to adapt the law to new challenges, must take into account not 
only humanitarian concerns, but also the demands of effective warfare if 
they seek to make an impact.111 This also includes the need for obtaining as 
____________________ 
106  See in general: Geiß and Zimmermann, ‘The ICRC: A Unique Actor’ (n 89) 215; 
Kelisiana Thynne ‘The role of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ in 
Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Law of 
Armed Conflict (Routledge 2016) 477, 481, 486-90; for the customary law study: 
Henckaerts, ‘ICRC and Custom’ (n 96) 96 et seq. 
107  For the critical reactions to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct 
Participation, see: Cryer, ‘ICRC and Direct Participation’ (n 92) 132 et seq. 
108  Geiß and Zimmermann, ‘The ICRC: A Unique Actor’ (n 89) 237. 
109  See Anne Peters, ‘The Rise and Decline of the International Rule of Law and 
the Job of Scholars’ in Heike Krieger et al (eds), The International Rule of Law: 
Rise or Decline? (forthcoming), Working Paper available <https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=3029462> accessed 20 November 2017. 
110  Cf Kolb, Ius in Bello (n 6) 122-26. 
111  Most clearly: Geoffrey S. Corn et. al, ‘Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity 
of a Least Harmful Means Rule’ (2013) 89 International Law Studies 536, 541: 
‘… LOAC must, as it has historically, remain rationally grounded in the realities 
of warfare’, and in concreto 610 et seq; see also on this Cryer, ‘ICRC and Direct 
Participation’ (n 92) 132 et seq; Jochnick and Normand, ‘The Legitimation of 
Violence’ (n 92) 83-84, although in concreto too critical of the practicality of 
the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, for whose (partly) customary law status 
see: Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Air Warfare’ in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP 
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much legal certainty as possible. Members of armed forces, who manage 
high levels of factual uncertainty in fulfilling their tasks,112 have a keen 
interest in knowing precisely what the law requires from them so as not to 
become liable to disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution.113 
Considering the dynamic nature of warfare, military personnel applying the 
law will often, and legitimately so, enjoy discretion in making bona fide 
decisions on the ground.114 These are structural cornerstones of IHL that 
cannot be spirited away: IHL is not only intended to protect the individual, 
but also to enable States to wage armed conflicts effectively. Any 
expectations that IHL will abolish suffering completely and at the same time 
attract perfect compliance will necessarily be disappointed. But attempts to 
interpret IHL in a manner that would unreasonably relax existing 
restrictions on warfare to the detriment of the protection of individuals 
should likewise be disappointed. 
During the first conference of the SFB Project C8 in 2011, Robert 
Cryer115 aptly described this state of affairs and the sometimes seemingly 
excessive expectations towards IHL in the following manner: ‘International 
Law isn’t Mommy. It’s not going to make everything all right’. But the 
aspiration that the law can make a contribution, and lead to reasonable 
solutions legitimately adapted to new challenges, should not be 
abandoned.116 It is our hope that this volume makes a small contribution to 
that endeavour.
____________________ 
112  See eg Barry R. Posen, ‘Foreword: Military doctrine and the management of 
uncertainty’, 39 (2016) Journal of Strategic Studies 159. 
113  Amichai Cohen, ‘Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces’ 
(2011) 26 Connecticut Journal of International Law 367, 384; Jeremy J. Marsh 
and Scott L. Glabe, ‘Time for the United States to Directly Participate’ (2011) 1 
VJIL 13. 
114  Cf Henry, Nécessité militaire (n 20) 686. 
115  Professor of International and Criminal Law, University of Birmingham (United 
Kingdom). 
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